

The Mexican Citizen in Transition

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*A mi familia,
por nuestros sueños.*

Thesis Summary

This research attempts to explain the effect on citizens of the move towards a more open and participatory society. Many studies have been conducted on the relationship between the Mexican citizen and the Mexican voter. Such studies have examined the differences in political values among different generations, the instability of partisan identification, and the ability of voters to anticipate economic scenarios and to make political and electoral decisions. This research attempts to answer a key question relevant to the country's development: do Mexicans internalise political and economic affairs in different ways in the context of political competitiveness and economic openness? Have Mexicans improved the way they interiorise these affairs?

The political development and economic opening of Mexico has transformed the way Mexican citizens think and act in society, the forms of participation, and the mechanisms employed to evaluate various policy alternatives; these developments have generated different decisions in the political and electoral field. In this sense, this doctoral research examines three political attitudes that are crucial to the development of a democratic system. The first part of the research examines citizens' decisions to vote on the basis of subjective assessments of the economy and their relationship with the economic context for the period 2000 to 2009. The second investigation studies the effect of political values on non-electoral participation among several political generations in 2005. Finally, the third analysis describes the formation and the short- and long-term determinants of PID instability in Mexico's 2000 and 2006 presidential elections. Based on different empirical analyses and data sources, it is possible to argue that Mexican citizens have adjusted the way they make choices and the ways in which they participate in politics.

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1. Introduction

If we compare Mexico with countries in Central America, we might conclude that the country is doing well. However, if the comparison is made with Europe or the United States (industrialised countries), the results are less positive. Mexicans and Mexico always seek populations or countries with which they can be contrasted. Almost without exception, a comparison is made with their neighbours to the north, the United States of America.

Paz (1950) argued that Mexican society began to lose its identity even before it was attained. In this sense, he suggests that modernisation implies nationalism, and that the idea of "Mexican" does not include the concept of diversity. O'Gorman (1977) asserted that Mexicans are trying to be modern, but they also want to remain the same. This is a country that was established during the Mexican Revolution—an era of violence—and when there are armed mobilisations, the attitude toward violence is ambiguous. In addition to this, national heroes endorse the lack of a culture of legality, understanding it to be respectful for the rights of others.

In modern Mexico, at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the early nineties, discussions began about the need for a democratic transition,¹ which, in turn, gave impetus to the development of democracy. During this period, political and economic reforms changed the rules of the political and economic system. Mexicans, as

¹Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that a democratic transition is complete when the following conditions hold: 1) sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government; 2) a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote; 3) this de facto government has the authority to generate new policies; 4) the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure. Democratic consolidation occurs once democracy becomes "the only game in town" – that is, when 1) no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state; 2) even in the face of severe political and economic crises, an overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from the parameters of democratic formulas; 3) all the other actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict will be resolved according to established norms (laws, procedures and institutions) and that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly; and 4) democracy becomes routinised and deeply internalised in social, institutional and even psychological life, as well as in calculations for achieving success.

a result, have experienced a significant change in the political system, witnessing a shift from a system of hegemonic party authoritarianism (described by Vargas Llosas in 1990 as the perfect dictatorship) to a democratic system. The changes in the political regime began with the political reforms of 1977; however, this process of transformation took more than three decades. The authoritarian system, therefore, covered more than 60 years, while the democratic era has covered barely 24 years.

The country's democratic transition came in two stages. First, since the 70s, the hegemonic party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional PRI), introduced mechanisms for greater political representation and established democratic institutions. Second, since the late 80s, the economy was opened and began competing at an international level. This section presents evidence of these two major historical changes and their impact on Mexico and the Mexican citizen.

1.1. Historical Perspective

Two hundred years ago, Mexicans fought against the Spanish Empire to construct a free nation. One hundred years later, the country was governed by a dictator, who was overthrown by a society seeking political freedom and social equality. In Mexico today, little has changed. Social polarisation, the poverty of the majority, no social representation, the lack of government outcome and the low credibility of politicians and the government (Moreno, 2009; World Values Survey, 2010) are all signs that something has to change (Von Humboldt, 1966; Wilson and Silva, 2013).

1.1.1. The Independence of Mexico

At the end of the 18th century, Mexico (New Spain) experienced social, economic and political transformations. During this century, the mining industry saw important growth: for example, gold and silver production tripled from 1714 to 1805 (Dobado and Marrero,

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2011). The economic development of the Spanish colony generated a new elite class of enlightened Hispanics. The independence of Mexico took place in the face of great social polarisation, the power vacuum of the Spanish monarchy and an imbalance in the distribution of national wealth. In addition, Mexicans did not want to share their wealth, imperilling the idea of a free and independent nation (Knight, 2002).

The Mexican independence movement played a key role in the fall of the Spanish Empire. For Van Young (2001), Mexican Independence was a war of national liberation which, in turn, was an internal war pitting different ethnic groups and social classes against one another. It was a battle in two areas: one rural, in which the indigenous people sought to preserve their land, and the other urban, where elites sought to seize power from the Iberian Peninsula to construct a new nation (Anna, 1978; Florescano, 1971; Hamill, 1966).

The Spanish monarchs Charles III and Charles IV, inspired by the French Enlightenment, launched a reform process throughout their empire. The failure of these reforms, which were based on Enlightened Despotism, generated dissatisfaction among the Creole elite. The Napoleonic invasion and occupation of Spain by French troops in 1808 triggered the separatist movements in New Spain (Harvey, 2000; Lynch, 1986). This intensified political activities, creating a new political culture. The armed struggle began in 1810 and opened the door to a process of militarization that did not end until after the culmination of the independence movement (Guedea, 2000).

The difficulties that prevailed in Spain generated an opportunity to undo the Bourbon reforms (Hernández and Dávalos, 1877; Lafuente, 1941). The Bourbon reforms had stimulated new sectors of the economy; however, the benefits were not distributed in an equitable manner (Knight, 2002). The lower classes did not see major changes. At the same time, the Creole exalted nationalism as an element of identity, giving importance to

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the cultural wealth of the country and the legacy of the land of their birth. In this period Mexico experienced a social discontent: the Creoles (Americans) were born in the national territory and had liberal ideas, while the conservative Peninsulars (Europeans) were accustomed to the privileges of their dominant status (Knight, 2002; Van Young, 2001).

Viceroy José de Iturrigaray saw an opportunity to strengthen his authority, which had been limited by the collapse of the Spanish monarchy, by convening a series of meetings in an attempt to establish new political conditions. However, this initiative served to increase the differences between the Creoles and the Peninsulars (Guedea, 2000). The debate culminated in 1808 when the Peninsulars, as defenders of the imperial interests, imprisoned the Viceroy. The coup further polarised the positions taken by the Americans and Europeans (Knight, 2002).

In 1810, the discovery of the conspiracy in Querétaro (and other regions of El Bajío) gave rise to an open break with the regime. Miguel Hidalgo began the insurrection in order to combat the bad government, defending the Kingdom, the King and the Catholic religion of the French (Knight, 2002; Van Young, 2001). The insurgent group was very heterogeneous. The peasants and workers, who were members of the movement, had different objectives; some sought access to the land, while others wanted to improve living and working conditions. In addition, the insurgents comprised all those who had not found a place in the structure of New Spain; there were also regional differences (Knight, 2002). Therefore, the movement was neither homogeneous nor comprehensive; in many cases it sought only to meet regional demands. In this regard, it is appropriate to speak of several insurgencies, rather than just a single insurgency (Guedea, 2000; Knight, 2002). These differences caused major problems within the rebellion (Van Young, 1992).

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For example, it was extremely difficult to establish a common front that could coordinate all members of the pro-independence ranks (Hamnett, 1986).

During the first phase, the imperial army defeated the disorganised insurgency (Hamnett, 1986). Hidalgo and his followers fled to the north of the country, but were captured and executed scarcely six months after initiating the independence movement. Several insurgent leaders (particularly Rayón and Morelos) understood the problems of having a disorganised army, so they transformed the movement into a coherent and unified cause (Guedea, 2000), and increased the number of their supporters, particularly in the cities.

The Constitution of 1812 allowed local groups to govern their regions (Chust, 1995, 1999). The elections in Mexico City that year reflected the prevailing situation in the country. The results were unfavourable for the colonial regime, since many of the regime's opponents were elected. Alarmed by the results, the Peninsular authorities nullified some of the elections and arrested several opponents (Hamnett, 1982).

On November 6, 1813, the Congress declared its independence and began constructing a new nation. Following a national consultation, the 1814 Constitution was approved, recognising the sovereignty of the Congress and the division of powers. However, these events did not end the independence movement (Knight, 2002). In 1814 the insurgent group was defeated and King Ferdinand VII returned to Spain to abolish the constitutional regime and restore the old regime, directly impacting the situation in New Spain. The imprisonment and death of Morelos in 1815 marked the end of the organised movement (Harvey, 2000; Lynch, 1986).

Subsequently, the insurgency lost its military strength, becoming a purely political movement. By 1820, the Viceroyalty of New Spain was virtually pacified. The return of the constitutional system in that year gave the new Spanish an opportunity to

promote their interests through several elections. However, most people felt that in order to achieve the changes they wanted, the country should be independent (Guedea, 2000). The insurgents in pursuit of independence were led by Agustín de Iturbide in 1821 and proved to be professional, organised and disciplined soldiers. In the same year Juan O'Donoju, upon his arrival in New Spain, ratified the Plan of Iguala (García, 1910), also known as the Plan of the Three Guarantees, and recognised the independence of Mexico.

1.1.2. The Mexican Revolution

More than 100 years after the Mexican Revolution the debate over its scope and importance continues. This discussion focuses on the social and political issues, relating to the revolution, that have arisen in the intervening years (Guerra, 1985; Katz 1981, 1988; Knight 1985, 1986; Tobler, 1984). The progress of Mexican society and the emergence of the middle class required a change in the political life of the country: popular participation in politics would promote social reforms. The ideological gap between young and old was wider due to the lack of political freedom (Knight 1985, 1986). This limitation reduced the possibility of the new social classes having access to politics. Under the dictatorship of General Díaz, the citizens could not choose rulers, since the general's friends took control of the government. The more educated classes demanded the need for open opportunity policies within the government, since the “*porfiriato*” did not represent new political ideas (Fabela, 1959; Molina, 1909; Silva Herzog, 1960).

The revolutionary movement began as a protest movement by the middle class against the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911). Díaz established a stable political system in which local politicians controlled the elections and the opposition, thereby establishing public order. During this period, the Mexican economy was solid:

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there was significant foreign trade, and foreign investment grew. Consequently, the Mexican oligarchy benefited (Tannenbaum 1966; Womack, 1969). Mexico in the 19th century experienced economic progress; however, the benefits were distributed among only a few. For example, 85% of the national territory belonged to less than 1% of the population. Social antagonism between the rich and the poor was very strong. The peasants had no land or work and also suffered from hunger and poverty. This difference became evident in wealth, education and welfare (Knight, 1986).

In Mexico, the expansion of the State and the economy promoted the growth of an urban and more educated middle class, who argued for open opportunity policies within the government. The dissatisfaction with Díaz was widespread, especially since the “*porfiriato*” allowed no room for fresh political ideas (Leal, 1972). Nevertheless the protests of 1902 and 1903 were suppressed violently. One of the main declarations was the banner published in the offices of the newspaper “*El hijo de El Ahuizote*”: “The Constitution has died” (Hernández, 1984). The liberal political groups established in 1904 proposed to reform the political structures and instigate a revolutionary movement. The national situation was complex, and the climate of insecurity and uncertainty began to worry business owners.

Three generations of thought can be identified in the analysis of revolutionary history (Knight, 1986). The first generation is composed of participants who served as direct observers at the beginning of this historic period. Essentially, this generation comprises intellectuals from the left (Fabela, 1959; Molina, 1909; Silva Herzog, 1960), intellectuals from the right (Bulnes, 1956; Vera, 1957) and foreign analysts (Gruening, 1928; Tannenbaum, 1929, 1966). These historians concluded that the Revolution was a popular movement, rural, agrarian and nationalist.

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The second generation of historians published works between the 1950s and 1970s (in Mexico: Blanco, 1961; and Cosío, 1972; Valadés, 1948; Ulloa, 1971; and in USA: Cumberland, 1952, 1970; Quirk, 1960; Ross, 1955). This generation defined the revolution as a popular, spontaneous and agrarian movement characterised by solid peasant participation and a large-scale confrontation between farmers and landowners, a veritable social revolution with a strong class involvement (Knight, 1986).

Within this generation we can trace the beginnings of a revisionist interpretation (Falcón, 1979; Jacobs, 1982; Meyer, 1974, 1978; Werner Tobler, 1971, 1982), which distanced itself from the focus of the first generation. It has its origins in the 1940s with the analyses of Jesús Silva Herzog (1960) and Daniel Cosío Villegas (1955-1965). This conceptualisation of the Mexican Revolution criticised the movement for being purely political, and forged from the manipulation of the masses. In other words, it sees the revolutionary struggle as a "bourgeois" civil war.

The third generation of historians are known as the *baby-boomers*, and they are more numerous and more professional than their predecessors. They completed a geographical analysis of the revolutionary movement, specialising by subject and methodology (Aguilar Camín, 1977; Ankerson, 1984; Benjamin, 1981; Craig, 1983; Fowler, 1971; Friedrich, 1970; Jacobs, 1982; Joseph, 1982; Martínez 1979, 1986, 1988; Meyer, 1973, 1976, 1985; Paoli, 1977; Schryer, 1980; Warman, 1976; Wassennan, 1984; Wells, 1985; Womack, 1969). This generation concluded that the revolution was not a monolithic event; rather, there were several revolutions as well as "many Mexicos". The revolution was neither monolithic, nor was it unidirectional (Knight, 1986). As Tannenbaum has argued, "so rapid and varied have been the cross currents that have come to the surface in the Revolution that it is most difficult to discover any direction in the movement" (1966, pp.121, 147). The diversification of the subject, and the complicated

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accumulation of debate amongst historians, demonstrates the same complexity as the revolution itself. As a result, the concept of a monolithic and homogeneous popular revolution has weakened. Instead, the revolutionary movement can be analysed at a local, regional level, and even by municipality (Knight, 1986).

Knight (1986) considered that the Mexican Revolution arose from political mistakes made during the period 1900 to 1910, the political crisis of 1909 to 1910 and the social crisis during the period 1910 to 1915. These political events led to a large, heterogeneous coalition forming around Madero, resulting in his rise to the Presidency, an office which had been revived definitively following the counter-revolutionary coup. The revolutionary struggle was an entirely popular movement. For Knight (1986), the struggle was not only class-based, but was also cultural: it arose from conflict between the urban educated who desired progress, and the rural illiterate, who were nostalgic for the past. According to Knight, this "war was civil and not international, but by virtue of its overall character, it had comparable effects" (1986: 518).

The revolution destroyed the professional army established by Porfirio Díaz; it completely replaced political personnel and liquidated the oligarchic group of large landowners. As part of this process, it erected an elite military body. Between 1920 and 1940, this group carried out a nationalist project of social and economic modernisation, of which agrarian reform and a fight against the Catholic Church were integral parts. The revolution left aside issues of an economic character, and social changes were not included. However, "there was informal social change that was neither planned nor legislated" (Knight, 1986:517). The victors found how to "incorporate the complaints of the popular movements with the construction of the State and the development of the capital" (Knight, 1986: 527). For Knight (1986), the revolution laid the groundwork for

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an unrestrained presidentialism, whilst creating a new army, a new administration, a new State, labour unions and agrarian leagues that were clients of the State.

The revolutionary movement began with Francisco Madero, a rich landowner from the northern part of the country, who launched a campaign in favour of the strictest application of the Constitution of 1857. "Effective suffrage, no re-election" was the slogan of Madero and his anti-re-election movement. Madero and his allies were arrested and lost the election of 1910, which was held in an atmosphere of corruption and coercion of the vote. Given this scenario, Madero called for the population to take up arms on November 20, 1910 (Womack, 1969).

Madero's call was successful amongst a sector of the population that had previously remained distant to change: the illiterate rural population. Under the Díaz Government, this sector of the population had suffered from major shortcomings comparable to those experienced in the condition of slavery. For this rural population, Madero's revolution, beyond being just a liberal-progressive political mobilisation, was also a call for the recapture of the lands, the overthrow of tyrant landowners, and a recovery of the world they had lost (Knight, 1986; Womack, 1969).

Armed groups emerged during the winter of 1910-11 in northern and central Mexico. Months later Madero was elected President in the freest election held in the country's history. The following years were chaotic and violent; Madero's liberal experiment had failed. Madero was finally defeated by the army and killed at the beginning of 1913 (Acevedo, 2004; Knight, 1986). Months of clashes culminated in the fall of Victoriano Huerta, a general dedicated to the restoration of the old regime, which served to guarantee the growth of popular rebellion. The revolution re-materialised as a social movement, led by Emiliano Zapata in the South and Pancho Villa in the North.

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This social revolution struggled for social reform, social justice and education causes (Womack, 1969).

However, none of the groups led by Díaz or Huerta, or the peasant rebellions led by Villa and Zapata, experienced definitive success. A fourth group emerged: the constitutionalists, led by Álvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles. They believed that the post-revolutionary regime needed a popular base (Sanderson, 1981). The revolution culminated in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. This Constitution guaranteed reforms; for example, liberal, civil and political rights, agrarian reform and labour legislation (Cumberland, 1972; Meyer, 1973; Niemeyer Jr., 1974).

In summary, the revolutionary movement was divided into three phases. It began as a rebellion against the Government of Porfirio Diaz. Díaz remained in power for more than 30 years; Francisco I. Madero represented the opposition to the Diaz dictatorship with its "effective suffrage, no re-election" slogan. The second phase was characterised by disagreement and confrontation between the "*porfirista*" bourgeoisie and Madero's group. In the last phase, the revolution became a social movement led by Emiliano Zapata in the South and Pancho Villa in the North. This social revolution struggled for social reform, social justice and education causes, culminating in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. This Constitution guaranteed reforms; for example, liberal, civil and political rights, agrarian reform and labour legislation.

Following the Mexican Revolution, the government of the oligarchy came to an end, the apparently solid "*porfirian*" state collapsed, and the national economy suffered great devastation: the peso was devalued and the birth rate declined (Knight, 1986; Womack, 1978). The revolutionary movement exhibited a Tocquevillian character: from the rubble, a stronger, more stable state was constructed (Meyer, 1985; Womack, 1986). This historical period generated major socio-economic changes that made the political

development and economic dynamism of the post-revolutionary era possible (Knight, 1986).

The revolutionary struggle was set against a background of widespread poverty; the unequal distribution of wealth; political and economic domination by a small sector of the population; the small representation of the government and the inability to resolve the new social demands of citizens, and address the limitation of their political rights (Knight, 1986; Tannenbaum, 1966; Womack, 1969). Mexico still suffers from the same circumstances and issues. Social polarisation is increasing; the income gap is wider than the gap observed in the 70's and these social outcomes are perceived to be the result of government inefficiency. In the same vein, low levels of electoral turnout are a consequence of society's distrust of the political system and of a party system that cannot meet the needs of the population (Moreno, 2003, 2009).

1.2. Contemporary Mexico

From the 1940s onwards, Mexico experienced economic growth and social and political stability, in comparison with the turbulent 1910s and 1920s (Knight, 1992). The achievements of the period from the 1950s to the 1960s are known as the "Mexican miracle" (Hansen, 1998).

The construction of the National Revolutionary Party in 1929, by the Mexican elites, united the "revolutionary family" in a single structure. The party that emerged controlled presidential successions and weakened the opposition until at least 1988 (Knight, 1992). The party policy depended on a patronage system, sponsorships, unwritten rules and loyalty around the party. This organised elite was orderly and disciplined, and constituted an "inclusive authoritarianism" that restricted the opposition and left-wing parties (Almond and Verba, 1963; Carr and Montoya, 1986; Knight, 1992).

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Despite economic and political problems, the government retained control owing to the legitimisation of the political system (Knight, 1992). The army was in the barracks and presidential successions occurred in relative tranquility. The 1988 presidential election opened the debate on the regime's legitimacy, a debate reflected in various social movements (Cornelius et al., 1989; Knight, 1990). In this political contest, the governing party of the PRI would meet its strongest challenge: the discontent of former PRI members emerged, invoking the memory of Lázaro Cárdenas and the revolutionary message (Almond and Verba, 1963; Cornelius, Gentleman and Smith, 1989).

1.2.1. Economy: The Mexican miracle

The Mexican miracle is characterised by a solid political and economic regime, high growth rates, low levels of inflation and an increase in per capita income (Hansen, 1998). In contrast, the 1980s were a period of economic stagnation. Despite this, Mexico enjoyed over 80 years of social stability (Knight, 1992).


From the 1930s until the end of the 1980s, Mexico adopted a policy of economic development based on the intervention of the state. Private companies working in partnership with the government received subsidies and were protected from the intervention of foreign companies. Unions and employees enjoyed great benefits, salaries, and medical assistance. The economy of the country in this period grew rapidly, and the ruling party (PRI) enjoyed support and approval from all social strata (Beezley and Meyer, 2010).

From 1940 to 1956, the number of industries increased, although they were not well developed since competition was restricted. However, the domestic market was consolidated, and growth was observed in the production of electric power, oil, and in the

manufacturing and construction industry (Hansen, 1998). From 1956 to 1970, the economy was further developed by the substitution of imports. In other words, Mexico had to produce what it consumed. The economy in this period was sustained by the industrial sector. Despite the economic progress, the development of companies that were not competitive internationally served to inhibit Mexico's ability to export to foreign markets, and therefore the country's economy did not experience true modern industrialisation and independence (Buchenau, 2005).

This period is referred to by Mexican historians as the "Mexican Miracle" (Hansen, 1998) and is characterised by accelerated economic growth. This growth had been stimulated by the import substitution industrialisation model (see Figure 1.1). The most important problems of this period were the increase in the number of companies protected by the government; these companies were inefficient because of their inability to export and because of the growth of the size of the working class. The country also reached its maximum limits of domestic demand, so the economy slowed gradually, whilst public and private debt expanded dramatically.

Figure 1.1. Gross Domestic Product, Annual Growth Rate



Source: Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI)

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At the beginning of the 1980s, the Mexican economy was one of the most closed and protected in the world (Pastor and Wise, 1994; Thacker, 2000). The import-substitution industrialisation model (ISI) produced a reduction in the productivity of the economy, sending the economic indicators (unemployment, inflation and GDP) below those of its international competitors, thereby reducing the expected economic growth (Zabludovsky and Pasquel, 2010).

The government declared the Mexican economy bankrupt in 1982 after the fall in oil prices and the need to borrow from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The root causes of the crisis were the increase in interest rates; the reduction in oil revenues; the reduction in the value of money (inflation) and the colossal debt (Teichman, 2001). The government had to accept drastic conditions - budget cuts, increased interest rates and wage cuts - which unleashed the economic recession of the early 1980s (Lusztig, 2004). After 1982, the government regularly devalued the currency to maintain current account adjustment, which in turn produced inflation (Cardoso and Helwege, 1992).

This situation produced two important effects on the incumbent party, the PRI: an insufficient budget to pay its supporters and a weakening of the political coalitions within the Party (Bruhn, 2006). Similarly, after the nationalisation of the banks by President López Portillo in 1982 (Del Ángel and César Martinelli, 2009), entrepreneurs mistrusted the PRI and began to sympathise with the right-wing National Action Party (PAN).

During the early 1990s, mainly during the administration of President Salinas de Gortari, most of the nationalised enterprises were privatised (with the exception of oil and energy). In 1994, Mexico entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada (Garciadiego, 1994; Vega Cánovas, 1993). Inflation had been reduced to single digits, annual growth averaged nearly 3 per cent, and

the government pursued a policy of a fixed exchange rate. However, the percentage of poor people increased. Moreover, the armed movement in Chiapas (Zapatista Army of National Liberation, EZLN) and multiple murders (of PRI presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio and several government officials) were perceived as negative signals to international investors, who withdrew most of their capital (Musacchio, 2012). This situation was unsustainable and forced the government to abandon the fixed exchange rate. The peso was devalued and the country entered into another recession in 1995 (Musacchio, 2012; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2004).


In the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, the government continued with commercial liberalisation, signing various free trade agreements with countries in Latin America, Europe, and Asia (Iyer, 2005; Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2005). The economy also remained stable, although there was no reduction in the inequality gap. Currently, Mexico is one of the most commercially open countries in the world. It has signed 12 free trade agreements with 43 countries (Pastor and Wise, 1994; Thacker, 2000). The exchange rate and inflation levels are stable; however, there is no improvement in economic growth, and the levels of poverty and unemployment remain high (see Figure 1.2).

One of the determinants of the growth of poverty in Mexico has been the poor management of the macro-economy. The country faced recurrent economic crises in 1976, 1982, 1986, 1994 and 2008. The main common denominator of these problems was the application of incorrect public policies (Musachio, 2012). However, the excessive influence of external factors has also played an important role in the development of the nation. For example, the drop in international oil prices in 1982 and 1986, the interest rate change and external capital flows in 1994, and the global impact of the crisis of 2008 had devastating effects on the Mexican economy. The costs of these economic crises were not

distributed equitably among the population. The least fortunate were the middle class, resulting in a dramatic increase in the poor population of the country and a widening of the gap between the rich and poor (Musacchio, 2012).

Mexico is considered to have the second-largest economy in Latin America (World Bank, 2013), and the third largest in the Americas (behind the United States and Brazil). From the data published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it is the 13th largest economy in the world. Yet, given the disparity and social inequality that prevails in the country, each year the number of poor people rises and the level of poverty becomes much more severe (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.2. Macroeconomic Indicators



Source: INEGI

Inequality in Mexico is not limited to individuals, families or groups—it is also present among geographic zones (Baker, 2006; Lawson, 2006; Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp, 1988; Johnston and Pattie, 1992; Johnston, Pattie and Russell, 1993; Pattie,

Johnston and Fieldhouse, 1994). The Northern states exhibit greater economic, political and social development than those in the South. The Northern states are urban zones with better economies, more schools, less illiteracy and higher standards of living.

1.2.2. Political Arena: Reforms and Alternation

At the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, Mexico initiated a slow but continuous process of democratisation (Woldenberg, 2006). The electoral and party systems underwent major changes, via a process of reform generated by the government (Molinar Horcasitas, 1986). The 1977 reforms promoted the opening of electoral competition and the Federal Law of Political Organisations and Electoral Process (LOPPE) was issued. These reforms introduced the concept of proportional representation. They also established an obligation to maintain a certain number of affiliates in the parties; to have a party, emblem and registered colour; to comply with legal statutes, edit a periodic publication and make lists of candidates. Rights were also established to postulate candidates; nominate candidates; appoint a representative to the polling stations and, with the Federal Election Commission (IFE), to obtain public financing, permanent time on radio and television and support for editorial tasks. The Federal Election Commission operated as the electoral authority. The reforms of 1977 removed the restrictions on left-wing parties and opened up the party system, causing a gradual erosion of the electoral base of the PRI and creating the possibility for pluralistic integration of a representative government (for more details of later reforms see Table 1.1). Politically, the changes placed the Mexican system within a new reality: a deep democratic transition in numerous directions.

Table 1.1. Electoral Reforms

Reforms

1986-7

The figure of the common candidacies emerges.

The Chamber of Deputies increased its number of legislators from 100 to 200 and established the number of 500 members, which still remains today. In the Senate a procedure was established so that this would be renewed by half every three years.

It incorporated the 'clause of governance', which guaranteed the absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

A representative of the senate and another of the deputies were incorporated in the Federal Election Commission, while the number of party representatives was proportional to the votes obtained in the last election.

The Tribunal de lo Contencioso Electoral (TRICOEL) was created. This was an autonomous administrative body, composed of nine judges appointed by the Congress. The TRICOEL only worked during the electoral process and was in charge of the resolution of appeals and complaints.

1990

The most important change introduced by the electoral reform of 1990 was, undoubtedly, the creation of a new autonomous entity to organize the federal elections: the Electoral Federal Institute (IFE), which replaced the Electoral Federal Commission, accountable to the Minister of the Interior.

A new Federal Record of Electorate was realized as well as a new format of vote id.

The Electoral Federal Court (TRIFE) was created and changed from an administrative organ to a jurisdictional one.

1993-4

This reform prohibited financing from governors, foreigners, ministers and business enterprises.

It established new rules for political parties: the provision of reports of annual income, expenses and campaigns. To construct coalitions, the parties had to apply for the same candidates in the elections of the president, deputies and senators and had the same declaration of principles, programme of action, statutes, electoral platform and programme of government or legislative programme.

It increased the number of citizens, local and district councilors in the IFE from 6 to 9.

The Federal Electoral Tribunal (TRIFE) was established as the highest authority in electoral matters with judicial powers.

In 1994, in the General Council of the IFE, counselor's magistrates were replaced by six counselors, who had eight-year terms, with the possibility of being ratified; their nominations had to be supported by two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies.

Table 1.1. Electoral Reforms

Reforms
<p style="text-align: center;">1996</p> <p>This established new requirements for obtaining registration as a party. It reinforced the equity of the prerogatives and the procedures for controlling and monitoring. The allocation of funding would be 30%, in a regular egalitarian manner, to the parties with representation in Congress and 70% in a manner commensurate with the vote obtained. It reinforced the equity of the prerogatives and the procedures for controlling and monitoring.</p> <p>In the Congress of the Union, limits were established to avoid overrepresentation: each party would then have a maximum of 300 deputies and the total number of members of a party would not be a percentage of the total of the camera, the top 8% of their national vote. The number of senators remained at 128, two elected by a majority in each State and the Federal District, and one assigned to the first minority. The remaining 32 would be elected by proportional representation.</p>
<hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">2002</p> <p>Gender equality was established in the exercise of political-electoral rights. For the political parties the obligation to promote equal opportunity and equity between men and women was established.</p>
<hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">2005</p> <p>In 2003 changes were realized in the requisites to integrate a political party or National Political Group (APN). In 2005, Mexicans living abroad were eligible to vote in presidential elections.</p>
<hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">2007-8</p> <p>This abrogated the COFIPE adopted in 1990. This reform recaptured the demands of the political actors, highlighting the following: The access rules to the party system allowed organizations of citizens to obtain their registration as a political party. The political parties prohibited corporate affiliation and acquired obligations in terms of transparency and access to information. The reform established regulation of the primaries, whose length was not to exceed 60 days for the Presidential and Congressional elections. The renewal of the Chamber was not to exceed 40 days. In addition, the period of election campaigns was reduced to 90 days in the year of a presidential election and 60 days in the year of a renewal of the Chamber Deputies. The dissemination of government propaganda was not to be performed during campaigns. The IFE had the authority to distribute and assign the times of the State for electoral purposes.</p>

Source: IFE

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Before the 1977 reforms, 70% of the municipal elections were solely contested by the PRI. The other parties did not think it worth their while putting up candidates (Molinar Horcasitas, 1986). In that same year, the President of the Republic, all governors, all senators and 82% of the country's deputies were members of the PRI (Woldenberg, 2006). Martínez Assad (1985) estimated that between 1978 and 1981 the PAN won 43 municipalities and in 1983 they won another 30, mainly in the north of the country.

By the end of the 1980s, the PRI's hegemony was weakened. The presidential election of 1988 was exemplified by the polemic surrounding the results. The victory of Carlos Salinas de Gortari was questioned, leaving strong doubts about the legitimacy of the election and the political system. In the following year, Ernesto Ruffo won the gubernatorial election in Baja California, becoming the first opposition governor in the history of the country. The PAN gains from the election in Baja California snatched a hegemony from the PRI that it had maintained since 1953, and initiated a gradual decline in the political supremacy of the PRI.

The 1997 midterm elections marked a change in the historical and political context of the country. The PRI lost its majority in the Congress and the PAN and the PRD took on greater political significance at the national level. Between 1977 and 1997, the electoral laws were reformed and electoral institutions were built; for example, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) and the Electoral Tribunal of the Judiciary (TEPJ), helped to incentivise a competitive party system and establish the minimum conditions for political competition, helping to create a political pluralism. During these years, the country experienced electoral reforms in six categories: 1) the party system; 2) the formation of the plural legislature; 3) the electoral institutions; 4) the electoral justice

system; 5) the conditions of electoral competition; and 6) the political reform in Mexico's capital city (Woldenberg, 2006).

The hegemony of the official party, as the PRI was known, ended when Vicente Fox Quezada, a PAN candidate, won the 2000 presidential election. The election was held on July 2 2000 and was characterised by close competition. The parties with the highest probability of winning were the PAN and the PRI. This election was the first in which the PRI was not the winner. As a result, after 72 years of hegemonic rule, the country was no longer managed or governed by a single party.

The presidential election of 2000 resulted in strong debates on issues such as the economy, security and corruption. The PAN candidate Vicente Fox, constantly described Francisco Labastida, the PRI candidate, "*as more of the same*," referring to the seventy years of PRI government in Mexico. Vicente Fox used the slogan "*change*" to identify his policy proposals as something new, and to promote his government as one that would inject innovation in all aspects of Mexican politics. The "*change*" implied a new way to implement public policies in the economy: it would be a new economic project. Francisco Labastida, the PRI candidate, used the slogan "*the power to serve the people*" with the purpose of trying to convince the Mexican people of the existence of a new PRI. The two candidates both considered that evaluating the performance of the previous government was crucial to determining the intent of the electoral vote. In this political competition, the PRD and its candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, obtained the third place with 17% of the total vote share.

The 2006 presidential election was also a close and competitive contest. The PAN candidate's Felipe Calderon won by a very small margin (0.59% of the total vote). There was very intense competition in the media. The two candidates with the greatest approval and support, Felipe Calderon (PAN) and Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (PRD),

exchanged performance assessments of the outgoing president Vicente Fox (PAN). The PRD candidate argued that if he was elected "the country would experience economic growth and employment generation" (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2006:3). However, Calderon claimed that if his party stayed in power "his government would retain economic stability, and this would translate into greater economic growth and generate more jobs from investment, but if you elected the opposition party, everything that had been achieved would be lost" (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2006:6). In this election the PRI candidate, Roberto Madrazo Pintado, obtained third place with 13 percentage points less than the PAN and PRD candidates.

During 2007 and 2008, electoral reforms took place. These reforms focused on better regulation of the political parties, the use of the media (television and radio) for the broadcasting of "spots," and establishing limits on the length of campaigns, in an attempt to eliminate negative campaigns. The "acid test" was the 2012 presidential election, in which the PRI recovered the presidency of the Republic with more than 38% of the vote, while the party that had been in power, PAN, ranked a disastrous third out of four possible positions, behind the second-placed PRD. This election took place in a context of insecurity, with an increased number of poor people, an increased number of the population who were unemployed, and a high percentage of young people neither studying nor working.

1.3. Multi-party System

A democratic evolution has defined Mexico since the 1977 reforms. The victory of the National Action Party in the electoral competition for governor in Baja Mexico in 1989 (Ernesto Ruffo Appel); the breakup of the political hegemony of the PRI in the Congress of the Union in 1997, and the victory of the PAN candidate Vicente Fox Quezada in the 2000 presidential election, have changed the political system at both the national and local

level. The democratisation process involved the transformation of the party system from a hegemonic party system (with limited competition and dominated by the party in government) to one that is plural and competitive; from rigged elections to an open and transparent competition (Mendez, 2007).


Today, Mexico has free elections and a plural and competitive party system that operates within a democratic framework. At the national level, the new party system is a tripartite format; this is in contrast with greater heterogeneity at the state level, where two party systems coexist. The three political parties with the greatest national and sub-national representation are: the PAN, the PRI and the PRD. The PAN is a right-wing political party, which supports an open economy and privatisation of industry, trade and services (a minimum state). On the other hand, the PRI is defined as a centre-left wing party and is in favour of a mixed economy and the nationalisation of industries. Finally, and of no less importance, the PRD is a party with a leftist ideology that defends the state's participation in the economy.

Founded in 1939, PAN emerged in opposition to the nationalist policies implemented by the PRI which, under President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), expropriated the oil and electrical industries. Cárdenas' expropriation decree on 18 March 1938 gave rise to PEMEX, the Mexican oil giant. For its part, the PRD was founded in 1989 after several left-wing supporters of the PRI approved secession, in response to (and as a rejection of) the neoliberal practices implemented by the party in government during the eighties.

The PAN and PRD have opted for two different roads within the public administration. PAN, a right wing party since its foundation, has encouraged the organisation of local supporters. In 1989, the *panismo*'s municipal administrative skills contributed to the party winning the greater part of the state capitals within the country

and achieving its first victory in the election for governor, followed by its historic triumph in the 2000 presidential election. In contrast, the PRD has had greater scope at both state and national level; however, the party has been little concerned with administrative performance (Bruhn, 1999; Estrada, 2003b). The PRD has neglected to develop local leaders, forcing it to nominate candidates from other parties, primarily PRI candidates. This has inhibited the PRD's growth at the local level. In recent years, electoral competitiveness has modified the distribution of political forces in the country (See Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3. Relative Majority of Federal Deputies by District



Source: IFE

Rae (1967) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989) established methodologies to measure the number of effective parties and the level of fragmentation of a political

system². Sartori (1997) pointed out that fragmentation of the parties occurs when no party approaches the point of an absolute majority. The measurement of how many parties compete and interact is needed because these shape the electoral system.

Table 1.2 presents the general trend in the decrease in the number of parties that receive votes and the inactivity in the number of parties that get seats in the legislature. In the last three elections, the number of parties that were voted for and the number who won seats were equal. On the other hand, the effective number of parties (by votes) increased in the last two federal elections, reaching 4.72 parties in 2012. In other words, in the last election there were almost five effective parties compared to the seven that received votes.

However, from an analysis of seats, the effective number of parties shows that there are nearly three, compared to seven seats that were achieved in the Chamber of Deputies in the last federal election. It can be inferred that the difference between the effective number of parties by votes and by seats occurs due to the fact that new or small parties, although they obtained the necessary votes, didn't have enough strength in Congress. In this sense, the electoral system is multiparty but can be reduced to a tripartite model, where the PRI, PAN and PRD have greater political and electoral weight.

² The Effective Number of Parties is the inverse of the size biased version of the traditional expected party size in shares. This index takes both the number of parties and their relative weights into account to compute a single value.

Table 1.2. Party System in Mexico, Federal Elections 1979-2012

Federal Election	Number of Parties		Effective Number of		Fragmentation Index	
	Year	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes
1979	7	7	1.76	1.77	0.43	0.44
1982	8	6	1.94	1.72	0.48	0.42
1985	9	9	2.03	1.85	0.51	0.46
1988	8	6	3.16	3.04	0.68	0.67
1991	10	6	2.39	2.21	0.58	0.55
1994	9	4	2.85	2.29	0.65	0.56
1997	8	5	3.42	2.86	0.71	0.65
2000	11	8	3.00	2.55	0.67	0.61
2003	11	6	3.78	3.01	0.72	0.67
2006	8	8	3.60	2.76	0.72	0.64
2009	8	8	4.15	2.23	0.76	0.55
2012	7	7	4.72	2.90	0.79	0.65

Source: 1979-1985 (Molinar, 1986);
 1991-2003 (Méndez, 2007);
 2006-2012, the author.

The index shows more clearly the trend of increasing fragmentation within the Mexican party system. According to the votes obtained by each party, and based on the parameters used by Sartori (1999), it can be observed that since 1997 there has been a multi-party system with extreme fragmentation, as this index has increased year after year.

Since the 1990s, the PAN has been triumphant in the North. Consequently, it is the largest electoral opponent of the PRI. In the South, the majority of electoral competitions are between the PRI and the PRD (Lawson, 2006). This bifurcation has generated “two separate systems of two political parties”, and is not a traditional tripartite system (Klesner, 1995:143). The North sympathises with the ideas of the right and the South has a more leftist orientation. Therefore, political parties have established themselves in the regions in which they have a greater probability of electoral success (Johnson, Pattie and Allsopp, 1988), giving rise to changes in the electoral geography (Crewe and Fox, 1984). In this sense, parties find it easier to recruit members if they are electorally strong and if they have large numbers of party members, as, for example, the

PAN and PRI in the North and the PRD and PRI in the South (Baker, 2006; Lawson, 2006).

1.4. Democracy: Mexican version

70 years of PRI political hegemony and 12 years of PAN government have developed a new political reality. Mexicans have lived through the most important changes in the political and economic spheres—the democratic transition and the commercial opening of the country.


Democratic efforts, focused on enforcing the vote and creating representative and pluralist political and electoral institutions, reflect the process of the modernisation of a society. Mexico has competitive elections, a multi-party system, alternation, and a real separation of powers without any form of subordination. Therefore, the country can be considered to be a democratic regime.

Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010) argued, on the basis of the use of the Bayesian statistical method, that Mexico has been democratic since 1988 (see Figure 1.4). Marshall, Jagers and Gurr (2012), and the Polity IV³ project considers that Mexico has been democratic since 1997 (see Figure 1.5). However, Polity IV argues that although elections are free in Mexico, they are not fair. Political minorities are excluded from the political process. Furthermore, the Mexican political system has become increasingly destabilised by populist efforts to overturn the electoral process through street protests. Political parties are weak and the government restricts the activities of the small parties. Moreover, human rights and civil liberties are subject to limitations.

³ The "Polity Score" captures a regime's authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Polity scores can also be converted to regime categories: we recommend a three-part categorisation of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and the three special values: -66, -77, and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10). The Polity scheme consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. The Polity data includes information only on the institutions of the central government and on political groups acting or reacting, within the scope of that authority.


With this perspective, Campbell, Barth and Pözlbauer (2012) generated The Democracy Ranking, which measures the quality of the democratic regime, covering concepts such as freedom and the characteristics of the political regime, as well as other information that is not specifically political, such as gender, economy, knowledge, health and environment.

Figure 1.4. Democracy Score 1970–2008



Source: Unified Democracy Score

Figure 1.5. Democracy Score, Polity IV 1970-2012



Source: Polity IV

According to data from Freedom House, political rights and civil freedoms were severely limited in Mexico until the beginning of the twenty-first century. It was not

until 2001 that Mexico was recognised as a free country; however, this qualification became only partial in 2011. In this sense, Mexico is partly free because there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties, as citizens suffer from corruption, weak rule of law, and ethnic and religious conflicts. In addition, it is a country without freedom of the press.⁴ Reports without borders (2013) argue that Mexico is one of the world's most dangerous countries for journalists: they are threatened and murdered by organised criminals and by corrupt officials with impunity. The resulting climate of fear undermines freedom of information. The violence (deaths and kidnappings), especially against journalists and communicators, has generated self-censorship and intimidation. The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) has recorded 46 killings of journalists since 2000 and a further eight have disappeared since 2003.

In addition, there is political control over the content of the media, and little transparency in the information that is presented. Table 1.3 presents information about the democratic quality of the country. It shows that Mexican democracy has declined since 2006. In 2012, Mexico's democracy was placed in position 54 of the 104 nations assessed.

⁴ The high number of journalists and netizens killed in the course of their work in 2012 (the deadliest year ever registered by Reporters Without Borders in its annual roundup), naturally had a significant impact on the ranking of the countries in which these murders took place, above all in Somalia (175th, -11), Syria (176th, 0), Mexico (153rd, -4) and Pakistan (159th, -8).

Table 1.3. Quality of Democracy 1999-2012

Year	Quality of Democracy ^{a)}	Ranking ^{a)}	Freedom ^{b)}	Civil Liberties ^{b)}	Political Rights ^{b)}	Freedom of the Press ^{b)}
1999	n.d.	n.d.	Partly Free	4	3	n.d.
2001	n.d.	n.d.	Free	3	2	n.d.
2002	60.07	40	Free	3	2	Partly Free
2003	58.74	69	Free	2	2	Partly Free
2004	n.d.	n.d.	Free	2	2	Partly Free
2005	63.31	40	Free	2	2	Partly Free
2006	60.38	40	Free	2	2	Partly Free
2007	58.62	50	Free	3	2	Partly Free
2008	55.27	47	Free	3	2	Partly Free
2009	55.27	51	Free	3	2	Partly Free
2010	56.70	53	Free	3	2	Partly Free
2011	54.00	54	Partly Free	3	3	Not Free
2012	56.60	54	Partly Free	3	3	Not Free

Source: a) The democracy ranking; b) Freedom House


The World Bank⁵ (2012) describes three areas that should be used to measure the governance of a country: (a) the process by which the government is elected, controlled and replaced; (b) the ability to formulate and implement effective policies; and (c) the respect for the institutions. These areas are defined on the basis of six dimensions: 1) voice and accountability; 2) political stability and absence of violence; 3) government effectiveness; 4) regulatory quality; 5) rule of law; and 6) control of corruption.

Figure 1.6 presents the results of the governance indicators. In contrast to the year 2000, by 2012 there had been a decrease in four of the six indicators of effective governance in Mexico. Although the government was more effective, and there was greater respect for the rule of law, the governance of the country was threatened by the inability of the democratic system to increase the freedom and participation of citizens; reduce the perception of political destabilisation and violence; improve services and the quality of public administration; and to improve the private sector regulatory controls in order to uproot the corruption of the political system. Compared to developed countries

⁵ The World Bank has published Governance Indicators since 1996.

with consolidated democracies, for example the UK and the USA, the situation in Mexico is not outstanding.


Figure 1.6. Governance Indicators, 1996-2012



Source: Governance Indicators, World Bank

Mexico is a democracy; however, much of the legacies of the authoritarian periods have been maintained. As a result, Mexican democracy is less complete and stable than other existing democracies. In this sense, the country faces a series of challenges to democratic consolidation. Nevertheless, citizens continue to support democracy over any other form of government. However, Mexican citizens don't trust in government and the levels of turnout are very low (see Figure 1.7).

Figure 1.7. Low Trust in Government, Democracy Support & Turnout 1990-2013



Source: Latinbarometer & IFE

Schettino (1997) concluded that the objective of the government in the 20th century was the improvement of society and the creation of a new citizen, which involves the construction of new priorities including democratic options, economic competition, social development, and political competition, all oriented to the development of the nation.

There are two processes that indicate that the establishment of the democratic regime has been consolidated. On the one hand, generational replacement is important for the establishment of democratic attitudes (Dalton 1994; Finkel et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; Minkenberg, 1993; Neundorf, 2010). On the other hand, the theory of modernisation argues that democracy will be strengthened by the implementation of a market economy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Ekman and Linde, 2005; Hesli, and Reisinger, 1994; Lipset, 1959; Miller, Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). However, democratic consolidation can be influenced by the two theories simultaneously. In other words, generational differences are influenced and updated based on short-term effects,

for example, the performance of the new regime (Mishler and Rose, 2007; Rose and McAllister, 1990; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998).

Studies of democratisation focus on the analysis of its structure and its action. The structural analysis relates to studies of the modernisation of society, in terms of social class and religious composition (Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart, and Welzel, 2009). The analysis of its action explains how the democratic regime was achieved and consolidated, as a result of factors such as the establishment of political parties (Diamond and Günther, 2001; O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986); free elections and political institutions (Birch, 2003; Moser, 2001). In this respect, once the process of democratisation has started, a certain level of economic development is required so that the new system can survive.

On this note, Neundorf (2010) examines the impact of socialisation in socialist societies and their transition to democratic regimes (especially in Eastern Europe). Neundorf's research confirms that political socialisation is an important factor in democratic consolidation and it confirms that citizens learn about the democratic system and its operation. This study demonstrates that economic development is necessary for acceptance of the new regime; according to this logic, if the people are doing well in economic terms, they will be in favour of the democratic system (Neundorf, 2010; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997).

The transformation of the political regime of Mexico established a process of renewal of the political culture, and the creation of a citizen with new ways of perceiving politics and formulating opinions. It has not been possible to break with the authoritarian structures without defeating the culture of distrust and political intolerance. Mexican democracy is in the process of development. It is a young/adolescent democracy, which

still has to mature into a democracy in which the principles are rooted in society and in everyday life.

The citizen and democracy are complementary. A modern, representative and deliberative democracy needs the participation of informed, conscious and free citizens. The Mexican democracy needs responsible citizens not only in the electoral field, but also in different forms and spheres of public life (Woldenberg, 2006). The democratic transition and the economic openness in the country were peaceful with a gradual process of institutionalisation. However, what has been the effect on the citizens? Can we really speak of a change in the way the citizen internalises political affairs, given the “new rules of the game”?

1.5. The Mexican Voter in Retrospective

In the sixties and seventies, the PRI and its allies won elections with 80% of the votes cast. However, this dropped by almost 10 percentage points in the presidential election of 1982, where the governing party and its coalition won 71% of the votes.

The Cardenista Coalition⁶ emerged in 1988 and contended with the PRI in the presidential election of that year. The coalition was formed around Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, former PRI Governor in the State of Michoacan and the son of a former President, Lazaro Cardenas. The Cardenista group lashed out at the ruling party for the lack of democratic guarantees within the party. For example, they criticised the fact that very few had the ability to elect candidates to governors of the federal entities and they disapproved of the power that the president flaunted in choosing his successor (Domínguez and McCann, 1992).

⁶ The coalition formed by Cardenas, called the National Democratic Front, had features of a Socialist Party since it included the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS); the old Communist Party; the People's Socialist Party (PPS); the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM); and the Cardenista Front National Renovation Party (PFCRN).

One of the main sources of the PRI's legitimacy was its capability for economic management (mainly during the "Mexican miracle"). However, in the 1980s the Mexican economy did not perform well. During this decade GDP dropped by 9% and inflation was above 60% per year (peaking at 159% in 1987). The minimum wage was 46% below the level observed in the early 1980s (United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1989).

The inability to prevent crises in 1982 and 1994 significantly reduced the support of the population for the PRI and also decreased the perception of risk of a change in the governing party (Magaloni, 2006; Morgenstern and Zechmeister, 2001). In this scenario, when citizens move from an authoritarian regime to a system of open elections, the fate of the governing party becomes the central theme of the debate for many voters, leaving attitudes towards issues such as the economy and the links between social groups in last place (Domínguez and McCann, 1992).

1.5.1. The Mexican voter in 1988

In the 1988 presidential election voters asked themselves: "Am I in favour of or against the PRI and the President"? In the study completed by Domínguez and McCann (1992) of this election, a two-step analysis of voting behaviour is documented. In the first step, voters analyze whether they are for or against the continuation of the PRI in the government. The majority of the voters do not move on from this stage of analysis. This finding suggests the importance of partisanship and presidential performance, as well as the need to generate doubts about the ability of the opposition to govern. This point is emphatic, given that the decision on whether to vote or not vote for the PRI was *not* determined by: (1) attachments to social cleavages⁷, (2) attitudes on policy issues, or (3)

⁷ The relationship between the socio-economic, demographic and geographic variables and the vote is difficult to study in the context of a political system where there is a dominant party (Camp, 1994).

general assessments about the prevailing circumstances and prospects for the nation's economy or personal finances (Domínguez and McCann, 1995).

The second step arises when the voters are against the governing party. If they did not support the continuation of the PRI, they analysed which opposition party to vote for. In this last stage of the process, issues and social cleavages did matter. However, socio-demographic characteristics were not relevant in determining the vote decision.

When voters considered this dilemma, their present and future perceptions of national and personal economic status did not have statistical significance for the vote decision for the Cardenista coalition. Moreover, positive assessments of the future national and personal economic situation decreased the probability of voting for the PAN. Those who thought that the economy and their finances would improve were less likely to vote for the PAN.

In the same sense, as the perception that the PRI was getting stronger increased, the probability of voting for the two opposition parties became less likely. Similarly, the greater the belief that the economy would improve if an opposition party ruled, the more likely a vote for the challenger parties would be; the lower the presidential approval, the greater the probability of voting for the Cardenistas and the PAN would be; the more likely a voter was to have voted PRI in a prior presidential election, the less likely this voter would be to support any opposition party.

The discrepancies of partisan determination between the Cardenistas and the PAN are also evident in the following areas: those citizens affiliated with a union were less likely to vote for the PAN; those who paid attention to the (Catholic) church and who were professionals were less likely to vote for the PRD. Those who supported the

Therefore, it is not surprising to find that during the transitional period these factors had a weak and even inconsistent relationship with the vote intention (Bruhn and Yanner, 1994; Dominguez and McCann, 1992, 1995; Moreno 1994; Yanner, 1992).

Cardenistas were more likely to believe that social peace was not at risk if an opposition party won the election. Although the Cardenista coalition stemmed from a division within the PRI, voters who had voted previously for the PRI were less likely to support Cardenas. However, those who voted for PAN in previous elections were more likely to vote for Cardenas.

One important consequence of this presidential election is that the entrance of Cardenismo reorganised those voters who were already sympathetic to pre-existing political options. However, this coalition could not mobilise the vote of those who were not sympathetic towards any current policy.

1.5.2. The Mexican voter in 1994

The year 1994 was one of the most difficult years in Mexico's political and economic history. The entry into force of NAFTA, the Zapatista uprising and the assassination of the PRI candidate to the presidency of the Republic called into question the ability of the political system to advance towards democracy without violence (Cortina, Gelman and Blanco, 2008). The objective of the 1994 presidential election was to maintain political stability, defend the electoral process and protect peace throughout the nation. Fear of increased violence and political chaos benefited the ruling party (Loaeza, 1999; Tuiran and Grobet, 1995), since it was regarded as the only political option capable of handling the prevailing situation in the country (Scherlen, 1998).

Moreno and Yanner (2000) used two surveys to explain the determinants of the decision to vote in the presidential election of 1994. From these surveys, the authors concluded that those Mexicans who identified with a political party were more likely to vote for the candidate of that political party and reject the rest of the options. Regarding socio-demographic characteristics, support for the PAN candidate, Fernández de

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Cevallos, came mostly from young, educated and wealthy people. For their part, supporters of Cardenas, the PRD's candidate, were more prevalent among the low-income male population living in urban areas. Finally, those who supported Zedillo Ponce De Leon, the PRI candidate, were women with a lower educational background.

Retrospective evaluations of the economy played an important role in the determination of the vote (Buendia, 1996). In this sense, positive retrospective assessments increased the likelihood of voting for the PRI (Poiré, 1999). On the other hand, forward-looking assessments did not play an important role in the formation of policy preferences.

In terms of the qualities of the candidates, this research concludes that experience and proximity to the people increased the likelihood of voting for the political option represented. However, these factors are not deemed statistically significant.

The voters who supported the continuation of the economic policy of the former president, Salinas de Gortari, were more likely to vote for the PRI. Citizens who perceived that the PRI continued to be the best political option were also more likely to vote for the PRI candidate. Those voters who believed it was time for alternation were more likely to vote for the opposition parties, and to vote for Fernández de Cevallos in particular.

In short, Moreno and Yanner (2000) conclude that support for Zedillo, the PRI candidate, is explained by the following factors: the vote for the PRI in 1988; positive retrospective evaluations; the desire for continuity of Salinas' policies and the idea that the PRI was the best political option. Meanwhile, sympathy for Fernández de Cevallos, the PAN candidate, was determined by the vote for Clouthier in 1988; the favourable image of the candidate (experience, personality and honesty); the protest vote and the conviction that change was required. Fernández de Cevallos' popularity was influenced

by demographic factors such as age, income and geographic location. Finally, support for the PRD candidate, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, was explained by factors such as age, the protest vote and by the idea of change.

1.5.3. The Mexican voter in 2000

The year 2000 was a year of “change”, one that ended more than 70 years of the PRI's political hegemony. The Mexican electorate voted for political alternation, and this became apparent during the presidential election of 2000. This election can be regarded as the peak of the democratic transition of the country, a transition that had its beginnings in 1977 with the first electoral reforms (Becerra, Salazar and Woldenberg, 2000; Lujambio, 1997; Ochoa-Reza, 2004).

The July 2, 2000 election was distinguished by close political competition. The two parties that had the best chance of winning were the PAN and the PRI. This presidential election was marked by an aggressive debate on issues such as the economy, security and corruption. The PAN candidate, Vicente Fox, constantly called Francisco Labastida, the PRI candidate, "more of the same", referring to the 70 years of PRI rule in Mexico. Vicente Fox used the slogan of "change" to identify his policy proposal as something new, a government that would inject innovation into all aspects of Mexican politics. The "change" would mean a new form of public policy in the field of economics: a new economic programme. For his part, Francisco Labastida, the PRI candidate, used the slogan "let power serve the people", designed to convince Mexicans of the existence of a new PRI. The two candidates believed that the assessment of the performance of the previous government was critical in establishing voting intention in the 2000 electoral competition.

In summary, Moreno (2003) concluded that the vote decision in the presidential election of 2000 was determined mainly by partisan identification and the image of the candidates. PAN supporters were more likely to vote for the PAN candidate, Vicente Fox; PRI supporters for the PRI candidate, Francisco Labastida, and PRD supporters for Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, the PRD candidate. However, some PRI supporters were inclined to vote for the PAN candidate. It was also evident that the candidate's image variable confirmed that the better the opinion of the candidate, the greater the probability of voting for him.

In this way, Moreno (2003) found that presidential approval played a moderate role in favouring the PRI candidate. Personal economic evaluations resulted in weak support for the governing party. On the other hand, retrospective evaluations of the national economy had no relevance in electoral decision making. As for ideological positioning, right-wing voters were more likely to vote for the PRI candidate, whilst religious voters were more likely to support the PAN. The female vote benefitted the PRI and those voters who lived in the north of the country voted for the PAN.

1.5.4. The Mexican voter in 2006

The 2006 election is considered the most polarised and closed in the history of the country (Bruhn and Greene, 2007). The PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón, won by a very small margin, and the intensity of competition among the candidates was reflected in the media. The two leading candidates, Felipe Calderón (PAN) and Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD) both criticised the performance of the outgoing President, Vicente Fox (PAN). The PRD candidate said that if he was elected "there would be economic growth and job creation" during his administration (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2006: 3). By contrast, Calderon said that "in his government, economic stability would be maintained and this

would grow into more economic growth and generate more jobs from investment or, if voters chose the opposition party, everything would be lost that had been accomplished" (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2006: 6). The ideological differences that characterised the political contests in 1994 and 2000 did not appear in 2006. The PRD moved to the political centre with regards to their economic policy, whilst the PAN was more to the left, in comparison to previous elections (Gilly, 2006).

The decision about whom to vote for in this election was also strongly determined by partisan identification and the image of the candidates. However, other variables were relevant too. Voters with higher education levels were more likely to vote for the PAN and those of lower education voted for the PRI. The presidential approval variable was a strong determinant of the decision to vote for the PAN or the PRD. Voters who supported the administration of Vicente Fox were more likely to vote for the PAN rather than the PRD.

As for assessments of the economy, the perception of personal economy did not significantly affect the vote decision, whilst retrospective evaluations of the national economy had a moderate (and statistically significant) effect. In light of this fact, Moreno (2009) concluded that sociotropic considerations mattered more than personal ones in this competition.

In a similar fashion, self-ideological positioning had a significant effect on the decision to vote for the PAN or the PRD. In terms of contextual variables, the regional variable was also a determining factor in the voters' choice. Finally, religiousness played an explanatory role in vote intention for the PAN or the PRI, although the effect was only moderate.

1.6. Comparative analysis: Democratisation in Taiwan, India and South Africa

In *Taiwan*, the “economic miracle” of the 1950s encouraged industrialisation and social development. However, policy was controlled by a single party, Kuomintang (KMT), which combined anti-Communist ideologies with a Leninist state organisation. The “political miracle” began in 1986 with the formation of opposition parties, in defiance of the martial law established in the 1940s during the Chinese civil war. The transformation culminated in 1991 with the withdrawal of the "senior legislators," who had been elected at the end of 1940 and who were kept in key positions both in the Parliament and the Presidency (Clark, 1998; Hood, 1997). From then onwards, the people of Taiwan elected their politicians in free and fair elections. In 1986, the achievement of Chiang Ching-kuo (Prime Minister of the Republic of China between 1972 and 1978, and President of the Republic of China between 1978 and 1988) was to complete the gradual transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. During his governance, the authoritarian regime was stable and society experienced a period of prosperity. However, the political changes produced a democratisation which was almost inevitable (Clark, 1998; Hood, 1997).

The process of democratisation originated from only a small decrease in the margin of victory of the Kuomintang party (KMT). The reforms instituted during the administration of Chiang Ching-kuo gave: 1) an emphasis on economic development and the participation of the technocrats; 2) agrarian reforms, whose objective was greater social equity; and 3) the institution of free local elections, resulting in the incorporation of local parties into the KMT. However, the key element of the democratic transition in Taiwan was the struggle within the KMT (Clark, 1998).

Lee Teng-hui (technocrat and vice president in the administration of Chiang Ching-Kuo) continued with the process of democratisation in the 1990s. In 1991, Lee

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Teng-hui declared the end of martial law, causing disputes with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The KMT lost control over local factions. Finally, in 1999, the opposition leader Chen Shui-bian of the DPP won the elections, leaving Lien, the KMT candidate in third place after Soong, the candidate of the People Power Party (PPP) and ex-militant of the KMT (Moore, 1966; Hood, 1997).

The democratisation of *India* can be explained by the nationalist movements of the elite (Moore, 1966), which facilitated the transition to democracy. The democratisation of this country took place in three phases. In the first stage, democratic practices and institutions were accepted during the 1950s and 1960s (under Sri Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru). Two institutions had great importance in this period and strengthened the democratic process: the properly functioning civil service, which contributed to governmental effectiveness and political stability (Potter, 1986); and a strong political party, the Indian National Congress (better known as Congress), which had great popularity, legitimacy and support (Kothari, 1970). In this first phase, the Congress Party was important for democratisation since it was able to create legitimacy in a dominant party, and the opposition elites were incorporated into a disorganised opposition.

The second period was the 1970s and 1980s. Economic development was slow and elitist, weakening the popularity of the party in government among the lower social strata. Indira Gandhi reformed the party, as a more populist institution, and promised the "alleviation of poverty" (Kohli, 1990). In addition, she abolished the opposition by imposing a "national emergency" in the 1970s. This transformation and its populist policy weakened authoritarian institutions. The politicisation of the civil service and the centralisation of political power generated higher competition throughout the country (Kohli, 1997). The administration of Indira Gandhi expanded the scope of democratisation thanks to the inclusion of the lower social strata. The assassination of

Indira Gandhi and her son, Rajiv Gandhi, in the 1980s, led to the end of the dominance of the Congress Party.

The third stage, from the beginning of the 1990s to the present day, is characterised by the development of several regional and national political parties. The emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a right wing party supported by religious minorities (for example, Muslims), has weakened the hegemony of the Congress Party (Kohli, 2001).

In *South Africa*, the African National Congress (ANC) played a similar role to the Congress Party in India. In the first 13 years of the democratic regime, the ANC won all of the provinces with the exception of the Western Cape and Kwa Zulu-Natal Midlands. Given the context of colonisation, the democratic transition required major negotiations. In 1994, the Interim Constitution was accepted by the three major political parties: the National Party (NP), representing the ruling whites; the ANC, representing the black majority; and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which represented the black people of rural areas, including the Zulu nation. This Constitution established the parameters for the new democratic regime, ensuring equality between the white minority and the blacks, and engineered the political division of the nation into nine autonomous provinces with governors and legislatures for each one. This resulted in a federal democracy. The latest constitution was unanimously adopted in 1996, giving responsibility for the provision of education, health services and housing to each of the provinces, and also ensuring that tax is shared between the nation and the provinces.

In this transition, the ANC expanded its base of support across South African territory through the adoption of different policies that transformed existing institutions. Politically, the ANC has been so dominant and encompassing that it has dominated the NP, maintaining sympathy and a strategic alliance with the Federation of Workers

COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP). At the same time, the judiciary institutions have been given autonomy and monitored governmental development (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2012). Both the national and federal bureaucracies were professional and efficient (Heller, 2008).

These processes of democratisation have three characteristics: 1) the democratic institutions and electoral procedures are solid, and there are no political forces that reject the legitimacy of the democratic regime; 2) there is respect for the rule of law, regarding both the Constitution and the judiciary system, which serves as a political counterweight; and 3) respect for this legal framework has been safeguarded and, in some cases, has expanded the role of citizens, who in turn are more responsive (Haller, 2009).

The transition to democracy in these countries was caused by a strong and coherent ideology with a unified and highly effective political party (Bond, 2000; Chibber, 2005). This effectiveness is founded largely on the party's ability to represent popular movements and to have their support in election periods. Institutions and reforms provided the base for a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system, where citizens (and voters) are more sensitive to the political and economic context; as a result, the political parties had to be more aware of the needs and priorities of the new society (Haller, 2009). These transitions to democracy resemble the process that Mexico has experienced during the last decades.


1.7. The Objective of this Work

Almond and Verba (1963) explained the concept of political culture that determines the participation and non-participation of citizens in democratic states. Political culture consists of "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the self in the system" (Almond and Verba, 1963:11). The civic culture cannot be learned in school; it is a complex process involving several institutions such as the family, work,

school and the state. Therefore, the civic culture develops directly from political progress, merging new attitudes with old ones (for example, those developed in other political contexts). The authors identified three types of citizen orientation: parochial (not involved, with no knowledge or interest in the domestic political system); subject (somewhat aware of political institutions and rules); and participant (possessing a strong sense of influence, competence and confidence in understanding the domestic political system). In Mexico, the authors concluded that the political culture is characterised by alienation and aspiration, with a low but positive sense of confidence.

Changes in individuals' choices take place in all areas; for example, they can be observed in the level of secularisation, measured either by the proportion of members of each religion (Meulemann, 2004) or by religiosity, measured by church attendance (Tilley, 2003). It is considered that authoritarian regimes are more efficient in achieving a forced secularisation (Meulemann, 2004; Neundorf, 2010); however, during periods of democratisation, levels of religiosity presented significant changes. In the past couple of years, there has been a significant decrease in the percentage of the population considered to be practising the Catholic religion; however, more than 80% of the population is considered to be a supporter of this religion (see Figure 1.8). In this context, the decline in the number of practicing Catholics in Mexico points to a more pluralistic society, suggesting that the choices made by the citizens have changed.

Figure 1.8. Religiosity



Source: Latinbarometer

The democratic transition and economic openness led to the weakening of the hegemonic party (PRI) and guided the national and subnational consolidation of PAN and PRD. This in turn stimulated more research in the field of political behaviour. Studies of political behaviour in Mexico have taken different paths in order to explain what factors have determined voters' choices. These determinants include economic assessments (Beltrán 2000; Buendía 1997, 2000; Moreno, 2003, 2009); the effect of information and uncertainty (Beltrán, 2000; Buendía, 1997); utilitarian calculations regarding the benefits of a party's triumph (De la O and Poiré, 2001; Magaloni, 1996; Poire, 2000); the influence of socio-demographic variables (Domínguez and McCann, 1995; Moreno, 2003, 2009; Moreno and Yanner, 1995); and partisanship and the effect of psychological factors (Estrada, 2006; Guardado, 2009; Moreno, 2003, 2009).

This thesis attempts to show that there is a deeper internalisation of political matters in Mexico: has there been a breakthrough in the Mexicans' democratic culture during the years of political democratisation and economic liberalisation? This question is posed with a definition and understanding of democratic culture as being the values

and attitudes that influence the political participation of citizens. The research does not focus on an analysis of political institutions, but rather on the democratic culture generated by political democratisation and a different economic reality. The key ingredient in the analysis developed in this project is the examination of the ways in which the Mexican voter analyses, understands and assesses political issues, as well as the mechanisms he uses to participate politically. To understand the behaviour of the Mexican voter is to understand one of the most important decision mechanisms for the democratic development of the country.

1.7.1. The puzzle of Mexican voters

This doctoral research paper seeks to overcome the empirical omissions and theoretical disputes of the existing research on the Mexican voter in a new political and economic context. In three academic projects, it focuses on studying political values (human values and materialistic-post materialist values), subjective economic assessments and partisan identity. These concepts are key to the democratic development of the country. The association of these three research projects lies in the central figure of the citizen and in the way in which he internalises, analyzes and evaluates issues of a political nature.

This research theorises that voters decide who to vote for based on short-term factors (for example, the subjective perception of the economy), and suggests that Mexicans determine their partisan identification based on short-term factors (assessment of parties and candidates). This partisan attachment exhibits instability levels comparable to consolidated democracies. Jointly, it proposes that those citizens who do not come to the polls will participate in the political arena via peaceful demonstrations or by signing petitions. The determinants of whether the type of participation is instrumental or symbolic are set by political values and generational differences. This may explain the

fall in turnout despite the support for democracy as the best political system, and suggests that citizens are looking for other forms of political expression to change the status quo.

Economic voting theory shows that voters use subjective assessments of the economy to decide which political party to vote for. However, in Mexico's case, these perceptions stem from a joint analysis of the national and personal economy, in the past, present and future. In other words, voters do not make any distinction between these assessments. Rather, they form a single perception that incorporates six assessments of the economic situation. This unique subjective perception provides a good forecast of what will happen in the national economic environment.

The empirical results of the theoretical model of the economic vote, which are clearly comprehensible in developed democracies, have not been so obvious in Mexico (Moreno, 2006). On the one hand, Domínguez and McCann (1995) concluded that neither prospective nor retrospective economic evaluations were decisive in the vote decision in the 1988 election. However, for the 1994 presidential election, sociotropic retrospective evaluations increased the likelihood of voting for the PRI (Buendía, 1996; Moreno and Yanner, 2000; Poiré, 1999). On the other hand, for the presidential election of 2000, Moreno (2009) concluded that personal (egocentric) assessments impacted positively in generating support for the PAN (the governing party). However, retrospective sociotropic evaluations were not decisive. Additionally, Moreno (2009) found that in the presidential election of 2006, sociotropic assessments were a moderate factor in vote decision, and egocentric considerations were not relevant.

This difference in the empirical results on the analysis of economic voting in the country allows us to study the electoral process from a different perspective. This research contributes to the analysis of economic voting in the country, by generating a latent variable that incorporates six subjective assessments of the economy (national and

personal economy, in the past, present and future), and by complying with all the theoretical and empirical specifications. This latent variable, called subjective perception of the economy (SPE), and the voter's objective economy (i.e. if he is employed and worried about the possibility of losing his job) influence the decision to vote. In addition, SPE is related to the objective economy (GDP, inflation and unemployment rate), and it suggests that the subjective perceptions of the voters are a reflection of what will happen to the national economy. In other words, the latent variable is a good forecast of the country's economic future. Also, both the subjective perceptions of the economy and the objective economy are involved in the vote determination.

As for the analysis of political values, we theorise that the new generations - those born in the generation of political alternation - will use other mechanisms of participation (symbolic and instrumental). The components of these new channels of participation are defined by human values, as outlined by Schwartz (1992), and material-postmaterial values, as described by Inglehart (1977): these are values that every citizen possesses. The analysis also investigates the implications of birth cohort for political participation, as well as the impact of attachment to distinct values within generations with regard to the two different forms of political action. In brief, this investigation suggests a change in the country's democratic culture or at least suggests that Mexican citizens, little by little, have established a democratic political culture which is distinctly larger than that observed in the post-revolutionary era (the period in which the political parties were founded and formed).

The analysis of political values in Mexico has been limited to research produced by Moreno (2005), who found a process of change in the political culture of the country, using data from the World Values Survey (in the years 1981, 1990, 1996-1997 and 2000), the European Values Study (1999) and the Banamex Foundation (two surveys

2003). During the 1980s, the Mexicans moved from traditional values to those characteristic of a modern society. This transition towards modernity is reflected in the "abandonment of the traditional patterns of authority", a growing secularism and a weakening of the nationalism that had powered the revolutionary discourse (Moreno, 2005:50). However, in the 1990s and early 21st century, Mexicans took up the typical values of a traditional society again. In short, Moreno (2005:173) concluded that Mexican society had moved towards a reunion with nationalism in an era of globalisation; towards the resurgence of spirituality in a world that is diversifying; towards the reconsideration of deference in a country that went from authoritarianism to democracy and, above all, the gradual replacement of a culture of survival by a culture of self-expression and appreciation for the freedom to choose.

Moreno's research (2005) opened the debate about the importance of values in our country. However, he limited himself to an analysis of the development of the traditional and modern values in Mexican society. This research will contribute to the study of values both human (Schwartz, 1992) and materialistic and post-materialistic (Inglehart, 1977), and consider the effect that they have on non-electoral political participation in different generations.⁸

On the other hand, the analysis of partisan identification in Mexico was theorised by Moreno (2003, 2009) and demonstrated empirically by Estrada (2005) and Guardado (2009). For Moreno (2003, 2009) the determinants that positively influenced PRI partisanship were age, family tradition (the link family members had with different

⁸ Accordingly, it is important to consider that in recent years the party system has become more competitive, although turnout has decreased. From the study of the presidential elections in 2000 and 2006, Moreno (2003-2009) concluded that partisan identification, information level, favourable opinions about the candidates, schooling and age were determinants of participation, whereas gender and ideological stances had a more moderate influence. Negative campaigning influenced the reduction of participation in the 2000 election. In turn, voters' attitudes towards democracy and satisfaction with its progress, encouraged them to be much more amenable to voting.

political options) and voting in the previous presidential election. On the other hand, factors that decreased PRI sympathy were positive evaluations of the personal and national economy and presidential approval. In turn, the determinants of PRD attachment were socio-demographic factors (income, age and education), former partisan identity and self-ideological positioning on the left. Finally, for identification with PAN, the variables that have the greater weight are previous affinity, approval of the Vicente Fox administration and positive economic evaluations.

Likewise, Estrada (2005) showed that retrospective assessments of the economy and the rejection of political parties are determinants of partisan identity, which he describes as a stable variable over time. Guardado (2009) explained that this partisan attachment is determined by the themes developed throughout political competition.

In the presidential election of 2000, using data from MIT, Moreno (2009) argued that 62% of the PAN voters were steadfast in their partisan identification; 56% and 48% of the PRI and PAN, respectively, maintained their partisanship during that election. In general terms, the author concluded that between 63% and 69% of those interviewed maintained the same partisan attachment. In the 2006 panel study, this research was corroborated, as Moreno (2009) confirmed that between 65% and 66% of the respondents retained their partisan identification. Also, a survey by the Comparative National Election Project (CNEP-III) found that 60% of respondents maintained their partisan affinity. To prove these hypotheses on party stability, partisan identification in aggregated groups of PAN, PRI, and PRD were considered within this study.

Moreno (2009) and Estrada (2005) concluded that partisan identity is the most entrenched and most stable political attitude in the majority of Mexicans, and this influences electoral participation and the vote decision of citizens. However, in the country, the determinants of this partisan attachment have been insufficiently analysed.

Research by Moreno (2009), Estrada (2005) and Guardado (2009) define partisanship as a stable variable. However, this thesis theorises that the instability in partisan identification in Mexico is comparable to that seen in developed countries (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009; Sanders, 2004; Neundorf, 2010; Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto, 2011). Therefore, this research incorporates the theories linked to PID (social identity and rational update) in order to define the elements that influence partisan attachment. The argument behind this chapter is that Mexican citizens shape their PID on the basis of a constant process of rational update. Therefore, the partisan attachment is in fact unstable.

A number of factors suggest a greater political and democratic maturity among Mexicans, including empirical support and change in the conceptualisation of economic voting in Mexico, visible partisan instability and the effect of belonging to different generations, and the impact of the values described by Schwartz (1992) and Inglehart (1977) in non-electoral participation decisions. These areas reflect the need to reconsider the issues Mexicans consider key to democratic development. For example, in the period of PRI hegemony, assessments on alternation and democratisation exceeded the economic and performance evaluations (Moreno, 2009: 381). These changes have occurred in an environment of greater political competition and economic openness.

1.8. Plan of the Doctoral Dissertation

This investigation has three aims: first, the study of the objective economy and its relationship to subjective perceptions; second to identify the different forms of non-electoral political participation among the different generations of citizens; and third to study the instability of partisan identification in the context of the consolidation of democracy in Mexico, which has characteristics that are unique and exceptional. Although the three core chapters of the thesis are different in form and content, their

essence is the same: knowing and understanding the Mexican citizen in a democratic environment.

The hypotheses that will be proven in this thesis are:

- i. H_{2.1}: The more favourable the subjective perception of the economy, the higher the probability of voting for the incumbent party.
- ii. H_{2.2}: Subjective perceptions of the economy, employment status (objective) and concerns about future employment status (subjective) have the same effect (sign direction) on vote choice.
- iii. H_{2.3}: Subjective perception of the economy predicts the real economic situation and both variables affect voting choice.
- iv. H_{3.1}: Despite ideological self-placement, citizens who have higher basic values (either in the dimension of openness-conservation or self-transcendence-self-enhancement) have lower probability of participating through demonstrations and the signing of petitions.
- v. H_{3.2}: Regardless of ideological self-placement, citizens with post-materialist and mixed (a combination of materialist and post-materialist) values have a greater probability of participating through instrumental and symbolic actions.
- vi. H_{3.3}: The political pluralism and political alternation generations have lower probability of engaging in unorthodox forms of participation such as demonstrations and signing petitions than the party system generation.
- vii. H_{3.4}: Citizens who are part of the political pluralism and political alternation generations, who have higher basic values, have a lower probability of participating in legal and passive manifestations and the signing of petitions.
- viii. H_{3.5}: People who belong to the political pluralism and political alternation generations, who have post-materialist and mixed (materialist and post-

materialist) values, have a greater probability of participating in non-electoral actions.

- ix. Hypothesis H_{4.1}: Regardless of Mexicans' social identity, rational updating (rationalisation) is also an important determinant of party identification.
- x. Hypothesis H_{4.2}: A significant percentage of Mexicans change their party identification during the electoral period, as do voters in consolidated democracies.
- xi. Hypothesis H_{4.3}: Mexicans with weak partisan identification more easily change their PID during the electoral period than Mexicans who define themselves as strongly identified.
- xii. Hypothesis H_{4.4}: Controlling for ideology and social identity, Mexicans with negative feelings towards political parties are more likely to be 'movers'.
- xiii. Hypothesis H_{4.5}: Regardless of social identity and self-ideological position, Mexicans with positive assessments of candidates have an increased likelihood of changing their partisan attachment during the election period.

The hypotheses test three central themes in relation to the citizen: 1) the subjective perceptions of the economy and the effect of the economic context, and the influence these variables have on the decision to vote and the subsequent impact; 2) the weight of the values and political attitudes among various generations and the impact they have on non-electoral participation (signing petitions and participating in demonstrations); and, 3) the characteristics of the instability in an environment of partisan plurality and competition. All of these concepts are crucial in the structure and development of democratic systems. In addition, they will help to understand more clearly the course that the Mexican citizen and the political culture have taken during recent years.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The second chapter refines our understanding of the analysis citizens made in deciding who to vote for at the time of the elections of 2000 to 2009, demonstrating that both subjective perceptions of the economy (a latent variable) and the objective situation of the economy influenced voter decisions. In this sense, both the subjective economy and the real economy have a positive effect on the decision to vote; therefore the electorate will favour the party in power when the economy is good, in both subjective and objective terms.

The next chapter investigates the implications of birth cohorts for political participation, and the impact of attachment to distinct values and attitudes within generations on different forms of political action (for example, participating in demonstrations and signing petitions). This section suggests a change in Mexican citizens — they have a different political culture which is distinctly larger than that observed in the post-revolutionary era (the period in which the political parties were founded and formed).

The fourth chapter presents empirical evidence in order to assess whether the dynamism or instability in the partisan attachment of Mexicans is comparable to that in other democratic countries. This chapter has three objectives: to determine the factors involved in citizens' party identification; to analyse the dynamism or stability of this identity; and to identify which elements increase the probability of being a 'mover'. The "valanced partisanship" concept developed by Sanders (2004) is the most accurate definition of partisanship in Mexico. Nevertheless, this research will provide evidence that the partisan identification described by the Michigan model has not been fully achieved in Mexico, to the degree that the voters tend to differentiate one election from another, and therefore tend to elect the better positioned alternative. This chapter proposes the evolution and development of a new citizen, one that knows the concept and

the benefits of alternation and has the ability to take the experiences he or she has had, in the process of his or her socialisation, to the ballot box. It therefore suggests that Mexico today has a new generation of electors, with an unstable partisan identification, determined by social identity and rational updates.

This research will apply advanced statistical methods to important research questions with the aim of testing theories of political behaviour, political values, attitudes and political participation. This dissertation not only aims to understand why people vote or do not vote, but how they vote. It emerges from a close study of a range of connected topics, including party identification; ideology; the economic situation; social class; the interest in and importance of political issues; the source of information, and the frequency of use of these sources; the opinion about parties and candidates; the union membership; political values; the effect of political campaigns; the prospective and retrospective evaluation of economy; and other concerns like security and corruption. In this context, this thesis will try to explain the behaviour of Mexican citizens in the first years of the democratic system. These three studies are part of the new format of the doctoral thesis and contribute to the study of political science. All papers are related to Mexico.

2. Economic Voting Models

2.1. Introduction

This paper will contribute to the academic debate on the relationship between voting decisions and economic evaluations.⁹ The literature on economic voting has largely focused on the relationship between the vote and subjective perceptions of economic conditions, though some comparative research has examined the effect of the objective economy.¹⁰ To date, moreover, most studies have distinguished between (1) retrospective (past) and prospective (future) and (2) sociotropic (national-oriented) and egocentric (self-oriented) economic evaluations.

This investigation builds on previous analyses of economic votes in Mexico (Beltrán, 2000, 2003; Buendía, 2000; Domínguez, 1999; Moreno, 2003, 2009; Singer, 2007), but extends that literature by examining the relationship between the subjective economic evaluations and the real economic situation, as measured by objective indicators.

This paper extends the study of economics and voting in Mexico by:

- a. Generating a latent variable - the subjective perceptions of the economy (SPE) - that is made up of six individual subjective economic evaluations;
- b. Examining the impact of this latent variable, as well as individual employment status and concern about future employment, on voting decisions;
- c. Relating SPE to the objective economy (measured by Gross Domestic Product or GDP, growth; inflation and unemployment rates).¹¹

⁹ Voting is a discrete choice (mutually exclusive and exhaustive). Voters are allowed to choose one party or candidate, cast a blank ballot or abstain (Duch and Stevenson, 2008).

¹⁰ Bartels (2011) concluded that voters penalised incumbent governments for a bad economic situation, with little regard for the government's ideology or the global economic condition.

¹¹ Inflation is measured as the change in Index Price. Unemployment rate is measured as the percentage of people who are not employed, but who have actively searched for a job or are waiting to return to work. More precisely, a person is unemployed if 1) he/she is not working and has made specific efforts to find work during the last four weeks; 2) he/she has been suspended from employment and is waiting to be called back; or 3) he/she is waiting to take up a job in the following month.

- d. Demonstrating that both subjective perceptions of the economy and the objective situation of the economy influence voting decisions;
- e. Demonstrating that objective economic conditions influence voting preferences and that subjective perceptions affect voting intentions in special economic and political conditions.

Both the subjective perception of the economy and the real economy, have a positive effect on the decision to vote. The electorate will favour the party in power when the economy - subjectively and objectively - is positive. The effects of the economy differ over time, and the economy matters in different ways at different moments and under different circumstances. A voter's decision is influenced by both subjective perceptions and the objective economy. Voters not only adjust their subjective perceptions based on the information they have, but it is also evident that their subjective awareness is consistent with what will happen in the economy.

2.2. Economic Voting

The relationship between economics and voting has been studied around the world since the 1960s. Over 400 books and articles have been written on the subject (Duch and Stevenson, 2005; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008). Key's reward-punishment model (1966), claims that citizens will reward their government for 'good' economic times and punish it for 'bad' economic times.¹² The most consistent finding is that economic evaluations influence voters' assessments of government performance and will, therefore, also influence their voting intentions (Downs, 1957; Lewis-Beck, 1988). Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier argue that, "the citizen votes for the incumbent party if the economy is doing all right; otherwise, the vote is against" (2000: 183).

¹² This hypothesis is important for understanding accountability. Accountability is guaranteed in democratic elections by means of economic voting, since it allows the electorate to express its approval or rejection of the government.

2.2.1. *Popularity Function and Vote Function*

This simple theory of economic voting suggests two ways of studying the influence of economic outcomes on politics: popularity functions (P-function) and vote functions (V-function).¹³ The first methodology seeks to explain the level of the vote, while the second explains the approval rating of the president or the willingness to vote for him in a hypothetical contest for the presidency.¹⁴

Studies utilising the P-function have concluded that the economy matters a great deal. Nevertheless, it is less clear which specific economic variables are significant (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). In general, however, attention has switched from objective measurements (for example, inflation or unemployment, exchange rate, or public sector borrowing requirements) to subjective perceptions (evaluations of the economy). This has greatly improved the fit of the models but has raised issues of causation that need to be addressed.

The focus of recent debates in Mexico has been on whether the voters are retrospective, prospective, or mix the two considerations in some way. The issue of economic voting, therefore, touches on enduring debates about the sophistication and rationality of the electorate. According to MacKuen et al. (1992), voters can be said to be sophisticated (bankers) when they make prospective evaluations and naive (peasants) when they rely on retrospective evaluations.

Studies of the V-function are rare in Mexico, since there have been few elections that could be considered free and fair. The V-function, however, is important because it directly assesses the effect of economics on elections (Kramer, 1971). In this case, the dependent variable is the proportion of votes supporting the governing party or

¹³ Mueller (1967) conducted the first study of the P-function and Kramer (1971) conducted the first investigation connected to the V-function. For more details, see Nannestad and Paldam (1994).

¹⁴ Presumably, most of the focus is on approval because there are no trial heats until the opposition have nominated their candidate for the presidency.

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incumbent. In this type of study, macro-economic variables, such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP) are the key explanatory variables, while the popularity of the president is included as an independent variable. Most studies related to this function treat the economy as a key factor that determines voting. Nevertheless, although the investigations into the V-function suggest a solid connection between the economy and the vote, this association is based only on an assumption of information about individuals. These kinds of studies aim to explain voting decisions or the election outcome.

Surveys avoid the problem of ecological inference. Individual-level data can be used to assess whether voters are egocentric or sociotropic, and whether they are prospective or retrospective. Contextual influences can also be examined (i.e. when a party, candidate or public policies are explicitly linked to the economic evaluation). The evidence generated by surveys demonstrates that economic voting represents an important factor influencing individual voting decisions (Anderson, 1995). Analyses of party campaigns also show that the economy features heavily in campaigns (Vavreck, 2009).

In general terms, the VP-function explains the support received by a government as a function of economic and political phenomena. In other words, it can be seen as a function of demand for economic outcomes -where demand is expressed in terms of the numeraire of votes rather than the more usual willingness to pay money- (Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).

The economic effects on political results have been confirmed at the aggregate level. Aggregate approaches analyse the link between the vote share or presidential approval and the growth of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), inflation, unemployment or some other economic indicator, such as real disposable income (Lewis-

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Beck, 1988; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson, 1992). Individual analyses also suggest a relationship between subjective economic perceptions and vote choice (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007).

During the last five decades, political scientists have been dedicated to carrying out and analysing surveys in order to investigate the effect of economic perceptions on vote decisions. This paper takes advantage of the great number of electoral surveys available, to understand the associations between subjective perceptions of the economy, the objective economy and the voting decision.

2.2.2. Subjective perceptions and the effects of the objective economy

Surveys use several questions to tap into subjective perceptions of the economy (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001; Nannestad and Paldam, 1997, 2000). Individual surveys cannot be used to assess the impact of the ‘real’ or ‘objective’ economy since this is, by definition, the same for every individual. In most survey studies there is no variation and without variation it is not possible to demonstrate association. The way around this, of course, is to pool data across a series of studies conducted within the same country or to pool studies across countries. The former is constrained by the number of repeated surveys, while the latter is constrained by the need for identical – or at the very least comparable - measures across countries.

Voters will form perceptions partly on the basis of the information obtained from the condition of the objective economy (Paldam and Nannestad, 2000). Sanders (2000) concluded that perceptions of the subjective economy are those that have a bearing on the partisan preferences of voters, not the objective economy (which is measured by

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unemployment and inflation). He concluded that subjective perceptions reflect objective reality. Therefore, even if the voter does not have enough factual information about the objective economy, their perception is very close to reality. Voters can make a decision with very little information using various 'heuristics' or 'rules of thumb' (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991). These evaluations mediate the influence of the real economy on voting choice (van der Eijk et al., 2004). However, these assessments have endogeneity problems and may simply reflect partisanship or current political preference (Duch and Palmer, 2002; Nannestad and Paldam, 2000; van der Eijk, Franklin, and van der Brug, 2007; van der Eijk et al., 2004).

The analyses of the objective economy have not - to date - been replicated at the individual level. In the reward-punishment model, the basic question is whether the real economy feeds the subjective perceptions of the voters (a latent variable), or if these perceptions are good proxies of the objective economic situation.

Van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin (2002, 2007) argued that the real economy has a homogeneous effect on the decision of the voter; however, they found no relationship whatsoever with the subjective perceptions. Economic perceptions and voting choice have been accused of endogeneity problems (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs, 1997), so the effect of these relations can be spurious. Party identification is assumed to be the cause of this problem (Andersen et al., 2004; Evans, 1999a; Evans and Andersen, 2006; Johnston et al., 2005; Wilcox and Wlezien, 1996; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs, 1997). In order to mitigate endogeneity, some scholars have suggested that studies should contain controls for partisan identification (Evans and Andersen, 2006).

Both Tilley et al., (2008) and Van Egmond et al., (2009) concluded that there is a weak relationship between the real economy and subjective economic evaluations.

Moreover, they asserted that real economic conditions have no effect on the support for the party in government. Models of economic voting must demonstrate that the real economic situation influences the subjective perceptions or evaluations and that these, in turn, affect voting intentions.

Little is known about how voters obtain economic information (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). Moreover, the studies that have established the connection between the objective and the subjective economy maintain that the perceptions are good proxies of the real economy (van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin, 2002, 2007). Accordingly, in this paper I suggest that subjective perceptions of the economy are related to the economic conditions in so far as they can predict the real economic situation. In other words, as the real economy develops, the voter adapts his/her expectations and thereby stays a step ahead in the decision-making process in the subjective field, so they can be considered instrumentally rational (Gibbard, 1973; MacKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972).¹⁵

2.2.2.1. Subjective Perception of the Economy (SPE)

This section focuses on producing a latent variable created from all of the survey questions related to perceptions of the economy (sociotropic-egocentric, prospective-retrospective-current and their various combinations). This appears to make a great deal of sense. It is now well-understood that responses to individual survey items contain a great deal of measurement error, as a result of generally low levels of random measurement error (Achen, 1975), the imprecision of survey instruments (Schumann and Presser, 1996) and relatively low levels of political awareness (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). Aggregating responses across a series of related items is likely to reduce the degree

¹⁵ Duch and Stevenson (2008:12) argue that, “individuals do not make systematic (or repeated) mistakes in forecasting the future”. For example, consider the implications of the Phillips curve: economic agents can anticipate the consequences of policy stimuli for price levels.

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of error, since random measurement error will tend to cancel out and the effects of non-random errors are offset by errors from other questions. In theory, moreover, perceptions of the national economy are likely to be conditioned by perceptions of the local economy and the personal economic situation of every individual or household. Therefore, the egocentric and sociotropic perceptions are closely related. Consequently, it is difficult for respondents to distinguish between them and equally difficult for analysts to determine the validity of those responses (Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).¹⁶

Survey items that attempt to distinguish between retrospective and prospective evaluations may be subject to similar measurement problems. In theory, prospective evaluations should be based on the anticipated utility or efficacy of each political party, and voters should choose the party or candidate that is likely to deliver more. Curtin (1982) and Roper (1982) maintained that voters are good predictors of their financial situations and the national performance of the economy, and that both egocentric and sociotropic prospective evaluations contain a significant portion of retrospective consideration (Anderson, 2007; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). Similarly, Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) determined that these two evaluations are essentially the same.¹⁷ However, this is not a problem, because citizens are likely to include retrospective considerations in their prospective estimations (Duch and Stevenson, 2007; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). In other words, voters use information from the past to establish their future economic expectations (Cagan, 1956; Fiorina, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979, 1981). The empirical analyses conclude that it is very difficult to find differences

¹⁶ Indeed, it is standard practice to assess the construct validity of items by assessing whether they correlate with other items designed or supposed to measure the same construct. See Beck (1994).

¹⁷ Downs established this relation in 1957.

between these assessments because they are highly inter-correlated (Nannestad and Paldam, 1997).

These empirical and theoretical considerations support the proposition that while theories suggest that voters distinguish between retrospective and prospective and egocentric and sociotropic evaluations, in practice voters are unlikely to do so.

2.2.2.2. Effects of the Objective Economy on voting choice

The evidence from both V-functions (votes for government parties) and the P-functions (government popularity), suggests that voters hold governments responsible for bad economic conditions, and therefore reduce their support for the party in government in times of high unemployment, inflation or an economic contraction (Dorussen and Taylor, 2002; Lewis-Beck, 1988).

The macroeconomic variables of unemployment and inflation rate are a fundamental part of the economic performance of a country, and form the “misery index” (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau, and Bélanger, 2004; van der Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin, 2007). Theory indicates that increases in these variables will have a negative effect on subjective perceptions of the economy and support for the incumbents. Duch and Stevenson (2008) concluded that inflation has the greatest effect on political results. This appears to be especially true of the British general elections of 1979 and 1997.

Other macro studies by Bartels and Zaller (2001) and Hibbs (2000) suggest that positive variations in the economy (i.e. growth of the GDP) will increase support for the incumbents. Conversely, van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin (2007) concluded that increases in inflation or unemployment have a negative effect on the vote share of the government and a positive effect on the proportion of votes that the opposition party receives.

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Micro-analyses similarly suggest that voters are more likely to vote for the party that has the greater probability of reducing the unemployment rate and the inflation rate (van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007). Following this logic, Hibbs (1979) argued that voters who are worried about their employment situation tend to vote for the parties that prioritise employment (mainly parties on the left), while voters who worry more about inflation are more likely to support parties that prioritise price stability (usually parties on the right).¹⁸

Powell and Whitten (1993) and van de Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin (2007) concluded that leftist governments are more affected than the right when the rate of unemployment increases. Hibbs (1979) maintained that voters perceive the parties on the left as promoters of employment and the parties on the right as promoters of low inflation, so rising unemployment is likely to hurt left-wing governments because it is an indicator that they have not lived up to their values.

Economic voting studies also indicate that voters are less likely to support the party in the government when there is uncertainty concerning their future labour situation (Anderson, 2001). Both Pohl (2006) and Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) found that employed people have greater happiness and life-satisfaction than the unemployed. Thus, subjective perceptions of the economy appear to be influenced by employment situations (Grafstein, 2005; Pohl, 2006). The employment situation affects economic evaluations in a different manner (Weatherford, 1978, 1983). Unemployed voters have more negative economic evaluations than voters who are employed. The impact of this assessment, however, is conditioned by the party in government (Gomez and Hansford, 2011). Voters may overstate the national economic situation when they intend to vote for the incumbent party, while understating it when the opposition governs.

¹⁸ Parties on the left and right try to promote both unemployment and low inflation but the left prioritises unemployment and the right prioritises inflation.

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Depending on their employment status, partisan voters and independents will have different economic evaluations (Pohl, 2006), so unemployed independent voters will have a greater probability of changing political choice than those who have a solid or habitual political identification.

The relation between the objective economy, the subjective perception of the economy and the voting decision can develop in three ways. First, the objective economy has an effect on subjective perceptions and the latter affects the voting decision. In this sense, voters form expectations about the state of the economy, i.e. the economic policy (Duch and Stevenson, 2005). Second, the subjective perceptions of the economy are associated with certain anticipation regarding the economic situation of the country and, in addition, these evaluations influence voting. Third, voters know that the parties have different policy orientations; therefore, they make a distinction between the objective and subjective economy and clarify the effects that the latter has on vote intentionality.

2.3. The Mexican case: Evidence of economic voting

The weakening of the hegemonic party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party [*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*'], and the consolidation of PAN, the National Action Party [*Partido Acción Nacional*'], have stimulated considerable research in the field of voting and political behaviour in Mexico. The study of the economic vote in Mexico began in the 1990s, at precisely the time that the dominant party, the PRI, lost its majority in the Congress. The most important results of these investigations are subsequently described in detail in this paper.

Survey studies and studies of aggregate tendency conducted in Mexico confirmed the existence of a relationship between economic performance and support for the president and his party. Survey studies established the relation between economic performance and the vote (Beltrán, 2000, 2003; Buendía, 2000; Domínguez and McCann,

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1995, 1996; Magaloni, 1999; Poiré, 1999; Singer, 2007), while aggregate studies established the relation between the economy and support for the president (Buendía, 1996; Klesner, 1993).

Based on pre-election surveys, Domínguez and McCann (1995, 1996) argued that economic evaluations did not appear to have any visible effect on either the 1988 or 1991 election. Buendía (2000) suggested that retrospective egocentric voting was important in the 1994 presidential election and featured to a lesser degree in 1991. This variable, however, did not appear to be significant in the 1997 election. On the other hand, the prospective egocentric vote was important in the 1997 election, but didn't influence the 1994 contest. This added to the impression of variability in the relationship between economics and voting behaviour in Mexico.

Poiré (1999) maintained that Mexicans are averse to risk and that incumbency benefits the party in government. Magaloni (1999) found that voters in the 1997 election formed their prospective evaluations from their previous beliefs (retrospective perceptions), based on available information.

Beltrán (2003) concluded that retrospective evaluations didn't influence voting for the PRI in the 2000 presidential election. In the same election, economic factors were overshadowed by questions concerning the legitimacy of the regime (as it was the first free and fair election, with the possibility that the opposition could win the presidential election), and by other political factors (Magaloni and Poiré, 2004). Voters consistently punished the incumbent party for the bad economic conditions with little regard for the ideology of the party in government (Bartels, 2011). In this sense, the incumbent party loses on average about 1.7 % of vote intention for one election period (Nannestad and Paldam, 1993); thus, parties lose support regardless of their performance and ideology (Paldam and Skott, 1995). In the same line of thought, voters appear to be

dubious about a long incumbency because this might increase the probability of policy errors (Nannestad and Paldam, 2002).

Singer (2007) maintained that the typical Mexican voter was retrospectively sociotropic in the 2006 presidential election and that economic evaluations influenced the voting intentions of the elector. Similarly, Moreno (2003, 2009), by using a multinomial logit model in exit polls for the *Reforma Newspaper*, argued that economic evaluations are one of the strongest explanatory factors in voting decisions. Singer (2007), by generating an ordered logistic model on the Mexico 2006 Panel Study, and Gómez and Wilson (2006), by using a probit model on a study conducted by the survey research unit of the Economic Research and Teaching Centre [*Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas*], concluded that the electorate is primarily sociotropic and retrospective.

This paper contributes to the understanding of Mexican electoral behaviour by using advanced statistics. More specifically, this study proposes to test the hypothesis that subjective perceptions of the economy and the objective situation of the economy are both important for voting decisions. Similarly, objective economic conditions influence votes and subjective perceptions affect voting intentions in special economic conditions.

It is apparent that the interpretation and weight of economic factors varies between countries, regions, and individuals (Dorussen and Taylor, 2002; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Lin, 1999); between groups of voters (Duch and Palmer, 2002; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Krause, 1997; Kroh et. al., 2003; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1991); and between elections (Duch and Stevenson, 2008). Thus, the analysis of the Mexican case can generate new conclusions, suggest new insights and encourage more detailed research in the future.

2.4. Data, hypothesis, models and variables

This paper has three objectives. The first is to examine whether it is possible to generate a single indicator that measures the subjective perception of the economy. This latent variable incorporates both sociotropic and egocentric considerations, and current, retrospective and prospective considerations.¹⁹

The second goal is to establish the relationship between the latent variable and voting choice. In this investigation I include variables that define the employment status of the voter and his/her perception of the security of their employment.²⁰ I expect that the subjective perception, the employment status (objective) and his/her perception of employment status (subjective) will correlate positively with voting for the incumbent.

The third aim is to establish the relationship between the subjective perception of the economy (latent variable) and the objective economy (GDP growth; inflation rate and unemployment rate)²¹, and to examine the associations between these variables and voting choice.

Before presenting the corresponding results, the next section describes the data, the hypotheses, the models and the variables used in this investigation.

2.4.1. Data

This research will use data published by Latinbarometer [*Latinobarómetro*] from 2000 to 2009. The studies carried out by the Latinbarometer Corporation investigate the economic, political and social development of Latin American countries focussing on values, preferences, opinions, attitudes, evaluations and their association with various forms of political behaviour, including party or candidate choice in national elections.

¹⁹ See a detailed question wording and coding in Appendix.

²⁰ See coding in Appendix.

²¹ These variables are available online at INEGI (<http://www.inegi.org.mx/>).

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The Mexican surveys were carried out by Mori Mexico (1996–2000), Mundamericas (2001–2005), BGC Mexico (2006) and Olivares Plata Opinion y Mercado (2007–2009). In each of the surveys, more than 1,200 people were interviewed face-to-face. The samples are representative of the adult population (over 18). In general, the surveys are also a representative sample of the population in the country (95% average). The margin of error is less than 3%.²²

This data set is a major survey roughly comparable in scope to the American National Election Studies and the British Election Studies. It is intended to be a resource for scholars working on campaigns, public opinion, voting behaviour and political communication, whether their focus is on Mexico or not.

It should be noted that the Eurobarometer survey, like Latinbarometer, has been used in several investigations related to economic voting (for example, Lewis-Beck, 1988). This enables the simultaneous analysis of countries over time and provides information relevant to the integration of economic sociotropic, egocentric, retrospective and prospective variables. Therefore, these studies have the information needed to carry out the empirical analysis of the hypotheses.

2.4.2. Hypotheses

The Latinbarometer includes questions about subjective current, past and future conditions and national and personal evaluations of the economy. This enables us to estimate the unique impact of retrospective, prospective, sociotropic and egocentric evaluations on individual vote decisions. The questions associated with the economic situation are – so to speak – quite ‘distant’ from the questions related to voting intentions. The questions on economics also do not include any reference to a named party or

²²All data sets used are available online at Latinbarometer (<http://www.latinbarometro.org>). The final merged data set is available by request.

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politicians and they are asked before the questions about voting intention in the questionnaire. This reduces - while not entirely removing - concerns that responses to such questions represent a rationalisation of decisions made for 'other reasons'.

Subjective evaluations, both egocentric-sociotropic and current-retrospective-prospective, are reduced to a single latent variable: the subjective perception of the economy. In other words, the six evaluations are taken to represent a general expression of the subjective perception of the economy. This latent variable will be directly related to the voting intention of the elector. So we can expect that:

H_{2.1}: The more favourable the subjective perception of the economy, the higher the probability of voting for the incumbent party.

H_{2.2}: Subjective perceptions of the economy, employment status (objective) and concerns about future employment status (subjective) have the same effect (sign direction) on vote choice.

Similarly, traditional economic voting models suggest that the objective economy affects the subjective perception and this variable influences voting choice (Sanders, 2003; van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin, 2007). This research hypothesises that:

H_{2.3}: Subjective perception of the economy predicts the real economic situation and both variables affect voting choice.

2.4.3. Models

The generation of the latent variable, the subjective perception of the economy (SPE), requires an Exploratory (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), since it involves an examination of the relationships between latent variables and observed data. The EFA determines the minimum number of latent variables that will be

used; on the other hand, the CFA is used to establish the relations between observed variables or indicators and latent variables or factors. We will test hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 using a logit model and a multinomial logit econometric model (Kennedy, 1998b; Wooldridge 2002, 2003).²³

For hypothesis 2.3, we will use a Structural Equation Model (SEM) to establish the relation between the subjective perception of the economy, the objective economy (GDP growth, unemployment rate and inflation rate) and vote choice. This type of analysis allows the modelling of several relationships between variables. The estimator for this analysis is a robust Weighted Least Squares Estimator (Muthén and Muthén, 2010).

The EFA, CFA and SEM models were estimated using M-Plus version 7 and the multinomial logit models were estimated using Stata version 11.

2.4.4. Variables

The dependent variable is voting choice from 2000 to 2009. Those who voted PAN are scored 1; those who chose PRI are scored 2 and those who elected PRD, the Democratic Revolution Party [*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*], are scored 3. The reference category for the logit and multinomial logit is those who voted PAN (1).

For the independent variables, the sociological approach identifies class, urban and rural residence, religion, region, language and race as important influences on voting choice (Lijphart, 1981). These ‘usual suspects’ are important control variables in the following models. Similarly, according to the Michigan school of thought, ‘party identification’ has a direct influence on voting decision and also shapes opinions and

²³ Please refer to Appendices to see the Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

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evaluations (Campbell et al., 1960). Alternatively, the issue voting tradition argues the importance of issues preferences (Franklin, 1992).

In the voting models the socio-demographic control variables are: social class; religion; occupation; education; subjective income; and marital status. The following will also be included as controls: ideological self-positioning; satisfaction with democracy; the most important problem in the country; and approval of the incumbent president and confidence in the political parties, the government and the president.²⁴

Latinbarometer always asks about ideological self-positioning (using eleven response options from left to right), but no questions are asked that relate to party identification. Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) suggested that ideological self-location is linked to party identification, since partisans learn the ‘symbols’ associated with their party. Accordingly, this variable may serve as an appropriate political control variable. Lancaster and Lewis-Beck (1986) and Lewis-Beck (1988) concluded that ideological self-positioning is a preferable measure of predisposition in multiparty systems and is more stable over time than reported party identification (van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983).

For the SEM (hypothesis 2.3) we will use three variables for the objective economy: GDP growth, inflation rate and unemployment rate. For these variables, information from INEGI [National Institute of Statistics and Geography] is used. The variations presented reflect the position for the same month in the previous year for each State. The Structural Equation Model uses individual-level information to analyse the subjective perceptions of the economy (subjective economy) and macroeconomic information at State-level (where the individual lives) for objective economic variables, for example, GDP growth, inflation rate and unemployment rate. Therefore an individual

²⁴ It would be preferable to include other variables, which are not available (for example, leadership).

who resides in Chiapas will have information concerning the objective variables pertaining to that State (see Table 2.1.).

Table 2.1. Descriptive Analysis

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>Dependent Variable</u>					
Vote Choice	4,171	1.89	0.78	1	3
<u>Core Variables</u>					
Subjective Perception of the Economy	4,171	0.04	0.55	-1	1
Concerned of future employment status	4,171	2.59	1.16	1	4
Employment Status	4,171	0.68	0.47	0	1
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Satisfaction with Democracy	4,171	2.15	0.84	1	4
L/R Self-positioning	4,171	5.39	2.65	0	10
First Problem in the Country: Economy	4,171	0.45	0.50	0	1
Subjective Income	4,171	2.72	0.79	1	4
Female	4,171	0.49	0.50	0	1
Age	4,171	37.30	14.59	18	99
Married	4,171	0.58	0.49	0	1
Catholic	4,171	0.80	0.40	0	1
Education	4,171	9.13	4.29	1	17
Socioeconomic Level	4,171	3.06	1.00	1	5
Confidence in Political Parties	4,171	1.91	0.82	1	4
President's Approval	3,097	0.55	0.50	0	1
Confidence in President	2,937	2.26	0.92	1	4
<u>Macro Variables</u>					
GDP growth	4,171	2.29	3.87	-13	16
Unemployment Rate	4,171	3.23	1.47	0	8
Inflation Rate	4,171	5.43	1.83	3	10

Source: Latinbarometer & INEGI

2.5. Results

2.5.1. Hypotheses 2.1 & 2.2: Subjective Perception of the Economy and Vote Intention

The objective of this analysis is to test hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2. To review all of the results obtained year by year would occupy considerable space and time.²⁵ By pooling several surveys taken at different points in time we can observe the changes and

²⁵ For this analysis, see Appendix.

obtain better estimators. In other words, pooling several surveys increases the sample size and we can generate unbiased and consistent estimators.²⁶

Table 2.2 presents the results from four pooled models. The first model presents the logit analysis which allows us to conclude that the voters with positive evaluations of the subjective economy are less likely to vote for the opposition parties (or challengers). This variable has the expected sign and is statistically significant (*Hypothesis H_{2.1}*). This model also suggests that voters with positive perceptions of their future employment status have a greater probability of voting for the incumbent party. Although in this latter case the variables are not statistically significant, they do have the same direction (expected sign) as the subjective perception variable (*Hypothesis H_{2.2}*).

Models 1 to 3 are multinomial logit models for each political party. Model 1 suggests that voters with positive subjective perceptions are more likely to vote for PAN, the party in government (*Hypothesis H_{2.1}*), than for the PRI and the PRD.²⁷

In the comparison between PRI/PAN, *ceteris paribus*, there is sufficient statistical evidence to conclude that voters who have a job and a positive perception of their future employment status will have a greater probability of voting for the incumbent party, controlling for prior variables (*Hypothesis H_{2.2}*). In the PRD/PAN model, however, the employment situation and concerns about future employment are not statistically significant.

²⁶ More observations will produce more efficient estimators because the standard error is smaller.

²⁷ See Appendix, where other latent variables are analysed (alternative hypothesis). In table 6.3, the first study evaluates the effect of subjective egocentric and sociotropic evaluations on the decision to vote (Model 1). From this analysis, it can be concluded that sociotropic evaluations have the most significant - and expected - effect on the decision to vote. In the case of the latent variables that reflect the current, retrospective and prospective assessments, none are statistically significant (Model 2). Finally, the study assessed the latent variable of subjective perception of the economy (Model 3), indicating that it is statistically significant and has the expected sign. Furthermore, based on the results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis, we can conclude that the six questions on the subjective perception of the economy should be reduced to a single variable to increase its explanatory value.

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Models 2 and 3 add three additional control variables.²⁸ These are: confidence in political parties; approval of the president (Model 2); and confidence in the president (Model 3).²⁹ The inclusion of these variables reduces the number of available observations and years of study. However, we can conclude that subjective perceptions of the economy, employment status and perception of future employment status are relevant to voting decisions (*Hypothesis H2.2*).

In the PAN/PRI section, *ceteris paribus*, voters from the pooled sample who consider that the subjective economic perception is good are more likely, on average, to vote for PAN. This variable, however, is not statistically significant. This is a surprising finding given the large N, which should make it easier to find significant relationships. Similarly, employed workers and voters with optimistic expectations about their employment prospects are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. In this case, however, these variables are statistically significant.

²⁸ The coefficient control variables represent the direct and unmediated effect of those variables on the dependent variable. They do not represent the causal impact of these controls and the dependent variable because they do not allow for indirect effects.

²⁹ See coding in Appendix.

Table 2.2. Multinomial Logit Models Results for Vote Choice (2000-2009)

Variables	Logit	Model 1		Model 2 ^{a)}		Model 3 ^{b)}	
	PRI & PRD	Basic Model (BM)	BM + Controls	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD
<u>Economic Evaluations</u>							
Subjective Perception of the Economy	-0.52*** [0.07]	-0.38*** [0.07]	-0.76*** [0.09]	-0.14 [0.09]	-0.62*** [0.10]	-0.12 [0.12]	-0.49*** [0.13]
Concerned of future employment status	0.05 [0.04]	0.09* [0.04]	-0.02 [0.05]	0.15* [0.07]	-0.03 [0.08]	0.22* [0.10]	-0.07 [0.10]
Employment Status	-0.17+ [0.10]	-0.26* [0.11]	0.00 [0.13]	-0.53** [0.18]	-0.02 [0.21]	-0.69** [0.25]	0.15 [0.26]
<u>Control Variables</u>							
Satisfaction with Democracy	-0.09* [0.04]	-0.02 [0.05]	-0.22*** [0.05]	0.05 [0.06]	-0.18** [0.07]	0.14+ [0.08]	-0.16+ [0.08]
L/R Self-positioning	-0.09*** [0.01]	-0.03* [0.01]	-0.19*** [0.02]	0.00 [0.02]	-0.13*** [0.02]	0.01 [0.02]	-0.09*** [0.02]
First Problem in the Country: Economy	0.11 [0.07]	0.16* [0.08]	0.02 [0.09]	0.26** [0.09]	-0.03 [0.10]	0.10 [0.12]	-0.18 [0.13]
Subjective Income	-0.01 [0.05]	-0.02 [0.05]	-0.02 [0.06]	-0.01 [0.06]	-0.02 [0.07]	0.08 [0.09]	0.02 [0.09]
Female	-0.10 [0.07]	-0.08 [0.08]	-0.13 [0.09]	-0.11 [0.09]	-0.14 [0.11]	-0.13 [0.13]	-0.05 [0.13]
Age	0.00 [0.00]	0.00 [0.00]	-0.01+ [0.00]	0.00 [0.00]	-0.01 [0.00]	0.01* [0.00]	0.00 [0.00]
Married	-0.06 [0.07]	-0.04 [0.08]	-0.08 [0.09]	-0.03 [0.09]	-0.03 [0.11]	0.04 [0.13]	0.14 [0.13]
Catholic	-0.26** [0.09]	-0.23* [0.10]	-0.29** [0.11]	-0.06 [0.12]	-0.18 [0.13]	-0.05 [0.15]	-0.25 [0.16]
Education	-0.04*** [0.01]	-0.05*** [0.01]	-0.04*** [0.01]	-0.04*** [0.01]	-0.03* [0.01]	-0.04* [0.02]	-0.03* [0.02]
Socioeconomic Level	-0.03 [0.04]	-0.04 [0.04]	-0.01 [0.04]	0.01 [0.05]	0.01 [0.05]	0.00 [0.07]	-0.02 [0.07]
Confidence in Political Parties				0.14* [0.06]	0.01 [0.06]	0.26*** [0.08]	0.07 [0.09]
President's Approval				-1.20*** [0.10]	-1.21*** [0.11]	-1.47*** [0.14]	-1.34*** [0.15]
Confidence in President						-0.28*** [0.08]	-0.33*** [0.08]
Years Dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Constant	2.00*** [0.28]	0.96** [0.31]	1.85*** [0.36]	1.21** [0.39]	1.86*** [0.45]	0.14 [0.52]	2.73*** [0.54]
Obs	4,171	4,171		3,097		1,863	
ll(null)	-2,748	-4,526		-3,367		-2,043	
ll(model)	-2,610	-4,232		-3,043		-1,817	
df	22	44		44		40	
AIC	5,264	8,552		6,174		3,715	
BIC	5,403	8,831		6,439		3,936	
McFadden's R2:	0.05	0.07		0.10		0.11	
PRE	0.66	0.46		0.48		0.49	


Significance Levels + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Standard errors in brackets. Notes: a) Years: 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006; b) 2003, 2004 and 2006. Reference year: 2000. Sources: Latinbarometer

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Economic perceptions increase the probability of voting for the incumbent, as expected in the PRD vs. PAN vote model. Employment status, however, does not significantly discriminate between PRD and PAN voters.

In summary, we conclude that subjective perceptions, employment status and concern about employment prospects affect voting choice. These particular effects appear to vary in nature and the impact is sometimes significant, whilst in other scenarios there is no change or difference. For example, in the case of the comparison between PRI vs. PAN, the variables that matter are employment status and concern about employment prospects. On the other hand, subjective assessments matter in the PRD vs. PAN models (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Plot of Regressions Coefficients




Sources: The author

Summarising the results of the multivariate multi logistic regression (from Model 1), it seems clear that subjective perception of the economy is an important factor influencing voting choice. The marginal effect, illustrated in Figure 2.2, demonstrates that

this latent variable has a positive association with voting for the incumbent party, PAN, and for PRI (although this variable is not statistically significant) and a negative effect on voting for PRD. This provides considerable support for economic effects in individual-level models of voting choice in the Mexican case. These assessments appear to have an impact on the vote that is uniquely attributable to those variables, rather than to the control variables.³⁰

Figure 2.2. Marginal Effects of SPE on Vote Choice



Source: The Author

2.5.2. Hypothesis 2.3: Subjective & Objective Economy and Vote Choice


The economic voting model suggests that voters will evaluate the economic conditions and use this information to decide the future of the party in government, either by rewarding or punishing them in the next election. According to this logic, voters need real

³⁰ The presence of measurement error and missing variables (unmeasured effects or unobservable effects), that are likely to emerge given the nature of the data set and the questionnaire employed, can lead to the correlation of error terms across regression equations (Shaver, 2005). In this sense, omitted relevant variables will generate biased results; thus, if relevant variables are omitted, the ability to estimate causal inferences correctly might be limited (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). On the other hand, the type of questions asked and studied can also lead to substantial differences in interpretations (Miller and Shanks, 1996).

information about the economy. Most individual-level studies, however, have little to say about objective factors and are based on subjective perceptions (Miller and Shanks, 1996).

This section suggests that subjective perceptions of the economy (SPE) reflect the real economic situation (GDP growth, inflation rate and unemployment rate). In other words, voters have subjective perceptions of the economy that move in the same direction as the economy (*Hypothesis H_{2.3}*). This common movement suggests that voters' perceptions reflect the real world. Our hypothesised SEM is described graphically in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3. SEM Objective and Subjective Economy



Notes: n: 4,171; AIC: 32,017; BIC: 32,075.

Standardised coefficients and Standard Errors in brackets. Source: Latinbarometer

From this model we conclude that positive subjective perceptions of the economy are positive in relation to GDP growth rate; this variable is statistically significant. So we have information to conclude that subjective perceptions of the economy are related to good economic conditions (*Hypothesis H_{2.3}*).

In the next step, we analyse two additional factors: unemployment and inflation.³¹

2.5.2.1. Unemployment rate Analysis

The analyses reported in this section suggest that perceptions of the economy are related negatively with unemployment rate. More specifically, the unemployment rate is negatively correlated with economic perceptions (*Hypothesis H_{2,3}*) and is a statistically significant factor. As unemployment decreases, SPE increases; as unemployment increases, economic perception falls.

Turning first to the voting choice between the PRI and PAN, SPE appears to be a statistically significant factor. Positive subjective economic perception increases the probability of voting for the PAN. In contrast, an increase in the unemployment rate is correlated with a higher probability of voting for PRI; however, this is not statistically significant (see Table 2.3). Nevertheless, the total effect is negatively correlated with voting for the challenger party, PRI.

In the evaluation of PRD vs. PAN, voters with positive perceptions of the economy are more likely to vote for the incumbent party, PAN. In the same sense, negative economic conditions (the unemployment rate) decrease the probability of voting for the incumbent party, although this is not statistically significant. The total effect (SPE*Unemployment Rate) is positively related with voting for the incumbent party, and is a statistically significant factor (for details see Table 2.3).

³¹ See Appendix for more details.

Table 2.3. Results from SEM (Unemployment Rate)

Variables	Estimate			S.E.	Est./S.E.	P-Value
	B	[95% CI's]	β			
<u>PRI/PAN</u>						
<i>Direct Effects</i>						
Unemployment Rate	-0.04	-0.11 0.03	-0.19	0.03	-1.59	0.11
SPE	-0.55	-0.72 -0.38	-0.99	0.07	-8.24	0.00
<i>Indirect Effects</i>						
SPE * Unemployment Rate	0.01			0.01	1.48	0.14
<i>Total Effects</i>	-0.54			0.07	-8.14	0.00
<u>PRD/PAN</u>						
<i>Direct Effects</i>						
Unemployment Rate	-0.01	-0.07 0.06	-0.02	0.03	-0.19	0.85
SPE	-0.87	-1.07 -0.67	-1.00	0.08	-11.34	0.00
<i>Indirect Effects</i>						
SPE * Unemployment Rate	0.00			0.01	0.19	0.85
<i>Total Effects</i>	-0.87			0.08	-11.35	0.00
Unemployment rate ON						
SPE	-0.17	-0.28 -0.07	-0.07	0.04	-4.16	0.00

Notes: n: 4,171; AIC: 23,967; BIC: 24,024; B: Unstandardised coefficients; β : Standardised coefficients. Source: Latinbarometer

2.5.2.2. Inflation rate Analysis

The relationship between the subjective perception of the economy and the inflation rate is negative and statistically significant. Therefore, positive evaluations reflect scenarios where there is a reduction in inflation (*Hypothesis H_{2.3}*).

When comparing the PRI and PAN, we can conclude that the subjective perception of the economy and the objective economy move in the same direction. In other words, if inflation increases and there are negative perceptions of the economy voters will decide in favour of the PRI. Meanwhile, an increase in the inflation rate leads to a reduction in the likelihood of voting for the PRD. Similarly, positive perceptions of the economy increase the likelihood of voting for PAN (see Table 2.4).

Table 2.4. Results from SEM (Inflation Rate)

Variables	Estimate				S.E.	Est./S.E.	P-Value
	B	[95% CI's]		β			
<u>PRI/PAN</u>							
<i>Direct Effects</i>							
Inflation Rate	0.01	-0.04	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.57	0.57
SPE	-0.54	-0.72	-0.37	-1.00	0.07	-8.12	0.00
<i>Indirect Effects</i>							
SPE * Inflation Rate	0.00				0.00	-0.55	0.58
<i>Total Effects</i>	-0.55				0.07	-8.15	0.00
<u>PRD/PAN</u>							
<i>Direct Effects</i>							
Inflation Rate	-0.08	-0.14	-0.02	-0.30	0.02	-3.55	0.00
SPE	-0.88	-1.08	-0.68	-0.97	0.08	-11.49	0.00
<i>Indirect Effects</i>							
SPE * Inflation Rate	0.01				0.01	2.06	0.04
<i>Total Effects</i>	-0.87				0.08	-11.36	0.00
Inflation rate ON							
SPE	-0.12	-0.25	0.00	-0.04	0.05	-2.59	0.01

Notes: n: 4,171; AIC: 25,774; BIC: 25,831; B: Unstandardised coefficients; β : Standardised coefficients. Source: Latinbarometer

It is important to note that this distinction between the two types of objective economic context emphasise the fact that the voter is much less likely to vote for the PRD when unemployment levels increase. On the other hand, the probability of a vote for the PRI increases when inflation levels increase. In other words, a negative economic context will affect the available political options in a different way: inflation is more likely to hurt the PAN and PRD, while unemployment is more likely to hurt the PRI and PRD. The economic voting effect differs depending on the political party that is evaluated. These findings apparently support the earlier conclusions reached by Hibbs (1979).

In summary, the voting decision is influenced by both subjective perceptions and the objective economy; voters not only adjust their subjective perceptions based on the information they have, but this awareness is also consistent with what will actually happen in the economy.

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The investigation does not stop there. The economic situation varies significantly over the years of the study; therefore, in these case years, it is important to perform the previous analysis initially with subgroups. Van der Brug, van der Eijk and Franklin (2007) argued that the effects of the economy differ over time and that the economy matters in different ways at different moments and under different circumstances. According to this logic, the strength of economic voting is expected to vary.³²

The 2006 election was characterised by a debate about the economic performance of the Fox administration and the outgoing President. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the PRD candidate, argued that if he was elected “there will be economic and employment growth” under his administration. On the other hand, Calderon claimed that, “we can maintain the economic stability we have today and convert it into economic growth and jobs through investment or we can lose what we have already achieved”.

The party campaign propaganda similarly emphasised economic issues. For example: Calderon’s slogan was “el presidente del empleo [the president of the employee]”, and López Obrador’s advertisements argued for “un nuevo modelo económico [a new economic model]”. Both candidates thought that voters’ economic evaluations would be decisive in the electoral contest in 2006. This provides evidence of economic voting. In this sense, Vavreck (2009) concluded that not only does the actual economy matter, but also the reaction of candidates to the economy and the role it plays in the campaigns. Despite the strong role played by the context conditions, there is still an important part for candidates, their histories, their thoughts and their campaigns. Hence, the types of campaigns that candidates are running affect the stories that will in turn colour the competition and perceptions about the economic situation. Thus, the effect

³² See Appendix for graphic analysis.

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of economic conditions – especially in the USA - depends on the campaign strategies of the candidates. In this light, Vavreck (2009) concluded that the economic condition provides the setting for the type of campaigns that should be performed.

In this context, it is to be expected that during these years the subjective perceptions and the real economy might have an important effect on voters' political preference. Therefore, the extension of the model of structural equations is represented in Table 2.5.

In 2006, the subjective perception of the economy has the expected relationship with the real economy (unemployment rate) and is statistically significant; therefore, this variable is an accurate forecaster of the economic situation.

In the comparison between PRI and PAN, subjective perception influences the voter both directly and indirectly. In this context, the subjective economy is positively related to the real economy and in addition the objective economy reduces the effect of perceptions on the vote.

On the other hand, an increase in the level of unemployment increases the probability of voting for the PRD – although this is not statistically significant - and reduces the probability of voting for the PRI. Meanwhile, the positive subjective perceptions of the economy increase the likelihood of voting for the PAN, which is statistically significant in both cases. The PRD is most likely to be damaged by subjective assessments of the economy.

Table 2.5. Results from SEM in 2006 (Unemployment Rate)

Variables	Estimate				S.E.	Est./S.E.	P-Value
	B	[95% CI's]		β			
<u>PRI/PAN</u>							
<i>Direct Effects</i>							
Unemployment Rate	-0.37	-0.61	-0.12	-0.79	0.10	-3.81	0.00
SPE	-0.57	-1.02	-0.11	-0.72	0.18	-3.23	0.00
<i>Indirect Effects</i>							
SPE * Unemployment Rate	0.08				0.03	2.27	0.02
<i>Total Effects</i>	-0.49				0.18	-2.75	0.01
<u>PRD/PAN</u>							
<i>Direct Effects</i>							
Unemployment Rate	0.11	-0.16	0.38	0.20	0.11	1.05	0.29
SPE	-0.90	-1.38	-0.43	-0.96	0.19	-4.88	0.00
<i>Indirect Effects</i>							
SPE * Unemployment Rate	-0.02				0.02	-0.96	0.34
<i>Total Effects</i>	-0.92				0.18	-5.06	0.00
Unemployment rate ON							
SPE	-0.21	-0.41	-0.02	-0.12	0.08	-2.77	0.01

Notes: n: 464; AIC: 2,410; BIC: 2,448;

B: Unstandardised coefficients; β : Standardised coefficients.

Source: Latinbarometer

2.6. Discussion

This paper has analysed the economic vote in Mexico using the database generated by Latinbarometer, 2000 - 2009. This database is - in itself - of some significance, since there is very little research concerned with economic voting in the first ten years of democracy (Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton, 2010), or at least on the change in the party that held the presidency.

The paper has asked a series of questions: Is it possible to create a valid latent variable that simplifies subjective economic perceptions of the voter? Can this variable be included in the theoretical framework of the economic vote and respect the theories behind the egocentric-sociotropic and current-prospective-retrospective vote? Which of the two economic variables - the subjective or the objective - has a positive impact on vote intentionality? Do subjective perceptions reflect the real economic reality, as measured by unemployment and inflation?

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These questions are answered throughout the investigation. This paper shows that subjective perceptions of the economy can be reduced to a latent variable, fulfilling all of the theoretical and statistical requirements linked to the economic vote. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that the perceptions of the economy variable relates specifically to the objective economy and to voting intention. In contrast, the objective individual economic variable (employment status and subjective perception of future employment status) is only significant in the comparison between PRI and PAN.

This research compares the objective economy and subjective perceptions and concludes that subjective perceptions precede the real economy. In this logic, subjective perceptions and the objective economic situation are crucial for defining the vote. These subjective perceptions are very close to reality – the objective economy - and clarify the short term economic situation.

These results represent a step forward in the literature on voters in Mexico. This investigation is supported by the extensive literature on the economic situation and voting choice. The use of advanced statistical techniques has shown that – at least in aggregate - the electorate in Mexican is made up of economic voters. Mexican voters not only adjust their subjective perceptions based on the information they have, but their awareness is also consistent with what is actually happening in the economy.

3. Values; Attitudes and Participation

3.1. Introduction

This paper contributes to the literature on the democratic development of Mexico. Most studies that have examined the political progress of the country have been based on an analysis of voting patterns (Ai Camp, 2001; Domínguez and McCann, 1996; Inglehart, Basañez, and Navitte, 1994; Moreno, 2003, 2009). Little attention has been given, however, to the transformation of the values of distinct generations, values that are shaped by key events in the political, economic and social development of the country.

This investigation examines whether the country's democratic culture has changed. This question is posed with an understanding of democratic culture as the values and attitudes that influence the political participation of citizens. In general terms, this study uses the material and post-material values described by Inglehart (1977), and applies the methods developed by Schwartz (1992), to identify the distinct dimensions of human values in the Mexican case. In other words, this investigation focuses on materialist and post-materialist values; the dimension of self-enhancement versus the dimension of self-transcendence; openness to change versus the dimension of conservation and the effect these values have on instrumental and symbolic political participation (Whiteley, 2012). The analysis also investigates the implications of birth cohort for political participation and the impact of attachment to distinct values within generations on the two forms of political action.

In brief, this investigation suggests a change in the country's democratic culture or at least suggests that Mexican citizens, little by little, have established a democratic political culture which is distinctly larger than that observed in the post-revolutionary era (the period in which the political parties were founded and formed).

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3.2. Literature review

For any democracy to function, it is necessary for the citizens to hold and share certain basic values and attitudes towards different issues. The values and beliefs that citizens have regarding the political system and political actors are crucial for democratic effectiveness. Therefore, it is essential to know the contexts of these concepts in order to determine the effect they have on the various forms of political participation.

3.2.1. Values and political attitudes

The terms ‘values’ and ‘attitudes’ have been used interchangeably due to problems with their measurement (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000). For Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz values are “desirable objectives that vary in importance, which serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” (2008: 423). These are abstract motivations that justify, suggest and express the attitudes, opinions and actions of individuals (Schwartz, 1992). Therefore, they are central to understanding the attitudes and behaviour of individuals (Allport, Vernon and Lindsay, 1960; Williams, 1968).

In this sense, Inglehart (1977), by applying the logic of Maslow’s value hierarchy, described two types of values, which can be defined according to the goals they achieve. Materialist values reflect strong defence forces, crime fighting, order maintenance, a stable economy, economic growth and contesting rising prices; while post-materialist values reflect beautiful cities, the expression of ideas, free speech, a less impersonal society, more say on the job and more say in government.

Political attitudes reflect a “psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour” (Eagly and Chaiken, 1998: 269). Attitudes appear to be unstable over time (Converse, 1964), while values tend to be stable over time (Heath, Evans and Martin, 1994; Inglehart, 1985). Some

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attitudes – possibly including partisanship - may be quite stable, because they are based on considerable knowledge and feeling. In general, attitudes can be placed on a continuum, from non-attitudes where the individual brings nothing to bear on a subject, to strong attitudes where the individual brings a great deal to bear and their viewpoint is fully crystallised.

Values are relevant in the generation of political attitudes since they influence attitudes, and people may structure their evaluations and perceptions based on political attitudes (Knutsen, 1995; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Zaller, 1992). For example, some people relate to opinions on war (Cohrs et al., 2005), human rights (Spini and Doise, 1998), immigration (Schwartz, 2007), or environmental considerations (Shultz and Zelezny, 1999).

Values guide behaviour and evaluations (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). Although they develop in childhood, they are reinforced throughout life by a process of political culturisation (Feldman, 1988). Schwartz (1992) introduced a basic theory of human values, identifying ten motivational values, which take into account different cultures and religions and consider distinct theoretical discussions. These ten values are:


1. Power: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources;
2. Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards;
3. Hedonism: pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself;
4. Stimulation: excitement, novelty and challenge in life;
5. Self-direction: independent thought and action - choosing, creating, exploring;
6. Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature;

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7. Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact;
8. Tradition: respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self;
9. Confirmatory: restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms;
10. Security: safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self.

The theory described by Schwartz (1992) maintains that there is a circular structure of dynamic relationships between values. The pursuit of one particular value may generate conflict with or be consistent with other values. Figure 3.1 outlines the relationships between the values; the simplest explanation suggests that those that are closest are the most alike, while those that are farther away are more antagonistic (Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz, 2008). For example, openness to change - which refers to independent work, thought, sentiment, and preparation for new experiences - is contrary to conservative or traditional values that emphasise self-restraint, resistance to change and adherence to order. Davidov, Schimidt and Scwhartz (2008) summarise the structure of relations of the basic values in two dimensions: the self-enhancement versus the self-transcendence dimension, and the openness to change versus the conservation dimension.

Figure 3.1. Structural Relationship of the 10 Basic Values



Source: Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz (2008)

Schwartz (2005a, 2005b) and Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz (2008) have provided some evidence that this structure is applicable in more than sixty nations, although they did not study the case of Mexico. Various studies have found a well-documented empirical relationship between values and political preferences (Feldman, 1988; Zaller and Feldman 1992) and between values and electoral behaviour (Evans, Heath, and Lalljee, 1996; Knutsen and Kumlin, 2005). The measurement of values after Schwartz (1992) has stimulated the empirical analysis of the relationships between values, attitudes, and behaviour (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; Schwartz, 2005a, 2005b). However, little is known about the general relationship between these values and non-electoral political participation, and even less is understood in the specific case of Mexico.

3.2.2. Political Participation and Models

Political participation is crucial for the democratic development of a country; without participation, there is no effective democracy (Whiteley, 2012). Various forms of formal and informal participation, for example, the discussion of political issues at home or at work (Dowse and Hughes, 1977; Whiteley, 2012), are designed to influence - directly or

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indirectly - the development of the government (Verba et al., 1978). Whiteley (2012) considered that political participation can be divided into symbolic (to express an opinion) and instrumental (to achieve a specific result).

There are two theories that can explain citizens' political participation, and they reflect two different approaches: sociological explanations³³ and the explanations that put individual decisions at the centre of the analysis.³⁴ For the sociological approach, participation is determined by social status, employment status, education, income, social context, the organisations to which an individual belongs (Parry, Moyser, and Day, 1992), and the social capital of the citizen (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Putnam, 2000). The second approach is based on two models: the cognitive engagement model, where political participation is determined by the skill and disposition of the individual to assimilate information (Clarke et al., 2004; Dalton, 2005; Norris, 2000), and the general incentives model, where participation is determined by a cost-benefit calculation (Olson, 1965; Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, 2002; Whiteley and Seyd, 2002). Despite their differences, these two approaches contribute to the understanding of the determinants of political participation.

Verba et al. (1995) suggested that an individual's political participation is conditional on the amount of resources needed to perform the activity. Usually these resources are scarce and unevenly distributed in society; therefore, participation levels vary considerably from group to group (Rosenstone and Hansen, 2003). Generally, studies find that wealthier, educated, young, religious and married men are more likely to participate in politics compared to others (Armingeon, 2007). The second type of bias indicates that political interest, political opinion, subjective political efficacy (Armingeon, 2007), political trust (Dalton, 2004) and civic duty are strongly associated

³³ For more details read Coleman, 1988, 1990; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978.

³⁴ Read Clarke et al., 2004; Dalton, 2005; Norris, 2000; Olson, 1965; Seyd and Whiteley, 1992, 2002; Whiteley and Seyd, 2002.

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with political participation (Dalton, 2008). Citizens are more likely to participate in politics if they are more interested in political affairs, believe that they can influence the election results, hold more radical positions on the left-right scale and possess a higher sense of civic duty.

The study carried out by Almond and Verba (1963) identified various connections between values and political attitudes and the subsequent level of democratic participation. Values and attitudes emerge and work to support the democratic institutions; for example, voting is conceptualised as “a moral obligation” and the notion that “to not vote implies a breach of civic duty is strongly rooted” (Blais 2000: 99).

Democracy either requires – or at least strongly implies – social participation in multiple spaces, resulting in a political equality that will in turn encourage institutions to expand liberties. The degree of a citizen’s commitment and connection to the activity distinguishes the various modes of political participation: “1) elections (voting), 2) participation in political campaigns, 3) particularised contact, or 4) activities for the benefit of the community” (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1971:78). Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) suggested that these political actions differ according to four dimensions: scope of outcome (how many citizens can be affected by the act); degree of conflict (absence of presence of active counter-participants); initiative (time and effort needed in choosing how and when to act) and cooperation (the act is done individually or through interaction with others). (See Table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Dimensions and modes of Participation: Verba and Nie’s Model

Modes of Participation	Dimension			
	Initiative	Scope	Conflict	Cooperation
Voting	Low	Collective	High	Low
Campaigning	Some	Collective	High	Some/High
Communal Activity	Some/High	Collective	Usually Low	High
Particularied Contact	High	Particular	Low	Low

Note: Clagget and Pollock III (2006) adapted from Verba, Nie and Kim (1978: 316)

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These forms of political action appear to be changing, as “the old forms of political participation - voting, party work and campaign activity - are declining” (Dalton, 2005:73). People fail to participate because of a sense of political ineffectiveness (Shaffer, 1981); the lack of a sense of civic obligation (Almond and Verba, 1963); they feel little partisan attachment (Campbell et al., 1960; Dalton, 2005; Miller, 1991); they possess few educational resources (Wolfinger and Rosentones, 1980); or they exhibit some combination of these factors (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982). People with weak or non-existent party bonds are less concerned with politics and election outcomes and are less likely to vote. Political dissatisfaction, however, may also motivate a citizen to participate – provoking anger and a need for retribution (Dalton, 2008). Citizens participate when they consider that electoral decisions have a real influence on the creators of public policies (Dalton, 2005; Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley, 2004).

In this sense, Brennan and Lomasky (1993) argued that elections are decided by everyone, not just by an individual. Therefore, voting choice is an expression of socio-demographic or ideological traits, rather than profit maximisation. The authors pointed out that even if people always have the same motivations, regardless of context, this does not mean that those motivations will be expressed in exactly the same way. Therefore, Shuessler (2000a, 2000b) concluded that focusing only on ballots could generate an overestimation of this form of political participation. Therefore, it is important to consider that sometimes citizens want to express who they are and what they care about (Shuessler, 2000b); the individual acts with the objective of being someone rather than doing something (Shuessler, 2000a).

Given the decrease in electoral participation, this research examines two forms of participation: symbolic (signing of petitions) and instrumental (participation in demonstrations). These differ considerably across the four dimensions (scope of outcome,

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degree of conflict, initiative, cooperation), as previously described by Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). In symbolic participation, the participation of many people is not required; there is no conflict; very little time and effort are required; and the interaction with other participants can be almost zero. In contrast, instrumental participation requires a greater effort of cooperation. This type of participation will undoubtedly affect many people, and it can reach a high degree of conflict, therefore requiring greater effort and time.

3.2.3. Social movements: Protests

In recent years, the analysis of participation in social movements has focused on the study of factors such as grievances or complaints (Klandermans, 1997; Neidhardt and Rucht, 1993). Klandermans (2004) distinguished between the demand and supply of involvement in protests; the first refers to the potential that a society has to participate in a protest, and the latter refers to the opportunities offered by the organisers of these demonstrations.

Protest movements begin with social dissatisfaction caused by social inequality, feelings of social injustice or deprivation and moral outrage caused by some offence (Klandermans, 1997). In this sense, the classical theories argue that individuals participate in protests to express their grievances arising from deprivation, frustration or perceptions of injustice (Berkowitz, 1972; Gurr, 1970; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Relative deprivation theory points out that participation in protests is a result of the comparison of the current situation of the individual with a particular standard (Folger, 1986). Fraternalistic deprivation is particularly important for engagement in protest (Major, 1994; Martin, 1986). In the literature on social justice two types stand out: distributive and procedural. Distributive justice refers to impartiality in the provision of the outcomes, and procedural justice refers to impartiality in proceedings (Tyler and Smith, 1998). Tyler

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and Smith (1998) point out that procedural injustice is a stronger determining factor in participation in social movements, as opposed to distributive injustice.

Participation in these movements is a multifaceted phenomenon, since there are many forms of participation. Participation in protests can be determined by the effectiveness of the movement and the amount of resources allocated (Klandermans, 1984; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

The efficiency of demonstrations lies in the capacity to alter current conditions or public policies as a direct result of the protests. Empirical analyses have shown that feelings of efficacy are associated with participation in protests (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Mummendey et al. (1999) suggest that the effectiveness of a group successfully predicts its participation in protests. In the same sense, Klandermans (1984, 1997) suggests that people are more likely to participate in social demonstrations when they believe they will help to alleviate their complaints at affordable costs. In short, the basic relationship suggests that individuals will participate with greater probability in protests when they deem it will be effective and efficient (i.e. there is a cost-benefit).

Two (scarce) resources are required for participation in social movements: the time and effort required. Some forms of participation require little time and effort; for example, signing a petition. In contrast, there are other forms of participation, such as participation in peaceful demonstrations, which require a lot of time and effort. In this sense, the key aspects for participating in social protests are the availability of resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and the presence of political opportunities (McAdam, 1982).

Collective identity³⁵ (Klandermans and De Weer, 2000; Reicher, 1984; Simon et al., 1998) and emotions also play an important role in the propensity to

³⁵ Personal identity is self-definition from personal attributes, whereas social identity refers to self-identification in terms of social categories (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Collective identity concerns cognition shared by members of a single group (Taylor and Whittier, 1992).

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participate in social protests (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). The generation of a collective identity is essential for the development of protests. In this sense, the more people identify with a group, the more likely it is they will participate in the protest (Kelly and Breinlinger, 1996; Klandermans et al., 2002; Mummendey et al., 1999; Reicher, 1984; Simon and Klandermans, 2001; Simon et al., 1998; Stryker et al., 2000). Accordingly, the decision to participate in protest movements is not taken in a state of social isolation. On the contrary, feelings of grievance and unrest are strengthened in groups. Almond and Verba (1965) found a strong relationship between active participation in associations and political effectiveness, arguing that by belonging to associations, citizens get to know and learn more about the workings of political institutions. This capacity of association and participation in groups, known as social capital (Putnam, 1993; Lin, 1999), facilitates the participation of citizens in protest movements. The more politicised the members of a group are, the more likely it is they will participate in protests (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Regarding the relationship between emotions and participation in protests, anger is seen as a prototype emotion for participation in social protest (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007). It is difficult to conceive of a protest separated from feelings of anger. In fact, Van Zomeren et al. (2004) verify that anger is an important driver of participation in protests. Compared with emotions related to despair (Taylor, 2009) or fear (Klandermans et al., 2008), anger moves people to adopt a more challenging relationship with authorities.

3.3. The Mexican case

The process of democratisation in Mexico is associated with several political reforms, the most important of which took place in 1977. The aim of this reform was to guarantee plurality and incite greater political participation in the House of Representatives [*Congreso de la Unión*] and local congresses. In 1987 the rupture of the left occurred

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within the PRI, the Institutional Revolutionary Party. As a result, in 1989 the PRD, the Democratic Revolution Party [*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*] was born. In 1989, the PAN [*Partido Acción Nacional*] triumphed in the state elections and gained a reputation for political competency. In 1997, the PRI lost its majority in congress, obtaining only 39% of the national vote (the PAN obtained 27% and the PRD 26%).


In recent years, the quality of democracy in Mexico has experienced a significant relapse (Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy, 2012); on the other hand, government effectiveness has been maintained and has had a significant rebound (World Governance Indicators, 2011), despite not reaching the points observed in the late nineties. The study year of this research is 2005, when high quality democracy prevailed despite lower levels of government effectiveness.

Freedom House (2012) considered Mexico to be a free country in 2005, with political rights being tainted by corruption. In this sense, political parties and opposition groups had limited function, and no foreign or military influence entered national politics. As for civil liberties, the media were not totally independent due to restrictions placed on trade union activities and acts of social discrimination (for example, with regard to women and minorities).

Mexicans appear to have little faith in government institutions (Diamond and Gunther, 2001), but consider democracy to be the best political system (ENCUP, 2001; Moreno, 2002). Despite support for democracy, however, popular confidence in the government has appeared to decline (World Value Surveys in 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005). This is associated with (and may partly be a cause of) apparently declining levels of political participation. The average Mexican participates and contributes little to political life, even though the Mexican government is much more democratic now than it was in the seventies and eighties (Inglehart and Catterber, 2002; Moreno, 2002). In particular,

turnout (vote) has appeared to decline, from 66% in the 1994 presidential election to 45% in the most recent elections (see Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2. Democracy Score and Turnout, Mexico



Source: Unified Democracy Scores³⁶ & IFE

Langley (1988) concluded that the decrease in turnout in the eighties and nineties was due to: a) the inevitability of the victory of the PRI; and b) the inability of the left and the right opposition to develop, for whatever reason, a base of support large enough to challenge the ruling party, the PRI (cited in Butler and Bustamante, 1991: 18). Klesner (2001) suggested that these reductions were due to the decline in ‘clientelism’.³⁷ Klesner and Lawson proposed that “individuals who were most enmeshed in the PRI’s clientelistic network were most likely to show up at the polls on Election Day” (2001: 27). ‘Clientelism’ was perfected in the seventies (Shafner, 2001). However, in recent years, political parties have considerably reduced their ability to mobilize, as party membership is in decline, party activism is reduced and clientelistic practices – that provided selective incentives for participation – are phased out (Buendía and Somuano,

³⁶ Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010), by using a Bayesian latent variable approach, synthesise a new measure of democracy from 10 extent scales: the Unified Democracy Scores (UDS). The UDS score only moved into positive territory in 1988 when the dominant party, the PRI, and the leftist parties competed in a very close election. The following year, the PAN won the first state election, the government of Baja California.

³⁷ For more about ‘clientelism’, see Owen (2011).

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2003). Temkin et al. (2005), based on the evidence from the intermediate election of 2003, indicated that the level of absenteeism increased due to the widespread and growing distrust in the parties and public institutions.

There are two views of Mexican political behaviour. The first describes an attentive electorate (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1964) and the second defines the national political culture as irrational (Page and Shapiro, 1992). Supported by the theories of modernisation (Deutsch, 1961; Lerner, 1958) and its amendments (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Baker, 2000), studies performed in Mexico (Alducin, 1991; Almond and Verba, 1963; Cleary and Stikes, 2006; Domínguez and Lawson, 2003; Ponte, 2004; Moreno, 2005) have concluded that traditional and modern values coexist in Mexico. Moreno (2005) used data from the World Value Survey (from the years 1981, 1990, 1996-1997 and 2000) to conclude that the Mexicans have reinforced their traditional values (religion, nationalism, faith); however, they do not reject rationality when making political decisions.

Studies of values have been carried out in Mexico since the 1980s. However, most have been limited to the consideration of traditional and modern values, as these were thought to be the most relevant. The surveys carried out in 2000 and 2005 however indicated that values related to tolerance, diversity, well-being, quality of life, and freedom of expression have regained importance (Moreno, 2005). In Mexico, the left-right dimension (ideological self-placement) not only reflects the classic conflict between the classes (Klesner, 2003), it also manifests values and attitudes towards economic, political, social and cultural topics (Moreno, 2006). The left express their support for economic equality, freedom and a democratic government, and they express dissatisfaction with the government and its performance. They are more tolerant of homosexuals and abortion, and support issues associated with the rights of minorities.

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The right express support for economic individualism, a limited state, order, and maintaining the status quo; they value the present and evaluate public policies in a positive light. They are also less tolerant of homosexuals and abortion, and reject cultural, ethnical and political diversity (Moreno, 1999, 2003, 2006).

The evolution of the democratic system in the country has had important implications for Mexicans, who have strengthened both their democratic and non-democratic values in recent years (Moreno, 2005). Studies of the relationship between democratic values and support for democracy began in the nineties, showing great political transformation in the country (Ai Camp, 2001; Domínguez and McCann, 1996; Inglehart, Basañez, and Navitte, 1994). Those who favour the democratic transformation are more likely to vote for the PAN, and those who support the PRI tend to express authoritarian attitudes and values (Moreno, 1998; Moreno, 1999). Research related to the analysis of political values in Mexico has focused on the analysis of tolerance and obedience, concluding that obedience reflects a submission to authoritarianism and that tolerance is linked positively to the democratic system (Moreno, 2005).

Mexico presents two distinct viewpoints with respect to political preferences (Cleary and Stikes, 2006; Domínguez and Lawson, 2003; Durand Ponte, 2004; Moreno, 2005). On the one hand, it presents an environment of congruence and predictability in which opinions, attitudes and behaviour emerge from rational, consistent processes. On the other, Mexican society has become attached to traditional values, and inconsistencies can be observed in its political preferences.

3.4. Data, variables, hypothesis and models

This paper has three goals. The first aim is to generate the two dimensions of values in the Mexican case by using the method developed by Schwartz (1992). The two dimensions of values are self-enhancement versus the dimension of self-transcendence,

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and openness to change versus the dimension of conservation. The second goal is to measure the effect that these dimensions and the material-post-material values (Inglehart, 1977) have on instrumental and symbolic political participation. The third aim is to investigate the consequences of birth cohort for political participation, and the impact of attachment to distinct values within generations on those two forms of political action.

Before presenting the corresponding results, the next section describes the data, the hypotheses, the models and the variables used in this investigation.

3.4.1. Data

This research uses the data published by the World Values Survey (WVS). This data was gathered from 256,000 interviews conducted in 87 countries between 1981 and 2008. This is a major survey roughly comparable in scope to the American National Election Studies and the British Election Studies.

The WVS has been used in several investigations into related topics like perception of life; environment; work; family; politics and society; religion and morale; national identity and sociodemographics. These data sets enable the analysis of multiple countries over time, and contain information relevant to the integration of these variables (Inglehart, 2008). Consequently, these studies have the information needed to carry out the empirical analysis of the hypotheses.

The questionnaires employed by the WVS are the most important source of statistical information for studies on attitudes and values in the Mexican case. The questions associated with values are ‘distant’ from the questions related to attitudes, and also to those concerning political participation. Consequently, the structure of the questionnaire should reduce the risk – identified by Sears and Lau (1983) – that responses may represent a rationalisation of political behaviour and an effort to ensure consistency.

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This database contains a wealth of empirical information for the purpose of this investigation.

At the start, the objective in using the WVS data was to cover all years. Unfortunately, not all of the questionnaires included the necessary questions, therefore our investigation was restricted to data for the year 2005 (the fourth wave). The fifth wave questionnaire has been fielded, but this data was not public at the time this research was completed (May 2013).

Moreno, Mantillas, and Gutierrez conducted the Mexico survey in 2005. The organisation that was charged with collecting the information was the 'Reforma' group [*Reforma newspaper*]. The questionnaire used a procedure of gradual sampling; that is, interviewees were selected at random, controlling for age and gender, which is common practice in rural areas. In total, more than 1,560 interviews with the adult population (those over 18 years old) were carried out. In general terms, this sample is representative of the country's population (WVS Official Data, 2005).

3.4.2. Hypotheses

This investigation centres on the study of the relationship between: dimensions of basic human values (Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz, 2008); material and post-material values (Inglehart, 1977); and changes in political participation, both instrumental and symbolic (Whiteley, 2012).

H_{3.1}: Despite ideological self-placement, citizens who have higher basic values (either in the dimension of openness-conservation or self-transcendence-self-enhancement) have lower probability of participating through demonstrations and the signing of petitions.

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H3.2: Regardless of ideological self-placement, citizens with post-materialist and mixed (a combination of materialist and post-materialist) values have a greater probability of participating through instrumental and symbolic actions.

It is important to indicate that this suggests a difference – an expected sign - in the effect of these different values: in the basic values described by Schwartz (1992), and in the material and post-materialist values described by Inglehart (1977). The first set of basic values reflects a more moderate citizen, or a citizen tied to the traditional development of the political and institutional life of the country. On the other hand, the post-materialist values (and mixed values) are related to a modern citizen who, in the search for an improvement, is seeking new avenues or systems to contribute to national development.

New democracies are not as effective in representative terms as those previously established. Political socialisation is a crucial process in the transition of an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime (Neundorf, 2010). In general, adult citizens have unconsciously learnt to accept and live with the political system with which they are confronted (Mishler and Rose, 1996).

This investigation distinguishes three generations, all defined by important political events that brought about transcendental changes in Mexican society:

- *The party system generation:* those who came into adulthood during the dominant party system, from 1921 through to 1976 (representing 33.57% of the sample). This period began at the close of the Mexican Revolution and ended with the hegemony of the PRI.
- *The pluralism generation:* those who came into adulthood between 1977 and 1988 (27.74% of the sample). This generation is characterised by the political reform of 1977, which holds as its axis an enlargement of national

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representation, permitting representation to the minority political powers in the House of Representatives and local congresses, guaranteeing plurality and inciting greater political participation.

- Lastly, the *alternation generation*: those who came to adulthood during the period from 1989, when the PAN won its first election for the governor in Baja California, up until the present day (representing 38.69% of the sample).

To define these generational groups, researchers have used evidence about when individuals acquire their attitudes. They have suggested that adolescents around the age of 14 or 15 begin to have consciousness of the political world (Mishler and Rose, 2007). The ranges of birth cohort are:

- *The party system generation*: those who were born before 1962;
- *The pluralism generation*: those born between 1963 and 1974;
- *The alternation generation*: those born after 1974.

Therefore, the generational hypothesis suggests:

H_{3.3}: The political pluralism and political alternation generations have lower probability of engaging in unorthodox forms of participation such as demonstrations and signing petitions than the party system generation.

This relationship suggests that citizens from the contemporary generations have lost the connection and the sympathy with the political process, due to a change in the social structure; a reduction in partisanship, or the inexistence of ideological differences between political parties; a null civic commitment; or a significant decrease in the incentive not to participate (Whiteley, 2012).

By knowing the effects of values and generations on symbolic and instrumental political participation, this research analyses the discrepancy in the weights

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that each generation places on the values. It further assesses the ways in which the structure of the determinants of political participation varies according to these generations and, consequently, according to the process of socialisation of the individual. As a result, basic, post-materialist and mixed values are expected to have greater weight for future generations, and primarily for those socialised in a democratic regime.

Membership of a generation influences the weight that citizens give to each dimension of political values. Accordingly:

H_{3.4}: Citizens who are part of the political pluralism and political alternation generations, who have higher basic values, have a lower probability of participating in legal and passive manifestations and the signing of petitions.

H_{3.5}: People who belong to the political pluralism and political alternation generations, who have post-materialist and mixed (materialist and post-materialist) values, have a greater probability of participating in non-electoral actions.

Birth cohort and political values are determinants in deciding the type of political action that citizens take.

3.4.3. Variables

For the *dependent variable*, this paper distinguishes between two types of political participation, *instrumental* and *symbolic*, previously described by Whiteley (2012). The attendance at a peaceful/lawful demonstration variable is used to indicate instrumental political participation, while signing a petition is used to indicate symbolic participation.³⁸

For the *independent variables*, each of the constructs generated represents an abstract concept, developed from the observed variables. The two constructs relating to

³⁸ For coding see Appendix.

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basic humans values are based on the ten basic values identified by Schwartz (1992). These are: 1) power; 2) social achievement; 3) hedonism; 4) stimulation; 5) self-direction; 6) universalism; 7) benevolence; 8) tradition; 9) confirmatory; and 10) security.

Responses to survey items measuring these elements are used to create two latent variables, and these variables can be used to summarise the basic values: self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence and openness to change vs. conservation.³⁹ All of the variables are codified from the smallest to the largest.

For the materialist and post-materialist values defined by Inglehart (1977), the index generated by the World Values Survey will be used for the year of study. For *attitudes* we use the variable importance of democracy and satisfaction with the financial situation of one's household. The *control variables* used are based on ideological self-placement⁴⁰ and socio-demographic variables (e.g. education, employment status, income, age, gender, subjective social class, civil state and religion).⁴¹

Table 3.2 presents the descriptive analysis of the variables used in this research.

³⁹ In practice, however, the two dimensions are highly correlated.

⁴⁰ Ideology incorporates different political values that can coexist and that can be united by a coherent logic, in the sense that beliefs are thought to go together (Converse, 1964). Ideology provides a benchmark that helps to evaluate various political attitudes, simplifying the process by which citizens develop their political preferences (Sniderman and Bullock, 2004).

⁴¹ For question wording and coding, see Appendix.

Table 3.2. Descriptive Analysis

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>Dependent Variables</u>					
Signing of petitions	703	0.66	0.47	0	1
Demonstrations	703	0.63	0.48	0	1
<u>Core Variables</u>					
Self-Transcendence-Self-Enhancement	703	1.17	0.71	0	5
Openness-Conservation	703	1.05	0.34	0	2
Mix Values	703	0.62	0.48	0	1
Postmaterialism Values	703	0.21	0.41	0	1
Materialims Values	703	0.17	0.38	0	1
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Importance of Democracy	703	8.82	2.09	1	10
Satisfaction with Financial Situation	703	7.32	2.53	1	10
Ideological self-placement	703	6.15	2.91	1	10
Age	703	37.34	14.12	18	84
Female	703	0.47	0.50	0	1
Subjective Social Class	703	3.80	1.01	1	6
Educational Level	703	4.54	2.41	1	8
Married	703	0.66	0.47	0	1
Employment Status	703	0.57	0.50	0	1
Catholic	703	0.89	0.31	0	1

Source: World Values Survey, 2005

3.4.4. Models

The construct variables are generated using Exploratory (EFA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), because this is necessary to explore the relationship between operational indicators and theoretical constructs. The EFA determines the minimum number of latent variables; on the other hand, the CFA establishes the relations between the variables. Having generated these constructs we will test hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 using a logit (Wooldridge 2002, 2003); for hypothesis 3.3 we use a main effect analysis (Mitchell and Chen, 2005); and for hypotheses 3.4 and 3.5 we will use a multigroup logit model (Muthén and Muthén, 2010).

The EFA, CFA and multigroup logit models were estimated using M-Plus version 7. The main effect analysis and the logit models were estimated using STATA version 11.


3.5. Findings

To test the hypothesis of this research, it is necessary to generate the latent variables linked to these two value dimensions. Therefore, the first aim is to establish the feasibility of the generation of these variables.

For Brown (2006), three methodologies exist for determining the number of necessary factors: 1) the Kaiser-Guttman rule; 2) the screen test; and 3) parallel analysis. In this study, the first two will be used to constitute the number of latent variables.

In the case of the Kaiser “criterion”, this model has two eigenvalues greater than 1 (eigenvalues = 2.875 and 1.591). From the graphic representation (see Figure 3.3) we can determine that the minimum optimum number of latent variables required, to explain the correlation between the observed variables, is equal to 2.

Figure 3.3. Eigenvalues for EFA, Values



Source: The author

Therefore, following the argument described by Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz (2008: 424), “two dimensions summarise the structure of relations among the basic values”: the self-enhancement versus self-transcendence dimension and the openness to change versus conservation dimension.

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To evaluate the adjustment of the model on a CFA, Yu (2002) considered that the best evaluation method is based on the WRMR (less than 1) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), which should be less than 0.06. On the other hand, Bentler (1990) pointed out that for a model to adjust correctly the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) should approach the range of 0.90 – 0.95 and Yu (2002) concluded that the models with Comparative Fit Indices (CFI) at a cut-off value close to 0.96 are acceptable when there is an $N \geq 250$. This model has an RMSEA equal to 0.019; meanwhile, the CFI is 0.998, the TLI is equal to 0.992 and the WRMR is equal to 0.278. Therefore, the model is correctly adjusted. In this sense, all of the loading factors - not including power - are statistically significant with a p value $< 1\%$, and are more than sufficient for generation of the latent variable related to the basic values (for details see Table 3.3).

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Table 3.3. Unstandardised and Standardised Coefficients for Values

Variables	Estimate	β	S.E.	Est./S.E.	P-Value
Openness - Conservation by					
Self-Direction	1.00	0.37	0.05	7.99	0.00
Hedonism	0.86	0.31	0.06	5.67	0.00
Stimulation	0.81	0.30	0.07	4.43	0.00
Security	1.43	0.53	0.04	12.00	0.00
Conformity	1.21	0.44	0.04	10.86	0.00
Tradition	1.17	0.43	0.05	9.34	0.00
Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement by					
Benevolence	1.00	0.66	0.04	16.01	0.00
Universalism	0.86	0.57	0.07	8.60	0.00
Achievement	0.81	0.54	0.04	13.46	0.00
Power	0.08	0.05	0.06	0.83	0.41
Self-Transcendence - Self-Enhancement by Openness - Conservation					
	0.24	0.99	0.06	15.58	0.00
<i>Security with</i>					
Self-Direction	0.11	0.14	0.05	2.88	0.00
<i>Universalism with</i>					
Achievement	-0.03	-0.05	0.07	-0.75	0.46
Conformity	0.10	0.14	0.05	2.65	0.01
Stimulation	-0.11	-0.14	0.07	-2.22	0.03
Hedonism	-0.06	-0.08	0.05	-1.44	0.15
Benevolence	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.89	0.37
Power	-0.10	-0.12	0.05	-2.28	0.02
<i>Tradition with</i>					
Hedonism	-0.04	-0.04	0.05	-0.92	0.36
Self-direction	-0.05	-0.06	0.05	-1.43	0.15
Conformity	0.10	0.13	0.04	2.95	0.00
Stimulation	-0.10	-0.11	0.05	-2.11	0.04
Power	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	-1.05	0.29
Universalism	0.13	0.18	0.05	3.64	0.00
<i>Stimulation with</i>					
Benevolence	-0.11	-0.15	0.08	-1.95	0.05
Security	-0.17	-0.21	0.06	-3.43	0.00
Achievement	0.18	0.23	0.06	4.10	0.00
Power	0.29	0.30	0.04	7.39	0.00
Hedonism	0.18	0.19	0.05	4.05	0.00
<i>Hedonism with</i>					
Security	0.16	0.20	0.04	4.61	0.00
<i>Achievement with</i>					
Power	0.19	0.23	0.05	4.63	0.00
Hedonism	0.17	0.21	0.05	4.54	0.00
<i>Power with</i>					
Benevolence	-0.05	-0.07	0.06	-1.06	0.29
Hedonism	0.23	0.24	0.04	5.58	0.00
Self-direction	0.18	0.19	0.05	4.32	0.00
<i>Conformity with</i>					
Hedonism	-0.09	-0.10	0.05	-2.27	0.02

Notes: Estimate, Unstandardised coefficients; β , Standardised coefficients. Source: WVS

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As a result, it is possible to replicate the analysis of the basic values developed by Schwartz (1992). The next step will test the three hypotheses described above. A logistic regression will be used to test hypothesis 3.1. The models are displayed in Table 3.4, including important control variables such as socio demographic and ideological orientation, as well as some variables relating to attitudes, in order to provide estimates of the unique effect of political values on distinct political actions.

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Table 3.4. Logistic Regression on Political Participation

Variables	Demonstrations				Signing of petitions			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Beta	Odds	Beta	Odds	Beta	Odds	Beta	Odds
<u>Schwartz's Values</u>								
Openness-Conservation	-0.43+	0.65+			-0.29	0.75		
	[0.24]	[0.16]			[0.25]	[0.18]		
Self-Transcendence-Self-Enhancement			-0.25*	0.78*			-0.18	0.83
			[0.11]	[0.09]			[0.12]	[0.10]
<u>Inglehart's Values</u>								
Mix Values	0.25	1.29	0.24	1.28	0.35	1.42	0.35	1.41
	[0.22]	[0.28]	[0.22]	[0.28]	[0.22]	[0.31]	[0.22]	[0.31]
Postmaterialism Values	0.54*	1.71*	0.53*	1.70*	0.54*	1.71*	0.53+	1.71+
	[0.27]	[0.46]	[0.27]	[0.46]	[0.27]	[0.47]	[0.27]	[0.46]
<u>Attitudes</u>								
Importance of Democracy	0.05	1.05	0.05	1.06	0.06	1.06	0.06	1.06
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.04]
Satisfaction with Financial Situation	-0.04	0.96	-0.04	0.97	-0.01	0.99	-0.01	0.99
	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]
<u>Ideology</u>								
Ideological self-placement	-0.06*	0.94*	-0.06*	0.94*	-0.01	0.99	-0.01	0.99
	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]
<u>Socio-demographics</u>								
Age	0.01	1.01	0.01	1.01	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Female	-0.05	0.95	-0.05	0.95	-0.09	0.92	-0.09	0.91
	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.18]
Subjective Social Class	-0.13	0.88	-0.12	0.88	0.13	1.13	0.13	1.14
	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.10]
Educational Level	0.16***	1.17***	0.16***	1.17***	0.16***	1.18***	0.16***	1.18***
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]
Married	0	1	-0.01	0.99	0.21	1.24	0.21	1.23
	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.23]	[0.18]	[0.22]
Employment Status	0.27	1.32	0.27	1.32	0.2	1.22	0.2	1.22
	[0.19]	[0.25]	[0.19]	[0.25]	[0.20]	[0.24]	[0.20]	[0.24]
Catholic	-0.17	0.85	-0.17	0.84	-0.36	0.7	-0.36	0.7
	[0.27]	[0.23]	[0.27]	[0.22]	[0.28]	[0.20]	[0.28]	[0.20]
Constant	0.36		0.19		-0.76		-0.86	
	[0.69]		[0.66]		[0.70]		[0.68]	
Observations	703		703		703		703	
AIC	911		910		880		879	
BIC	975		973		944		943	
Degrees of Freedom	13		13		13		13	
McFadden's R2	0.05		0.05		0.06		0.06	
PRE	0.65		0.65		0.67		0.67	

Significance Levels + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
Reference Categories: Inglehart's Values: Materialist Values


Models 1 to 4 confirm that the basic values established by Schwartz (1992) are associated with lower political participation in demonstrations and the signing of

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petitions, even when controlling for attitudes, ideology and other variables (education; social class; gender; age).

Citizens who have higher values in the dimensions of openness versus conservation and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence are less likely to participate in passive demonstrations and the signing of petitions (*Hypothesis H_{3.1}*).⁴² However, these variables are statistically significant only when the analysis is made with regard to participation in legal and peaceful demonstrations. The marginal effect, illustrated in Figure 3.4, demonstrates that these values have a negative association with instrumental and symbolic participation. This provides considerable support for the testing of the *Hypothesis H_{3.1}*. On this evidence, at least, people who have stronger basic values (Schwartz's Values) are less likely to engage in acts that could be linked to a rejection of the government.

Figure 3.4. Marginal Effects of Schwartz's Values




Source: The author

⁴² It is important to remember that the correlation between the two dimensions defined by Schwartz (1992) is very high.

Ceteris paribus, the post materialists and mixed values described by Inglehart (1977) have the expected sign (positive); however, only the post-materialist variable is significant in all cases (*Hypothesis H_{3.2}*). This suggests that citizens who believe that they have post-materialist values are more likely to participate in a symbolic way, and those who have exclusively materialistic values participate in instrumental ways (see Figure 3.5.).

Figure 3.5. Plot of Regressions Coefficients




Source: The author

To test *Hypothesis H_{3.3}*, an analysis of the main effect was developed. This type of graph analysis evaluates the effect of averaging variables across all of the other variables in the model. Each graph represents the relationship between the dummy variable of the generation (either the pluralism generation or the alternation generation),

and the probability of participating in an instrumental or symbolic action while considering the contribution of the covariates (CC).⁴³

Figure 3.6 presents the generation gap that exists in terms of participation in demonstrations; it shows how the difference between the predicted probabilities slightly decreases as the CC changes from the 20th to the 80th percentile. In other words, citizens in the pluralism and political alternation generations - compared to the party system generation - have lower probability of participation in demonstrations (*Hypothesis H_{3.3}*); nevertheless, this difference is very small.


**Figure 3.6. Main Effect analysis on Demonstrations,
Predicted probabilities as function of CC**



Source: The author

⁴³ Covariate Contribution is an index that represents the composite influence of all of the covariates.

**Figure 3.7. Main Effect analysis on Signing of Petitions,
Predicted probabilities as function of CC**



Source: The author

Figure 3.7 presents the main effect of the dependent variable: signing of petitions. These graphical representations suggest that, compared to the citizens of the party system generation, citizens who belong to the pluralism generation have a lower probability of participating in a symbolic way. In other words, the differences between various predicted probabilities vary as changes occur in the CC. However, compared to citizens belonging to the alternation generation, the results reveal no variation in the probability of participating in the signing of petitions (*Hypothesis H_{3.3}*).

To verify the relationship between these distinct generations and the weight they place on political values, logit models were developed by groups. These are defined by each of the three generations.

Table 3.5. Logistic Model on Political Participation, Group Analysis

Variables	Demonstrations						Signing of Petitions					
	Model 5			Model 6			Model 7			Model 8		
	β	Odds	S.E.	β	Odds	S.E.	β	Odds	S.E.	β	Odds	S.E.
<u>Party System Generation</u>												
<i>Schwartz's Values</i>												
Openness-Conservation	0.36	1.43	0.46				-0.11	0.89	0.46			
Self-Transcendence-Self-Enhancement				0.07	1.07	0.21				-0.15	0.86	0.21
<i>Inglehart's Values</i>												
Postmaterialism Values	-0.01	0.99	0.48	0.01	1.01	0.48	-0.15	0.86	0.52	-0.14	0.87	0.52
Mix Values	0.49	1.64	0.38	0.50	1.65	0.38	-0.18	0.84	0.38	-0.18	0.84	0.38
<i>Attitudes</i>												
Importance of Democracy	0.09	1.09	0.06	0.09	1.10	0.06	0.06	1.07	0.07	0.07	1.07	0.07
Satisfaction with Financial Situation	0.00	1.00	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.06	-0.01	0.99	0.06	-0.01	0.99	0.06
<i>Ideology</i>												
Ideological self-placement	-0.11	0.90	0.06	-0.11	0.90	0.05	-0.01	0.99	0.05	-0.01	0.99	0.05
<i>Socio-demographics</i>												
Female	-0.26	0.77	0.32	-0.26	0.77	0.32	0.36	1.43	0.33	0.36	1.43	0.33
Subjective Social Class	-0.46	0.63	0.18	-0.46	0.63	0.18	-0.06	0.94	0.16	-0.06	0.95	0.17
Educational Level	0.19	1.21	0.07	0.20	1.22	0.07	0.22	1.24	0.06	0.22	1.24	0.06
Married	0.56	1.74	0.33	0.54	1.72	0.33	0.14	1.15	0.35	0.13	1.14	0.35
Employment Status	0.39	1.48	0.33	0.39	1.48	0.33	0.63	1.88	0.33	0.64	1.90	0.33
Catholic	-0.09	0.92	0.47	-0.10	0.90	0.47	0.04	1.04	0.43	0.02	1.02	0.44
<u>Pluralism Generation</u>												
<i>Schwartz's Values</i>												
Openness-Conservation	-0.44	0.65	0.55				-0.25	0.78	0.56			
Self-Transcendence-Self-Enhancement				-0.32	0.73	0.28				-0.20	0.82	0.27
<i>Inglehart's Values</i>												
Postmaterialism Values	-0.21	0.81	0.52	-0.22	0.80	0.53	0.73	2.07	0.54	0.72	2.06	0.53
Mix Values	-0.54	0.58	0.41	-0.56	0.57	0.42	0.61	1.84	0.43	0.60	1.82	0.43
<i>Attitudes</i>												
Importance of Democracy	-0.01	0.99	0.07	-0.01	0.99	0.07	0.10	1.10	0.08	0.10	1.10	0.08
Satisfaction with Financial Situation	-0.02	0.98	0.07	-0.02	0.98	0.07	0.03	1.04	0.07	0.04	1.04	0.07
<i>Ideology</i>												
Ideological self-placement	-0.03	0.98	0.06	-0.03	0.98	0.06	-0.02	0.98	0.06	-0.02	0.98	0.06
<i>Socio-demographics</i>												
Female	-0.30	0.74	0.40	-0.32	0.73	0.40	-1.12	0.33	0.42	-1.13	0.32	0.41
Subjective Social Class	0.03	1.03	0.17	0.03	1.03	0.17	-0.04	0.96	0.17	-0.04	0.96	0.17
Educational Level	0.15	1.16	0.07	0.15	1.16	0.07	0.15	1.16	0.08	0.15	1.16	0.08
Married	-0.16	0.85	0.41	-0.14	0.87	0.41	0.42	1.52	0.40	0.43	1.53	0.40
Employment Status	0.24	1.27	0.41	0.21	1.24	0.41	-0.67	0.51	0.44	-0.69	0.50	0.44
Catholic	0.26	1.30	0.48	0.29	1.33	0.48	-0.06	0.95	0.53	-0.04	0.97	0.53
<u>Alternation Generation</u>												
<i>Schwartz's Values</i>												
Openness-Conservation	-1.10	0.33	0.37				-0.57	0.57	0.40			
Self-Transcendence-Self-Enhancement				-0.49	0.61	0.17				-0.28	0.75	0.18
<i>Inglehart's Values</i>												
Postmaterialism Values	1.12	3.05	0.42	1.11	3.03	0.42	1.15	3.16	0.44	1.15	3.14	0.44
Mix Values	0.51	1.66	0.37	0.50	1.65	0.37	0.72	2.05	0.39	0.72	2.05	0.39
<i>Attitudes</i>												
Importance of Democracy	0.06	1.07	0.07	0.06	1.07	0.07	0.00	1.00	0.08	0.00	1.00	0.08
Satisfaction with Financial Situation	-0.02	0.98	0.06	-0.01	0.99	0.06	0.01	1.01	0.06	0.01	1.01	0.06
<i>Ideology</i>												
Ideological self-placement	-0.08	0.92	0.05	-0.08	0.92	0.05	-0.02	0.98	0.05	-0.02	0.98	0.05
<i>Socio-demographics</i>												
Female	0.20	1.23	0.30	0.21	1.24	0.30	0.09	1.09	0.32	0.09	1.09	0.32
Subjective Social Class	-0.04	0.97	0.15	-0.04	0.97	0.15	0.42	1.52	0.16	0.42	1.52	0.16
Educational Level	0.11	1.11	0.08	0.10	1.11	0.08	0.20	1.23	0.08	0.20	1.22	0.08
Married	-0.36	0.70	0.29	-0.36	0.70	0.29	0.15	1.17	0.32	0.15	1.16	0.32
Employment Status	0.22	1.25	0.30	0.22	1.25	0.30	0.37	1.45	0.32	0.37	1.45	0.32
Catholic	-0.84	0.43	0.54	-0.86	0.42	0.54	-1.51	0.22	0.64	-1.52	0.22	0.64

Notes: Significant values in bolds. Reference Categories Inglehart's Values: Materialist Values

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Table 3.5 shows the analysis of the logit models by groups. It describes the symbolic and instrumental political participation according to the two value dimensions described by Schwartz (1992), and the values defined by Inglehart (1977). In the same sense, Figure 3.8 presents a graph representation of the logit regressions coefficients for Schwartz's and Inglehart's values.

These models imply that for the party system and pluralism generations, demographic variables (i.e. education level, marital status and social class) define participation in peaceful demonstrations and the signing of petitions. For example, married citizens of the party system generation who are more educated are more likely to participate instrumentally. In the same manner, men belonging to the pluralism generation who are more educated are more likely to participate in a symbolic way. For these two generations, the variables relevant for this project (Schwartz's values and Inglehart's values) are not statistically significant (*Hypothesis H_{3,4}* and *Hypothesis H_{3,5}*).


The analysis of the alternation generation concluded that the values in the dimension of openness-conservation and self-transcendence/self-enhancement (*Hypothesis H_{3,4}*), as well as the post materialist values (*Hypothesis H_{3,5}*), determine citizens' participation in demonstrations. These variables are statistically significant and have the expected sign. On the other hand, the demographic variables and control variables are not significant.

The symbolic participation of the alternation generation is determined by the values dimensions of openness vs. conservation and post-materialists and mixed values. These variables are statistically significant and have the expected sign. On the other hand, some demographic variables, such as subjective social class and education, are crucial (and statistically significant) in this political participation. In the same sense, other socio demographic variables, such as employment status, or being Catholic, which are

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statistically significant in models that include openness-conservation and self-transcendence/self-enhancement, also define the determination of the symbolic participation. It is important to mention that the self-transcendence/self-enhancement dimension appears to be a significant determinant of participation in the signing of petitions, although only at $p = .10$.

Figure 3.8. Plot of Logit Regressions Coefficients by Generations



Source: The author

Therefore, we have found empirical evidence to conclude that political values and generational differences significantly influence the participation of citizens in instrumental and symbolic participation (*Hypothesis H_{3.4} and Hypothesis H_{3.5}*). In other words, we establish that there are generational differences in the way that political values apply to political participation. The greater the degree of the values that people maintain, in addition to their identification with the democratic regime (from membership in the generation of political alternation), the less likely they are to engage in other political activities. Additionally, in the models linked to both types of participation, attitudes were

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not statistically significant; therefore, in 2005, political participation was determined exclusively by the citizens' political values and generational differences.

3.6. Discussion

Every country is characterised by specific political attributes. Political attitudes and attributes are determined by the structure of the political system. The democratic transition in Mexico shaped and influenced the conversion of a state party system (that was in agony) to a multiparty system and, after 1996, the autonomy and independence of the Federal Electoral Institute [*Instituto Federal Electoral*]. It created a system largely tripartite in legislative power; a semi-authoritarian political culture fed by democratic principles; and a federalism weakened by dependence on financial resources (Ai Camp, 1999).

In recent years, various analysts have dedicated a great portion of their time and intellectual energy to the comprehension and explanation of the process of political change in Mexico. Silva-Herzog described the Mexican regime as a creature replete with 'buts': "authoritarian but civil; not competitive but with periodic elections; hyper-presidential but with a large institutional continuity; with a hegemonic party of revolutionary origin but without a closed ideology, corporate but inclusive" (1999: 18). For his part, Reyes Heróles (1999) concluded that Mexicans want modernity, but they also want to remain the same. In this phenomenon of transformation with great limitations, Aguilar Camín (2000) noted that the public has sought political transformation, inciting great change while still dragging along obstacles that impede the development of the democratic system. Mexicans, according to Aguilar Camín, "do not believe in law, don't support authority, expect from the government more than it gives...their historic memory is full of poor democratic lessons and glorifies violence, defeat, victimisation and distrust" (2000: 104). That said, Mexicans have distanced

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themselves from the political arena because of their distrust of political institutions. This has caused a significant drop in the level of citizen participation.

However, despite these deficiencies in the country's political culture, one of the most important changes in the democratic development is that Mexicans feel that decision-making in the family is defined as a personal action, with a high level of pluralism. In this sense, an authoritarian family environment leads to the support of authoritarianism and, in turn, a non-authoritarian family environment instils non-authoritarian political models. Ai Camp (1999) suggested that these long-term trends will drive a stronger democratic political regime.

The change in politics constitutes a relevant event in Mexico's political and historic development, and represents an opportunity to study the factors that intervene in the democratic transition of the country. The objective of this investigation was to identify how the political values and distinct generations of Mexicans determine the various forms of political participation. Various analyses have demonstrated the great importance of structural factors (e.g. education and income) when defining the concepts of participation and political culture (Moreno, 2005, 2009); however, this analysis goes beyond purely socioeconomic factors.

This investigation has analysed the effect that dimensions of defined values have, according to Schwartz (1992), on instrumental and symbolic political participation (Whiteley, 2012). It has also considered the impact of various generational differences on the nature and level of participation. The study was carried out using information published by the World Values Survey in 2005.

Is it possible to replicate the analysis of political values developed by Davidov et al. (2008) for the case of Mexico? Do basic values and material-post-material values have a determining effect on the distinct forms of political participation? Is the process

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of socialisation as measured by a citizen's generation, a decisive factor in the increase in political participation? Do the determinants of symbolic and instrumental political participation vary according to the generation of the individual? Do different kinds of values determine the participation of citizens in contemporary generations? Do socio-demographic factors determine the participation of the authoritarian or non-democratic generations?

In general terms, all of these questions are answered throughout the investigation. In summary, the empirical models presented in this research demonstrate a clear relationship between political generation and values on instrumental and symbolic participation. Basic values have a negative effect on the various forms of participation; meanwhile, the effect of post-material and mixed values is positive in both types of participations, and contemporary generations are less likely to participate in demonstrations and signing of petitions.

The most important result of this investigation suggests that belonging to the alternation generation, and having firm values, has an important effect on the probability of a citizen's instrumental and symbolic participation. This suggests that political socialisation is an important factor in political consolidation; citizens of the new democracies constantly learn about the scope and limitations of the system (Neundorf, 2010).

Generally, this investigation suggests that the transformation of the political culture of the country is dependent upon values and socialisation or generational belonging. These factors are key to the consolidation of Mexican democracy.

The results represent a step forward in the study of the development of Mexico's democratic transition. This investigation is supported and sustained by literature on values, attitudes and political participation. The use of advanced statistical

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techniques has demonstrated that the dimensions defined by Schwartz in 1992 are present in Mexico and, moreover, that the process of acculturation and political socialisation (measured using different generations) has resulted in significant changes in the forms of political participation.

4. Party Identification Dynamism: A latent class analysis

4.1. Introduction

This research contributes to the academic debate on party identification (PID) and its stability in Mexico. The first analyses of this topic in Mexico suggest correlation problems between party identification and voting choice (Buendía, 1995; Buendía, 1996; Magaloni and Poiré, 2003a, 2003b; Mercado, 1997; Moreno and Yanner, 1995; Moreno, 2003, 2009; Morgenstern and Zechmeister, 2001; Zechmeister, 2004). Recent studies have concluded that PID and voting choice are different; however these analyses do allude to the stability of the PID (Estrada, 2005). Denver (2003) concluded that party identification is psychological and that voting is linked to behaviour. In other words, partisan identification is in the mind of the voter, whilst voting is an action.

In Mexico, there have been few studies on the determinants of party attachment (Estrada, 2005; Guardado, 2009). This research incorporates the theories linked to PID (social identity and rational update) in order to define the elements that influence party attachment. Mexican citizens are found to shape their PID on the basis of a constant process of rational update.

This investigation is grounded on previous analyses of partisanship dynamism and extends the literature on this topic. Unlike previous studies on this subject, that relate to Canada, the United States of America (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009), the United Kingdom (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009; Sanders, 2004) and Germany (Neundorf, 2010; Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto, 2011), this project focuses on Mexico, a country that is still undergoing democratic formation and consolidation. Until the end of the 1990s, there was little if any electoral competition. In 2000, a president was elected from an opposition party for the first time.

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The instability of the Mexican PID contradicts Michigan's model (social-identity); there is sufficient empirical evidence of the dynamism or instability in the partisan attachment of Mexicans to demonstrate that it is comparable to that observed in democratic countries. The intensity of this attachment modifies the percentages of 'movers' within the population. This document extends the analysis of PID and establishes the factors that modify the probability of Mexicans being 'movers'.

4.2. The importance of Party Identification

Party identification mediates elements that affect voting decision and democratic attitudes (Downs 1957; Huber, Kernell and Leoni, 2003; Popkin et al., 1976; Shively 1979); changes perceptions of the economic situation (Bartels, 2000; Beltran, 2003; Fiorina, 1981); modifies the evaluation of the incumbent's performance (Campbell et al., 1960; Erikson, Mackuen and Stimson, 2002); and has a significant impact on the assessment of political candidates. Therefore, this identity plays the most important role in the decision to vote for electoral candidates around the world (in Mexico: Estrada, 2005; Klesner, 2005; McCann and Lawson, 2003; Moreno, 2003 and 2009).

PID is an emotional attachment to political parties that is formed in individuals during childhood (Belknap and Campbell, 1952; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954; Campbell et al., 1960, 1966; Miller, 1991; Miller and Shanks 1996). This attachment changes according to political assessments or election results, and it improves the way in which citizens perceive and understand political issues. PID combines the studies of elections, political parties and public opinion (Dalton, 2002). In addition, such an attachment is a desirable and necessary condition for the operation of democratic systems (Rose and Mishler, 1998).

Although PID is usually directly related to the decision to vote, it has other implications. It affects attitudes towards the political and democratic life of the country,

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and strengthens the party system (Dalton, 2002). According to this logic, it involves accepting the political parties as actors who are charged with representing the interests of the citizens (Dalton and Weldon, 2005) and, when it is open and moderate, it is necessary for democratic stability (Almond and Verba, 1963; Rose and Mishler, 1998).

This identity can be an indicator of the democratic development of a country, since stability is necessary for the construction and consolidation of the party system, which in turn strengthens representation for the people and reinforces a sense of accountability (Dalton and Weldon, 2007; Huber et al., 2005; Karp and Banducci, 2007; McCann and Lawson, 2003). PID also guides support for the party system, for example, by accentuating the rejection or acceptance of the different political parties. Therefore, a decline or collapse in PID would affect a country's democratic development.

In this regard, it is necessary to build and strengthen citizens' PID in democracies in Latin America (Mainwaring et al., 2006; Webb and White, 2007). However, studies indicate the decline of partisanship and a reduction of trust in democratic institutions (Roberts, 2007). A weak PID and an unstable party system have affected the development of the political system in Latin America for the past 20 years. Democratic development requires a greater commitment to the political parties - sympathy and identification - because this reduces electoral volatility and promotes political stability (Moreno, 1999). In addition, it encourages the democratisation of the country and participation in political, economic and social development; it also facilitates government accountability (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

PID motivates citizens to participate. Those who have weak or no identification with a political party will be less likely to vote. Elections are partisan competitions; therefore, people who identify with a political party are more likely to go to the polls (Dalton, 2002).

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4.2.1. *The Concept of PID*

For more than half a century, PID has been one of the most important topics in political science. This concept, developed by Campbell and his colleagues from the University of Michigan in the 1950s, was imported to Great Britain by Butler and Stokes in the late 1960s. The theory was studied in Mexico at the end of the 1990s (Moreno, 2003, 2009).

PID arises from citizens' need to identify with something; in most cases people's first identification is with social class. This identity enters the political field and the party system, forming lasting sympathy throughout electoral competitions.

Three theories define the concept of party identification. Sociological or social identity theory proposes that belonging to a social group or a social class determines PID through the formation of political and ideological values (Key, 1952; Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1948; Lipset, 1981; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Sociological investigations by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet in *The People's Choice* (1948) indicate that it is possible to estimate how a citizen will vote by knowing his or her social characteristics. A person thinks politically and acts socially; therefore the social characteristics of a person will ultimately determine his or her political preference (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1948). Therefore, this analysis focuses on the activities of the individual according to his or her social position and religious affiliation.

Psychological or political socialisation theory stresses that PID is an individual sympathy or predisposition developed during socialisation, mainly between parents and children (Niemi and Jennings, 1991). This predisposition is strengthened over time (Campbell et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Jennings and Niemi, 1974). Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) argue that the best way to determine voting decision is the 'funnel model'. The first time an individual generates his or her PID is via the relationship formed with their parents (Hess and Torney, 1967: 90), and via socialisation

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(‘psychological attachment’). Subsequently, this sympathy will transform attitudes. The party will further bias a person's position, and thereby strengthen his or her ideology in favour of the political party. In this evaluation, young people will change their political orientations faster than older people, and these orientations will then stabilise in adulthood (Jennings, 1989).

These two approaches are strengthened by means of two mechanisms. The first is information bias: people acquire information that reinforces their partisan attachment (Abramson, 1979). The second is the habit of voting for the same political party (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 2004).

Both theories conceptualise party identification as a process of socialisation and as a stable attachment to a group or social class. However, the consolidation of this partisan sympathy can be modified by short-term factors, for example, voters’ political experience or performance assessments of the political parties. In contrast, the third theory contends that PID changes constantly, because of the process of rational updating. In the process of updating – known as the rational perspective - the individual evaluates the most significant political, economic and social issues, and then analyses the candidates and the political parties. With this information, the voter forms a partisan attachment that can change over time (Achen, 2002; Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Franklin, 1992). The revisionist approach is criticised because it focuses on the analytical and not on the emotional side of party identification. This has been observed in Great Britain and Canada (Alt, 1984; Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley, 1997a, 1997b; Clarke et al., 2004; Stewart and Clarke, 1998).

Up until now, studies of PID, and its stability or instability, have been based on PID being a latent variable generated from observed variables. Latent class models estimate a set of unobserved, categorical outcomes with discrete (categorical) indicator

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variables, while assuming that observed indicator variables are subject to measurement error (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009). Latent class analysis is useful when survey responses are available for several discrete periods (Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 2002; McCutcheon 1987). This type of analysis began in the 1960s with researchers from Columbia University, and was reinforced by Converse (1964) and Dobson and Meeter (1974). However, recent theoretical disagreements have focused on the analysis of measurement errors (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002; Zaller, 1992). For example, Green and Palmquist (1994) and Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) suggest that it is difficult to use a single question to measure attitudes to political parties and identity at the same time; therefore, this controversy remains unresolved.

This problem can be addressed by using mixed Markov Latent class models (MMLC), which allow analysis of PID dynamism by controlling for random measurement error (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009; Hagenaars and McCutcheon, 2002; Neundorf, Stegmueller, Scotto, 2011; Sanders, 2004). In addition, this model allows the generation of Mover-Stayer models (MS), which are required for the analysis of partisan stability and instability.

Sanders (2004), using Mover-Stayer models, demonstrated the dynamism in British party identification from 1963 to 2001. Clarke and McCutcheon (2009), also using these models, concluded that in countries such as USA (1956 to 1996); Great Britain (1963 to 2006) and Canada (1979 to 2006), 29% to 57% of voters were ‘movers’. Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto (2011) analysed Germany from 1984 to 2007 using a Mixed Latent Markov model (MLM) and identified patterns of partisan stability; in this study, more than 50% of Germans are identified as ‘movers’.

Following intense academic discussion, the concept of PID has lost its relative stability, suggesting that any actor or political party can win or lose electoral

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competitions. More citizens than ever have no political affiliation; the parties are no longer able to link their policy proposals with society's needs. This is the result of a weak link between political parties and citizens, due to the parties' inability to generate socially desirable outcomes.

4.3. Mexican Context

For more than 70 years the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was Mexico's most important political party. Its dominance was comparable to that of the Soviet bloc countries (Garrido, 1986), the Grand National Party (Saenuri Party) of South Korea and the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan (Kishikawa 2000; Solinger 2001). The political weakening of the PRI in the first decade of the twenty-first century, alongside the collapse of the National Action Party (PAN) after twelve years of governance (2000-2012), transformed the political geography of the country. However, the three strongest parties (PAN, PRI, and PRD) have maintained their supporters.

In Mexico, the last three presidential elections (2000, 2006 and 2012) were highly competitive. In these campaigns, Mexico underwent a major political change, as partisan identification - that had been solid in the 1970s, 1980s and mid-1990s - was challenged by government performance evaluations, producing frail partisanship and an adjustment in support for the opposition parties (Moreno, 2003, 2009).

The PAN and the PRD are the two main opponents of the PRI. The '*panismo*' and '*perredismo*' have raised their national profiles. The PAN was founded in 1939, to repudiate nationalist policies such as the expropriation of the oil and electrical industries by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940). The PRD was founded in 1989 after several left-wing parties supported withdrawal from the PRI, in protest against the neoliberal practices implemented by the PRI in the 1980s. However, these parties took divergent paths on the subject of public administration. The right-wing PAN has always encouraged

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grass-roots activism. The '*panismo*' encouraged municipal administrative skills in order to win the capitals of the country, resulting in its first victory in the gubernatorial election in Baja California in 1989, followed by its historic triumph in the 2000 presidential election. In contrast, the PRD has had a greater impact at both state and national levels; however, this party has shown little concern for administrative performance (Bruhn 1999; Estrada, 2003b). The PRD has neglected the cultivation of local supporters and so has been forced to support candidates of other parties, such as the PRI.

70 years of PRI hegemony, and the twelve years of the PAN government, have enabled the electorate to comment on their political performance. In these judgments the electorate has expressed its support for, or opposition to, the political parties, thereby determining political attitudes, including partisan identification.

4.3.1. *Party Attachment in Mexico*

Electoral studies in Mexico have been published for more than a decade; however, few of them have analysed the determinants of party identification (Estrada, 2005; Guardado, 2009).

Most of the literature suggests that PID is the best predictor of voting decision; this produces a misleading notion of how voting decisions are conceptualised. Therefore, several investigations have not mentioned partisan identification as an independent variable of voting choice, since researchers have argued that these two concepts are almost the same (Buendía 1995, 1996; Mercado, 1997; Morgenstern and Zechmeister, 2001; Zechmeister, 2004). In empirical terms, the correlation between these variables is high (Buendía, 1995); therefore, researchers have concluded that it is incorrect to use these two variables in a statistical model.

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At the same time, researchers who have included PID as an independent variable in the analysis of voting choice have not explained the determinants of this independent variable. In this respect, Moreno and Yanner (1995) have concluded that PID was the main predictor of voting choice in the 1994 presidential election; however, these studies imply that it is necessary to establish a reliable measure of this variable. A third approach also uses this attachment, lagged one period, (Magaloni and Poiré, 2003a, 2003b) but with no analysis of this variable.

The PID in Mexico has been theoretically modelled by Moreno (2003, 2009). The first empirical study was then written by Estrada (2005), who used the first panel data of Mexico in 2000. Estrada (2005) demonstrated with different multinomial logit models that retrospective evaluations of the economy, and negative feelings towards political parties, are the main determinants of this identity. Estrada (2005) concluded that PID and voting choice are different concepts and that party attachment is a stable variable; as a result, voters can change their voting choice, but not their party identification.

Guardado (2009), using multinomial logit models, studied the determination of partisan identification in the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections. He found that the issues covered throughout the competition influenced the definition of PID. In other words, the idea of 'change' and, to a lesser extent ideology, had an important impact on party identification.

In Mexico, it is believed that ideology is determined by PID and not by the evaluation of the most important national issues (Estrada, 2005). Therefore, the rejection of certain political parties, especially those that are in power, could explain why people change their party affiliation. In this sense, voters' political commitment is a response to the evolution of political parties.

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PID is also formed from the negative perceptions of political parties; for example, some voters would prefer any political option rather than vote for a particular party. Therefore, PID is generated by antipathy towards certain political parties (Estrada, 2005; Rose and Mishler, 1998). In this logic, hostility to political parties is used to define individuals' PID (Crewe, 1980; Weisberg, 1980), since rejection of a political party implies a reduction in the probability of abandoning a political preference (Maggiotto and Piereson, 1977). Therefore, this identification can be described as the sum of a voter's feelings about the full spectrum of political parties (Crewe 1976, 1980).

During the democratic transition at the beginning of the 1980s, and in the late 1990s, PID was stable (Dominguez and McCann, 1995; Moreno, 2003). However, since then, variations in partisan sympathy have invited deeper analysis.

All studies of PID have indicated that the reduction in PRI sympathy is a result of greater electoral competitiveness (Dominguez and McCann, 1995; Moreno, 2003). However, for the other national political parties (PAN and PRD), the results are inconclusive. For example, in the 2000 presidential election, the number of PAN supporters increased while the number of PRD supporters remained stable (Estrada, 2005). However, in the 2006 electoral competitions, Guardado (2009) described an increase in voters identifying with the PRD, but not an increase in supporters of the PAN.

The first possible explanation of this partisan variation is attributable to generational change; however, Moreno and Méndez (2007) concluded that in Mexico this is unfounded, since there have only been changes in the degree of partisanship, not in self-identification. In other words, young people have a weak partisan attachment, but this can be expected to become stronger in adulthood (Moreno 2003).

The second explanation attributes the transformation of the PID to the growing importance that voters give to the evaluation of political issues (Abramowitz and

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Saunders, 1998; Adams, 1997; Carmines and Layman, 1997; Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Key, 1959; Petrocik, 1981; Sundquist, 1983). Moreno and Mendez concluded, based on logit models, that there is a partisan rotation, “a phenomenon of conversion of identity in certain segments of the electorate that involves moving from one to another and from that party to another” (Moreno and Méndez, 2007: 69). Therefore, in Mexico it is possible to observe a realignment of political parties, given the increase in electoral competitiveness.

The idea that partisan identification in Mexico is different from voting choice generates concerns that make it necessary to approach this topic from another direction. The inflexibility of partisan identification does not preclude the possibility of change in political affinity. The revisionist conceptualisation identifies that partisan allegiance is modified in accordance with important short-term forces.

Studies conducted previously in Mexico have not exhausted the relevance and importance of this concept within political science. In contrast, the foundations have been laid for a profound theoretical and empirical analysis. Therefore, partisan identification - stable or unstable - merits continued study.

4.4. Determinants and the development of PID (in)stability: Hypotheses

In Mexico, the 2000 and 2006 panel surveys suggest a change in the levels of partisan identification in the three largest parties. According to data published by the CIDE-CSES in 2000 and 2006, an increase could be observed in affiliation to the PRD, but there was a decrease in attachment to the PRI, and no change in identification with the PAN. In addition, the percentage of citizens with party identification rose by almost five percentage points, from 63% in 2000 to 68% in the 2006 presidential election. Therefore, it can be inferred that Mexicans are flexible in their political identity. At the same time, citizens think about how to maximize their utility, by reflecting on which party will have

a better performance in the administration, increasing sympathy and encouraging loyalty (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. PID in Mexico: 1988-2006

Year	PAN	PRI	PRD
1988	21	45	21
1991	6	29	6
1994	21	45	9
1997	13	31	12
2000	23	38	9
2003	22	28	8
2006	25	24	10

Source: Estrada (2005) and Guardado (2009)

The study of PID and its stability in Mexico is unique in comparison to previously analyses developed in Canada, the United States of America (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009), the United Kingdom (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009; Sanders, 2004) and Germany (Neundorf, 2010; Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto, 2011). Mexico is a country in the process of democratic formation and consolidation: there was little or zero political competition until the end of the 1990s.

This investigation identifies the determinants of PID in Mexico on the basis of social identity, socialisation, and rational policy. In general terms, citizens form their partisan identification on the basis of their social identity, in this case religiosity and social class (Neundorf, 2010). In this regard, citizens who are more religious are more likely to be identified with the right-wing PAN than with the PRI and the PRD (Dalton, 2002). In addition, members of the working classes are more likely to affiliate themselves with the left-wing PRI and PRD.

However, the effects of religious cleavage and social class in the determination of the PID can be reduced significantly when voters incorporate rational analyses of economic, political and social conditions, as well as attitudes towards political parties and the candidates themselves.

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Hypothesis H_{4.1}: Regardless of Mexicans' social identity, rational updating (rationalisation) is also an important determinant of party identification.

Therefore, PID is the result of a constant rational updating process of different flows of information, so political attachment can therefore vary over time (Fiorina, 1981). The direction and the stability of party identification corresponds with perceptions of political, economic and social events: therefore, it is not as stable as it has been thought.

Hypothesis H_{4.2}: A significant percentage of Mexicans change their party identification during the electoral period, as do voters in consolidated democracies.

Hypothesis H_{4.3}: Mexicans with weak partisan identification more easily change their PID during the electoral period than Mexicans who define themselves as strongly identified.

This hypothesis suggests that PID in Mexico is dynamic when partisan intensity is weak. Therefore, it is important to identify the determinants of this instability. In this sense, we expect that - independently of social identity and ideology - evaluations of political parties and candidates' opinions should be determinants of this dynamism.

Hypothesis H_{4.4}: Controlling for ideology and social identity, Mexicans with negative feelings towards political parties are more likely to be 'movers'.

Hypothesis H_{4.5}: Regardless of social identity and self-ideological position, Mexicans with positive assessments of candidates have an increased likelihood of changing their partisan attachment during the election period.

This research suggests that partisan attachment and its dynamism are compatible with the rational approach. It can be concluded from these investigations that Mexicans establish their partisan identification from a collection of assessments of

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candidates and political parties, an identification which is arguably closer to the concept of 'valenced partisanship' (Sanders, 2004).

4.5. Data, Variables and Models

This paper has three objectives. The first is to find out which of the theories on party identification has the greatest effect on the determination of Mexicans' partisan attachment. In this respect, the rational updating approach is expected to have the most important effect. Based on these results, we expect PID in Mexico to be a dynamic concept and anticipate that the percentage of Mexicans who are 'movers' will be close to the percentage observed in consolidated democracies such as Great Britain, the United States, Canada or Germany. The second goal is to calculate the percentages of PID generated by a latent variable, controlling for measurement errors, and to investigate the dynamism of this identity. The third aim of this research is to find out which factors change Mexicans' behaviour: the determinants that make a citizen a 'mover'.

This section provides information about the database, the variables used and the methodologies applied.

4.5.1. Data

The dynamic analysis at the individual level is the acid test for understanding the PID (Sanders, 2004). In this sense, the 2000⁴⁴ and 2006⁴⁵ Presidential Elections Panel Studies were used to analyse the stability of Mexicans' party identification.

⁴⁴ Organisers of the project were (in alphabetical order): Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson, Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Pablo Parás, and Alejandro Poiré. Interviews for the panel component of the project were conducted by the polling staff of *Reforma* newspaper, under the direction of Alejandro Moreno. Polling for the post-electoral cross-section was conducted by MORI de México, under the direction of Miguel Basañez and Pablo Parás.

⁴⁵ Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2006 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Andy Baker, Kathleen Bruhn, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Kenneth Greene, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Alejandro Poiré, and David Shirk. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-

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The Mexico 2000 Panel Study consists of 7,000 interviews in five surveys, using a hybrid panel/cross-sectional design. Its first round, conducted between February 19 and 27 (just after the official beginning of the campaign), polled a national cross-section of 2,400 voters. This sample was then randomly divided into two groups, one of which was re-interviewed in the second round (April 28 to May 7). Due to attrition, this wave included 950 respondents. In the third round (June 3 to June 18), pollsters re-interviewed all of those in the second randomly selected subset of the first round, in addition to 400 respondents interviewed in the second round. Finally, in the fourth round (July 7 to July 16), pollsters re-interviewed as many of the participants as possible from all of the previous rounds. This included almost 1,200 respondents who had been interviewed in the second and third rounds, as well as just over 100 respondents who had been interviewed in the first round. This panel sample was supplemented with a new cross-section of 1,200 respondents.

The Mexico Panel Study 2005-2006 was designed to undertake three waves of interviews between 2005 and 2006: two prior to the presidential elections of July 2 and one after that date. For the first survey, the sample design was organised in the following way: the population of the sample comprised Mexicans who were 18 years of age or older during the 2006 presidential election. This means that some people interviewed during the first wave, and included in the sample, may have been 17 years old, but turned 18 before the Election Day. The Panel used three samples: a national sample, an oversample for Mexico City, and an oversample for villages in rural areas located in the states of Chiapas, Jalisco and Oaxaca.

0517971) and *Reforma* newspaper; fieldwork was conducted by *Reforma* newspaper's Polling and Research Team, under the direction of Alejandro Moreno. Details available online at: <http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/mexico06>.

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The panels contained information about the respondents' socio-economic characteristics, party identification, political preferences and opinions about the candidates, and evaluations of national political and economic issues.

These surveys are comparable to those published by *American National Election Studies* and the *British Election Studies*. This data set provides the resources for academic research on campaigns, public opinion, political behaviour, political communication or any topic of Mexican politics. Respondents were selected randomly from the electoral list published by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE).

Interviews were all conducted in-person, face-to-face, in the home of the respondents. The questionnaires are the most important source of statistical information for studies of Mexican politics. The questions associated with PID are 'distant' from the questions related to voting choice and also to political evaluations. The structure of the questionnaire should reduce the risk – identified by Sears and Lau (1983) – that responses represent a rationalisation of political behaviour and an effort to ensure consistency. This database contains sufficient empirical information for this investigation.

4.5.2. Variables

For the *dependent variable*, this paper used the PID of the interviewee. The questions for this variable are:

2000 Panel Study: Generally, do you consider yourself *priísta*, *panista* or *perredista*? (Only to those who answered 'none' or 'don't know' in this question):

With which party do you most identify?

2006 Panel Study: In general, would you say you identify with the PAN, the PRI or the PRD? (Insist): Would you say you identify strongly with the (...) or only somewhat with the (...)?

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For each time point and panel study, respondents were assigned to the following mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories — being (1) PAN; (2) PRI; or (3) PRD. The reference category was PAN.

The *independent variables* were divided according to the focus of this study: social identity and rational update. For the social identity approach, religiosity and subjective social class were used. For the rational analysis various variables were used, classified into four major topics: assessments or perceptions of different subjects (perception of the economic situation; assessment of corruption and concern regarding security); negative feelings towards political parties; opinions of the candidates and approval of the president (see detailed coding in Appendix).

The *control variables* for the social identity analysis were: ideological position; age; education; marital status; employment status; subjective income; and gender. The rational analysis, in addition to the control variables described above, incorporated the variable of interest in political affairs. In this way we were able to isolate the effect of these approaches and establish a more accurate and effective relationship between the core variables and the PID in the years of study.⁴⁶

Table 4.2 and 4.3 present the summary statistics of the variables used in this analysis.

⁴⁶ See a detailed question wording and coding in Appendix.

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Table 4.2. Descriptive Analysis, 2000

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>Dependent Variable</u>					
Party Identification (PID)	1,264	1.76	0.66	1	3
<u>Social Identity Approach</u>					
Subjective Social Class	1,264	2.52	1.08	1	5
Religiosity	1,250	3.28	1.12	1	5
<u>Rational Approach</u>					
President's Approval	1,264	3.47	1.18	1	5
Economic Perception	1,264	2.85	0.88	1	5
Corruption Evaluation	1,264	3.30	0.91	1	5
Security Concern	1,264	3.04	0.90	1	5
Negative Feelings: PRI	1,201	0.36	0.48	0	1
Negative Feelings: PRD	1,201	0.45	0.50	0	1
Candidate Opinion: PRI	1,250	5.94	3.48	0	10
Candidate Opinion: PAN	1,250	5.98	3.13	0	10
Candidate Opinion: PRD	1,250	4.00	3.12	0	10
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Age	1,260	63.34	14.09	19	82
Educational Level	1,264	3.08	1.17	1	5
Married	1,264	0.61	0.49	0	1
Employment Status	1,264	0.52	0.50	0	1
Subjective Income	1,264	2.87	1.72	1	9
Female	1,264	0.52	0.50	0	1
Ideological self-placement	1,017	4.96	1.80	1	7
Political Interest	1,264	2.19	0.89	1	4

Source: MIT, 2000

Table 4.3. Descriptive Analysis, 2006

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>Dependent Variable</u>					
Party Identification (PID)	793	2.09	0.83	1	3
<u>Social Identity Approach</u>					
Subjective Social Class	793	2.18	0.87	1	5
Religiosity	789	3.09	1.11	1	5
<u>Rational Approach</u>					
President's Approval	793	3.38	1.41	1	5
Economic Perception	793	3.23	1.04	1	5
Corruption Evaluation					
Security Concern					
Negative Feelings: PRI	772	0.44	0.50	0	1
Negative Feelings: PRD	772	0.18	0.38	0	1
Candidate Opinion: PRI	789	4.34	3.16	0	10
Candidate Opinion: PAN	789	6.61	3.20	0	10
Candidate Opinion: PRD	789	4.34	3.19	0	10
<u>Control Variables</u>					
Age	793	38.48	14.84	18	83
Educational Level	793	3.36	1.19	1	5
Married	793	0.52	0.50	0	1
Employment Status	793	0.57	0.50	0	1
Subjective Income	585	4.70	2.85	1	10
Female	793	0.48	0.50	0	1
Ideological self-placement	793	3.64	1.65	1	6
Political Interest	793	2.41	0.98	1	4

Source: MIT, 2006

4.5.3. Models

To identify which factors or elements define Mexicans' PID (*hypothesis H_{4.1}*) we used a multinomial logit model (Kennedy, 1998b; Wooldridge, 2002, 2003).

We are now able to use advanced statistical techniques that allow us to analyse the instability of observed variables, taking into account the measurement errors generated in the surveys. In this sense, a Mover-Stayer (MS) model is used to test hypotheses 4.2 and 4.3, which are concerned with party identification as a latent variable and the question of its instability. The Mover-Stayer (MS) model is an extension of the Markov chain model for dealing with a very specific type of unobserved heterogeneity in the population.

These models divide the population into two groups. One group, 'movers', is characterised by behaviour according to a Markov model. The probability of moving from category i in period t to category j in the $t+1$ is collected in a usual transition matrix; in contrast, 'stayers' is a stable group, whose transition matrix is the identity matrix (Blumen, Kogan, and McCarthy, 1955; Goodman, 1962; Vermunt, 1997). Finally, Hypotheses 4.4 and 4.5 are tested using a logit model (Wooldridge, 2002, 2003). These models are appropriate when the answers are dichotomous, with 1 being 'movers' and 0 being 'stayers'. The multinomial logit and logit models are estimated using STATA version 11 and the Mover-Stayer (MS) models are developed with M-Plus version 7.

4.6. Results

The data set developed for the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections allows us to examine the determinants of PID in Mexico.

Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the results of the multinomial logit models for 2000 and 2006. Each table has six models - three for each year of study - which make reference to the analysis of social identity (Models 1 and 4), the analysis of social identity and the

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rational approach (Models 2 and 5), and the general model (Models 3 and 6). The latter includes the two approaches defined previously, and also incorporates the candidates' opinions and negative feelings toward the political parties. These types of analyses allow us to determine the most important elements of the partisan identification of Mexicans.

Table 4.4 presents the results of the comparison of the PRI and the PAN. For the study of the social identity approach, it is concluded that both religiosity and social class have the expected signs (negative). In other words, keeping everything else constant, Mexican people belonging to the upper social classes and who are more religious are more likely to identify with the PAN. However, in the analysis for the year 2000, the only statistically significant variable is social class.

With regard to the analysis of rational updating (Models 2 and 5), controlling for demographic, ideological and political factors, the results are as anticipated. The presidential approval rate, the perception of the economic situation, and the assessment of corruption in 2000 all have the expected signs and are statistically significant; the variable of concern regarding security issues, used in 2000, has the anticipated sign relation but is not statistically significant. In this sense, keeping the rest of the variables constant, Mexicans with positive evaluations regarding topics such as presidential approval and economic development are more likely to identify with the ruling party, which was the PRI in 2000 and the PAN in 2006.

Models 3 and 6 incorporate variables relating to any prevailing negative feelings towards the political parties and the candidates' opinions. These two models suggest that rejection of the political parties, combined with a positive opinion of the candidates, modifies the party identification. For the year 2000, holding everything else constant, negative feelings towards the PRI and the PRD increases the likelihood of identifying with PAN. In contrast, negative opinions of the party candidates for PRI

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(which are statistically significant) and the PRD (which are not statistically significant) reduce the likelihood of identifying with the PAN; negative views of PAN candidates increase the probability of identifying with the PRI. For 2006, the variables that are statistically significant are rejection of the PRI and positive opinions of the candidates from the PRI and PAN. In summary, negative opinions of the PRI and the PRD candidates increase the possibility of identifying with the PAN. While positive views of the PRI and PRD candidates increase the odds of identifying with the PRI, the opposite will happen if voters have a favourable opinion of the PAN candidate.

Table 4.4. Multinomial Models Results for PID: PRI-PAN

Variables	2000						2006					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios
PRI												
<u>Social Identity Approach</u>												
Subjective Social Class	-0.15*	0.86*	-0.13+	0.88+	-0.12	0.88	-0.19	0.83	-0.27+	0.76+	-0.22	0.80
	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.15]	[0.13]	[0.16]	[0.12]	[0.19]	[0.15]
Religiosity	-0.02	0.98	-0.04	0.96	0.08	1.09	-0.02	0.98	0.00	1.00	-0.06	0.94
	[0.06]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.14]	[0.13]
<u>Rational Approach</u>												
President's Approval			0.40***	1.49***	0.18+	1.20+			-0.61***	0.54***	-0.45**	0.64**
			[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.11]			[0.13]	[0.07]	[0.15]	[0.10]
Economic Perception			0.22*	1.25*	0.19	1.21			-0.37*	0.69*	-0.17	0.84
			[0.09]	[0.11]	[0.12]	[0.15]			[0.15]	[0.10]	[0.19]	[0.16]
Corruption Evaluation			-0.20*	0.82*	-0.05	0.95						
			[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.11]	[0.10]						
Security Concern			-0.09	0.91	0.03	1.03						
			[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.11]	[0.11]						
Negative Feelings: PRI					-2.05***	0.13***					-3.26***	0.04***
					[0.40]	[0.05]					[0.43]	[0.02]
Negative Feelings: PRD					-1.03**	0.36**					-0.37	0.69
					[0.37]	[0.13]					[0.43]	[0.30]
Candidate Opinion: PRI					0.53***	1.70***					-0.10+	0.91+
					[0.05]	[0.09]					[0.05]	[0.05]
Candidate Opinion: PAN					-0.62***	0.54***					0.03	1.03
					[0.06]	[0.03]					[0.06]	[0.06]
Candidate Opinion: PRD					0.04	1.04					0.19***	1.20***
					[0.04]	[0.04]					[0.05]	[0.07]
<u>Control Variables</u>												
Age	0.00	1.00	-0.01	0.99	-0.01	0.99	0.00	1.00	-0.01	0.99	0.01	1.01
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Educational Level	-0.15*	0.86*	-0.12	0.89	-0.03	0.97	-0.28*	0.76*	-0.38**	0.69**	-0.26	0.77
	[0.07]	[0.06]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.13]	[0.10]	[0.14]	[0.10]	[0.17]	[0.13]
Married	0.11	1.11	0.20	1.22	-0.03	0.97	-0.45+	0.64+	-0.53*	0.59*	-0.40	0.67
	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.16]	[0.19]	[0.21]	[0.20]	[0.25]	[0.16]	[0.26]	[0.15]	[0.33]	[0.22]
Employment Status	-0.20	0.82	-0.21	0.81	-0.19	0.83	0.25	1.29	0.36	1.43	0.23	1.26
	[0.16]	[0.13]	[0.17]	[0.14]	[0.22]	[0.18]	[0.28]	[0.36]	[0.30]	[0.43]	[0.37]	[0.47]
Subjective Income	-0.06	0.94	-0.06	0.94	0.04	1.05	-0.07	0.93	-0.07	0.93	0.01	1.01
	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.07]	[0.07]
Female	0.10	1.10	0.04	1.04	-0.09	0.92	0.16	1.17	0.23	1.25	0.17	1.19
	[0.16]	[0.18]	[0.17]	[0.18]	[0.23]	[0.21]	[0.28]	[0.33]	[0.30]	[0.38]	[0.37]	[0.44]
Ideological self-placement	0.22***	1.24***	0.16***	1.18***	0.14*	1.15*	0.05	1.05	0.09	1.09	0.06	1.07
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.08]	[0.08]	[0.10]	[0.10]
Political Interest			0.10	1.11	0.06	1.06			-0.12	0.89	-0.11	0.90
			[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.12]	[0.13]			[0.13]	[0.12]	[0.17]	[0.15]
Constant	0.61		-0.46		0.72		1.79*		6.04***		4.40**	
	[0.58]		[0.80]		[1.15]		[0.73]		[1.02]		[1.35]	

Significance Levels + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Reference category: Negative Feelings PAN

Table 4.5 compares the PRD and the PAN. The social identity approach (Models 1 and 3) concludes that, holding other variables constant, Mexicans with high religiosity and of high social class are more likely to have identified with the PAN in the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections. These variables have the expected sign and (excluding religiosity) are statistically significant in 2000.

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For the rational approach (Models 2 and 4), it is determined that in the 2000 election the perceptions of the economic position and the security situation are statistically significant. Mexicans who believed that the economic situation had improved were more likely to identify with the PAN; where there was an increase in concern about personal security, Mexicans were more likely to identify with the PRD.

The rest of the variables relating to citizens' evaluations have the expected sign, but are not statistically significant. For the 2006 presidential elections, it is evident that perceptions of the economy and presidential approval are determinants of PID; these have the expected sign and are statistically significant. Therefore, Mexicans with positive assessments of the economy, and those who approved of the president's performance, had greater preference for being identified with the PAN. Models 3 and 6 incorporate the two approaches and integrate negative feelings into the analysis of political parties and candidates' opinions. In general terms, negative feelings about the left-wing PRD and the PRI increase the likelihood that Mexicans identified with PAN in both presidential elections.

Table 4.5. Multinomial Models Results for PID: PRD-PAN

Variables	2000						2006					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios	β	Odds Ratios
PRD												
<u>Social Identity Approach</u>												
Subjective Social Class	-0.19+	0.82+	-0.20+	0.82+	-0.07	0.93	-0.28+	0.76+	-0.41*	0.66*	-0.21	0.81
	[0.12]	[0.10]	[0.12]	[0.09]	[0.15]	[0.14]	[0.14]	[0.11]	[0.16]	[0.11]	[0.19]	[0.16]
Religiosity	-0.11	0.89	-0.10	0.90	-0.17	0.84	-0.21*	0.81*	-0.18	0.84	-0.07	0.93
	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.13]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.08]	[0.11]	[0.09]	[0.14]	[0.13]
<u>Rational Approach</u>												
President's Approval			-0.11	0.90	-0.02	0.98			-0.72***	0.49***	-0.48***	0.62***
			[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.13]	[0.13]			[0.12]	[0.06]	[0.14]	[0.09]
Economic Perception			-0.24+	0.79+	-0.45*	0.64*			-0.50***	0.61***	-0.49**	0.61**
			[0.13]	[0.10]	[0.18]	[0.11]			[0.15]	[0.09]	[0.18]	[0.11]
Corruption Evaluation			-0.04	0.96	-0.21	0.81						
			[0.12]	[0.11]	[0.17]	[0.13]						
Security Concern			0.24*	1.28*	0.19	1.21						
			[0.12]	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.21]						
Negative Feelings: PRI					-0.25	0.78					-1.75***	0.17***
					[0.53]	[0.41]					[0.40]	[0.07]
Negative Feelings: PRD					-1.82**	0.16**					-2.86***	0.06***
					[0.63]	[0.10]					[0.67]	[0.04]
Candidate Opinion: PRI					0.11+	1.11+					-0.12*	0.89*
					[0.06]	[0.07]					[0.05]	[0.04]
Candidate Opinion: PAN					-0.67***	0.51***					0.52***	1.68***
					[0.08]	[0.04]					[0.07]	[0.12]
Candidate Opinion: PRD					0.70***	2.01***					-0.09+	0.91+
					[0.08]	[0.16]					[0.05]	[0.05]
<u>Control Variables</u>												
Age	-0.03***	0.97***	-0.03**	0.97**	-0.01	0.99	0.02+	1.02+	0.01	1.01	0.00	1.00
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Educational Level	-0.01	0.99	-0.09	0.91	-0.07	0.94	0.27*	1.31*	0.14	1.14	0.13	1.14
	[0.11]	[0.11]	[0.12]	[0.11]	[0.16]	[0.15]	[0.12]	[0.16]	[0.14]	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.19]
Married	0.12	1.13	0.09	1.09	0.45	1.57	-0.50*	0.60*	-0.59*	0.56*	-0.54+	0.58+
	[0.24]	[0.27]	[0.24]	[0.26]	[0.33]	[0.52]	[0.24]	[0.14]	[0.26]	[0.15]	[0.32]	[0.18]
Employment Status	-0.16	0.85	-0.26	0.77	-0.28	0.75	0.30	1.35	0.36	1.43	0.25	1.28
	[0.25]	[0.22]	[0.26]	[0.20]	[0.35]	[0.26]	[0.26]	[0.35]	[0.29]	[0.42]	[0.34]	[0.44]
Subjective Income	-0.21**	0.81**	-0.19*	0.83*	-0.13	0.88	-0.10*	0.90*	-0.11*	0.89*	-0.09	0.92
	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.06]
Female	-0.34	0.71	-0.29	0.75	0.17	1.18	0.10	1.10	0.13	1.13	-0.09	0.91
	[0.26]	[0.18]	[0.27]	[0.20]	[0.36]	[0.43]	[0.26]	[0.28]	[0.29]	[0.33]	[0.34]	[0.31]
Ideological self-placement	-0.12*	0.89*	-0.11+	0.90+	0.04	1.04	-0.36***	0.70***	-0.32***	0.73***	-0.22*	0.80*
	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.08]	[0.08]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.08]	[0.06]	[0.09]	[0.07]
Political Interest			0.18	1.19	0.31+	1.36+			-0.05	0.96	0.03	1.03
			[0.13]	[0.15]	[0.17]	[0.24]			[0.13]	[0.12]	[0.16]	[0.16]
Constant	2.84***		2.80*		1.64		2.00**		7.10***		3.89**	
	[0.79]		[1.11]		[1.62]		[0.69]		[1.00]		[1.33]	
Observations	1,007		1,007		980		584		584		568	
AIC	1,860		1,779		1,072		1,192		1,091		753	
BIC	1,958		1,926		1,267		1,279		1,205		910	
Degrees of Freedom	18		28		38		18		24		34	
McFadden's R2	0.06		0.11		0.47		0.09		0.18		0.45	
PRE	0.33		0.59		0.73		0.41		0.55		0.68	

Significance Levels + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Notes: Standard errors in brackets. Reference category: Negative Feelings PAN


In both years of analysis, the opinions of the candidates from the three major political parties are central to the definition of partisan attachment. In the 2000 election, positive views of the PRI and PRD candidates increased the likelihood of identifying with

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the PRD. In 2006, Mexicans who had positive opinions of the PAN and PRI candidates were less likely to identify with the PRD. The sense of alienation from political parties is also a determinant of partisan identity. In 2000 and 2006, Mexicans who rejected the PRI and PRD were more likely to identify with PAN; these variables are statistically significant (see Figure 4.1).

In general terms it can be concluded that rational updating plays a central role in PID, since positive evaluations increase the likelihood of voting for the party in power (*Hypothesis H_{4.1}*). Negative feelings towards political parties and positive opinions of the candidates were also important elements of Mexicans' PID in both elections (see Figure 4.1). The effect of these evaluations is important, to the extent that these variables reduce the effect and significance of the social identity approach on partisan attachment.

Figure 4.1. Plot of Regressions Coefficients Models 3 and 6



Source: The author

Chapter 4: Party Identification Dynamism

Model fit can be based on measures of information. Akaike's information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are two commonly used measures. The BIC penalises free parameters more heavily than the AIC. So for this research, the general models have lower AIC and BIC, and therefore have the best model fit. As expected, social identity measures do not seem to play an important role in partisanship development. This investigation suggests that Mexicans use rational updates to determine their partisan identification, which presumably varies over time (*Hypothesis H_{4.1}*).

Therefore we can continue with the analysis of PID dynamism by using the Movers-Stayers (MS) models. MS models were used to generate the latent variables of party identification. We were then able to calculate the percentage of Mexicans that changed or kept their partisan attachment during the electoral period.

Figure 4.2 shows the results of the MS model for the 2000 presidential election.⁴⁷ From this analysis it is concluded that 39% of Mexicans are 'movers' (*Hypothesis H_{4.2}*). Among the 'movers', 93% are concentrated within PAN and PRI identifiers. On the other hand, the greater part of those who are considered as 'stayers', representing two-thirds of the total sample (61%), are located in the PRI (77%) and in the PRD (22%). These percentages vary when the identification variables are divided according to their intensity; almost 7 of every 10 with a strong partisan identification sympathise with the PRI and this percentage is reduced by 15% when the intensity of identification is weaker (*Hypothesis H_{4.3}*).


From the study of PID intensities, it is evident that when intensity is weak, the percentage of 'movers' increases by almost four percentage points and the number of 'stayers' diminishes by almost 2%. However, when PID is strong, the proportion of

⁴⁷ For more details see Appendix.

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‘stayers’ grows by more than 14% and that of ‘movers’ diminishes by 27%. Nevertheless, the distribution within the political parties does not significantly change. The parties on the left retain the biggest proportion of ‘stayers’. On the other hand, the PAN and PRI account for the largest quantity of ‘movers’. It is usually assumed that voters who have a strong political party identity will not change this identity easily; nevertheless, they can alter their voting intention in different political competitions (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Crewe, Tall Sarlvik and Alt, 1977).

Figure 4.2. Mover-Stayer: PID (in) stability 2000, Percentage



Source: The author

According to the 2006 analysis, 18% of the Mexican electorate consisted of ‘movers’ and 82.3% were ‘stayers’ (*Hypothesis H_{4.2}*).⁴⁸ Among the ‘movers’, more than 58% were presumed to be latent PRD; 15% were latent ‘*panistas*’ and the remaining 26% were latent ‘*priistas*’. The ‘movers’ represent virtually 30%. In other words; each of the three parties has more than 30% of the representatives. In the same study, when

⁴⁸ For more information see Appendix.


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comparing PID intensities (where intensity is either low or high), there are major variations in the proportions of ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’. When partisan identity is weak, the percentage of ‘movers’ is increased and the percentage of ‘stayers’ is reduced, in each case by ten percentage points. In contrast, when partisanship is strong, the percentage of ‘movers’ is reduced by two percentage points, and the percentage of ‘stayers’ is increased by the same amount (*Hypothesis H_{4.3}*). This is illustrated in Figure 4.3.

It can be concluded from these results that PID in the 2006 presidential election was constant, reaffirming the conventional theory that partisanship was stable (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). However, these results are neither accurate nor effective because the data set has only three waves. Clarke and McCutcheon (2009) analysed the work of Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) and concluded that a three-wave panel model is employed, leaving no degree of freedom for goodness-of-fit tests. The parameters and goodness-of-fit of plausible, less restrictive, rival models (e.g., those specifying non-zero error covariances for observed indicators, or non-zero covariances for the structural-level error process) cannot be estimated (Bartels and Brady, 1993; Palmquist and Green, 1992; Wiley and Wiley, 1970, 1974). Therefore, this investigation provides more evidence that for the analysis of partisan dynamism a panel survey with at least four waves is required.

For a model to be clearly identified it is necessary to have an entropy greater than or equal to 0.8. Entropy with values approaching 1 indicates a clear delineation of classes (Celeux and Soromenho, 1996). Both MS models (2000 and 2006) have an entropy greater than 0.88; therefore the models are able to identify voters following different trajectories.

Figure 4.3. Mover-Stayer: PID (in) stability 2006, Percentage



Source: The author

In conclusion, knowing the determinants of PID and its dynamism provides the means to identify the various elements that distinguish ‘movers’ from ‘stayers’. In other words, what are the variables that increase or decrease the probability of being a ‘mover’? To address this question, we generated a pooled data set with the information from the two presidential elections. By pooling several surveys taken at different points in time, we can observe the changes that occurred and arrive at more accurate estimates. Specifically, pooling several surveys increases the sample size and as a result we can have unbiased and consistent estimators.⁴⁹ Table 4.6 presents the results of the logit model that estimates the factors that increase the likelihood of Mexicans being ‘movers’. The Mexican voter who is more likely to be a ‘mover’, and thereby change PID during the election, is an adult woman, with little education, who is unemployed and unmarried, with a low income, and who is not interested in political affairs but is left-leaning.

⁴⁹ More observations will produce more efficient estimators because the standard error is smaller.

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In the analysis of the theories, both social identity and the rational update approach are key elements in increasing the likelihood of a Mexican citizen being a ‘mover’. For example, a Mexican from a privileged social class (with class being statistically significant) and with little religiosity is more likely to be a ‘mover’. With regard to the rational approach, negative feelings about political parties (*Hypothesis H_{4.4}*) and the candidates’ views, increases the likelihood of having an unstable PID (*Hypothesis H_{4.5}*). The rejection of the political parties and leftist candidates (PRD and PRD), and positive opinions of the PAN candidate, increases the likelihood of a citizen changing his or her identity (*Hypotheses H_{4.4} & H_{4.5}*). In a similar vein, disapproval of the president and positive perceptions of the economy increases the likelihood of being a ‘mover’.

Table 4.6. Logit Models Results on Movers


Variables	β	Odds Ratios
<u>Social Identity Approach</u>		
Subjective Social Class	0.24* [0.10]	1.27* [0.13]
Religiosity	-0.03 [0.08]	0.97 [0.08]
<u>Rational Approach</u>		
President's Approval	-0.03 [0.08]	0.97 [0.08]
Economic Perception	0.20+ [0.10]	1.22+ [0.13]
Negative Feelings: PRI	0.64* [0.26]	1.89* [0.50]
Negative Feelings: PRD	0.85** [0.27]	2.33** [0.62]
Candidate Opinion: PRI	-0.21*** [0.03]	0.81*** [0.03]
Candidate Opinion: PAN	0.22*** [0.04]	1.25*** [0.05]
Candidate Opinion: PRD	-0.04 [0.03]	0.96 [0.03]
<u>Control Variables</u>		
Age	0.01 [0.01]	1.01 [0.01]
Educational Level	-0.03 [0.10]	0.97 [0.10]
Married	-0.36+ [0.19]	0.70+ [0.13]
Employment Status	-0.05 [0.22]	0.95 [0.21]
Subjective Income	-0.09 [0.05]	0.92 [0.05]
Female	-0.02 [0.22]	0.98 [0.21]
Ideological self-placement	-0.03 [0.05]	0.97 [0.05]
Political Interest	-0.16 [0.11]	0.85 [0.09]
<i>Years</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>yes</i>
Constant	-3.03*** [0.76]	
Observations	795	
AIC	792	
BIC	881	
Degrees of Freedom	18	
McFadden's R2	0.17	
PRE	0.81	

Significance Levels + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.
Standard errors in brackets. Reference category: Negative Feelings PAN

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The marginal effects, illustrated in Figure 4.4, demonstrate that subjective social class, economic perceptions, negative feelings towards PRI and PRD, and positive opinions of the PAN candidate increase the probability of being considered a ‘mover’. Nevertheless, variables such as religiosity, the president’s approval rating, and opinions of the PRI and PRD candidate decrease the propensity for having an unstable party identification. These effects provide considerable support for the argument that short-term factors alter the party identification of Mexican citizens.

Figure 4.4. Marginal Effects on Probability of being Mover



Source: The Author

4.7. Conclusions and discussion

In Mexico, the 2000 and 2006 presidential elections were highly competitive and unpredictable. The weakening of the PRI was clear, as was the increased popularity of the opposition parties. Mexican society underwent a major political change, as partisan identification - which was strong from the 1970s through to the mid-1990s - was

Chapter 4: Party Identification Dynamism


negatively influenced by evaluations of government performance, causing weak partisanship and a shift to support for the opposition parties (PAN and PRD).

The theoretical and empirical analysis of the PID in Mexico is a topic that has only been under discussion since the early 1990s; however, there are still no definitive conclusions. This research had three objectives: to determine the factors involved in citizens' party identification; to analyse the dynamism or stability of this identity; and to identify which elements increase the probability of being a 'mover'.

This investigation has several implications for the study of PID. Firstly, it establishes that rational update theory has a greater effect and importance than the social identity approach in the determination of party attachment. These findings suggest the possibility of partisanship dynamism or instability.

The second objective was to determine the existence of partisan dynamism in a country that is still undergoing democratisation, by estimating PID using latent variables (Models MS). The results of the studies with four waves (the presidential election of 2000) suggest that the percentage of 'movers' (at 39%) is within the range of the democratic countries previously analysed, thus rejecting the arguments that indicate partisan stability at the individual-level (see Figure 4.5). Conversely the three-wave panel verifies that this type of data is likely to yield inaccurate results (i.e. an over-representation of 'stayers'). In summary, this article verifies the presence of partisan volatility in the 2000 presidential election, confirming that this occurs in both advanced and developing democracies.

Figure 4.5. Percentage of Movers in USA, Great Britain, Canada, Germany and Mexico



Source: Data from Clarke and McCutcheon (2009); Sanders (2004); Neundorf (2010); Neundorf, Stegmüller and Scotto (2011).

This research also confirms the existence of partisan instability, which is dependent on partisan intensity; the percentage of Mexicans who are ‘movers’ increases when they have a weak partisanship and decreases when this identity is strong. This research supports the existence of ‘stayers’ (Michigan partisan style) and ‘movers’ (revisionist-style partisans). Mexican citizens are heterogeneous in the decision-making process; therefore, there is empirical support in Mexico for the theories developed by both the Michigan and Rochester schools. The partisan dynamic among Mexicans, at the latent level, is comparable to that of Americans, British Canadians and Germans.

The third aim of this document was to investigate the factors that increase the probability of a citizen being a ‘mover’. It can be concluded that negative feelings about political parties and candidates’ opinions are key in determining the probability of being either a ‘mover’ or a ‘stayer’. Therefore, this study suggests the importance of electoral strategy. It is important to remember that political alternation exists because of the capacity of political parties to draw the votes of ‘movers’.

Chapter 4: Party Identification Dynamism

The 'valanced partisanship' concept, developed by Sanders (2004), defines party identification as the cumulative assessment of political parties, leaders and candidates. This concept is the most accurate definition of partisanship in Mexico. In summary, PID varies over time; citizens maximise their utility by reflecting on which party will have a better performance, which party they sympathise with, and which candidate they like the most.

The research on PID in Mexico, far from having exhausted the relevance and interest of this concept, has laid the foundation for a deeper analysis of theory and empirical investigation. From our point of view, Mexicans' party identification is still a subject that needs careful study.

5. Conclusions

Many studies have analysed developed democracies, but only a few have examined countries in democratic transition. The focus of this research project was to better understand the characteristics of Mexican citizens during their period of democratic transition (from 2000 to 2009). This thesis began by describing the characteristics of Mexicans in a different political and economic context: a scenario of political alternation and open economy. More specifically, we focused on the new way in which citizens perceive and internalise political affairs. The political and economic contexts have been transformed and the 'new' rules of the game have produced changes in how citizens evaluate, analyse and choose.

Few studies have focused on Mexico. As a consequence, analyses of Mexican political values and attitudes are rare. This study attempts to fill in these gaps, while at the same time encouraging new research. The results of the three papers demonstrate the existence of citizens who understand and perceive the political arena in a new way. Their political assessments play a central role in their decision regarding whether or not to vote, their voting choice and their party identification. In this section, the dissertation results are summarised.

5.1. Mexico's democratic construction

An extremely common Mexican expression is that "*there is no evil that lasts a hundred years*". This expression is also applicable to the political arena. Mexico is a diverse and uneven nation. It is deep-rooted in its past and its traditions, and yet it has also been modernised. Over 50 per cent of its population lives in poverty. At the same time, some of the richest men and women in the world are Mexicans.

The development of the political system in Mexico is clearly demonstrated in a summing up of the last seven presidential elections: (1) 1976, elections with a single

presidential candidate; (2) 1982, many candidates, but little political competition; (3) 1988, political competition, but failure of the institutions to accept the results; (4) 1994, violence, with the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate, alongside the support of all political parties for the continuation of the PRI; (5) 2000, political alternation, the end of the first democratisation process; (6) 2006, an election that split the country in two, with the PRD supported by the lower social classes and the PAN supported by citizens who feared a new economic crisis; and (7) 2012, the return of the PRI to the presidency of the Republic (Woldenberg, 2013).

The elections in 1982 were the last ones in which the PRI was dominant. When this election was fought, more than 24 million Mexicans who appear on the current electoral list had not yet been born (representing 30% of the electoral list). If we add the number of young people who were less than 14 years old in 1982 (34% of the nominal list), over two-thirds of the current electorate do not have any lived experience of the political hegemony of the PRI. In other words, for more than 60% of the current Mexican voting population, the authoritarian past is something far away and strange. In contrast, this same group has witnessed and lived under a regime in transition to democracy. This unarguably changes the perspective of the future of the political system.

Over the past 25 years Mexicans have been able to build a democratic system. However, the current situation is not the end-point; instead, it is the place of departure for a series of tests to achieve democratic consolidation. The Mexican democracy is beset with challenges and obstacles of cultural, economic and social importance. Democracy survives in a pluralistic political environment (where all parties have representation in Congress); however, poverty and inequality are factors that place the political system at risk.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

Partisan identity has not disappeared; it has been modified by the effect of political and democratic development. The key actors in the democratic system, the political parties, have learned to live together. More specifically, they have learned to be pragmatic, to generate arrangements and alliances (for example, in the legislative ground) and to seek to attract society and its votes. Thus, they have become more open actors. In this respect, three strong political parties have been forged since the 2000 presidential election, with greater national representativeness and redesigned roles. Furthermore, despite their differences, they have accepted that all of these options are attractive to the electorate.

Mexican citizens currently support the democratic regime, as can be observed in their political values and attitudes, which function as determinants of political behaviour. Little by little, Mexican citizens are becoming more aware of the importance of politics, and the effect that parties and candidates have on the political and economic development of the country. This dissertation concludes that if Mexicans are economically well, they will favour the incumbent party, and will support the democratic system. This can be interpreted as a sign of political and democratic maturity and a reflection of the rethinking of political issues. In this sense, political studies were initially related to the alternation and democratisation process; today, however, political research has been directed towards political assessments, parties and candidates.

Mexicans support democracy as the best form of government; however, they are also convinced of the limitations of a democracy. This point is illustrated by the fact that the majority distrust political parties and other political institutions. Citizens believe democracy must solve problems linked to political rights and civil liberties. Nevertheless, the strongest problem affecting democracy, and the political system in Mexico, is the purchase and coercion of the vote. This is, without exception, a recurrent practice in all

parties. Aparicio (2002), using data from FLACSO-IFE for the 2000 presidential election, concluded that 13.3% of citizens were targets of some type of clientelism, while 7.2% reported having received a gift in exchange for their vote. Cornelius (2004), by using the 2000 Mexico Panel for the presidential elections, found that 14% of the population received a gift in exchange for their vote. Studies financed by the IFE (Federal Electoral Institute) determined that, in 2003, 3% of the electorate were affected by some kind of vote coercion; in 2006, that figure was 7%; in 2009, the number grew scandalously to 27.7%; and in the last survey of 2012, 28% of the voters were coerced with some type of vote buying. Osorio (2010) concluded that 38% of voters received a gift or favour in exchange for their vote in the 2009 legislative election.

Mexico is uneven in terms of poverty and ignorance. As such, there will be incentives for the exchange of goods for votes. In spite of these major challenges, it is not absurd to consider that the Mexican democracy has moved from a process of transition to consolidation, and the transitional phase can now be considered as a historical period of the Mexican democracy (Woldenberg, 2002).

5.2. In short: the Mexican citizen in transition

Using the empirical analysis presented throughout this doctoral thesis, we can conclude that the Mexican voter resembles voters in established democracies. This thesis defines Mexican citizens as citizens who consider assessments of the economy and political values. These Mexicans may have basic human values, as defined by Schwartz (1992), or materialist/post-materialist values, as defined by Inglehart (1977). They may also have an attitude towards political parties and candidates. They use the information they gather to make decisions about the political landscape by participating in the polls, participating in peaceful demonstrations or signing petitions. Through these experiences, the voters' partisan identities are moulded or modified.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

Chapter 1 presents a descriptive analysis of the economic and political context of the country of Mexico. In the economic sphere, the nation has experienced economic liberalisation since the beginning of the 1990s. Currently, Mexico is considered one of the most open economies in the world. It is the second-largest economy in Latin America and one of the 20 most important economies in the world.

Despite its progress, social inequality and poverty in Mexico have increased due to the economic crisis. This crisis was caused by the mishandling of public finances and dependency on external factors (for example, the price of oil and the exchange rate). In the political arena, Mexico has moved from an authoritarian system with a hegemonic party to a democratic system in the process of consolidation. This process was carried out within the government. More specifically, political and electoral reforms have allowed for a multi-party system with greater representation of different political and ideological currents. Political alternation is a common denominator throughout the national territory and at different government levels.

However, political rights and civil liberties are limited. Citizens suffer from the effects of corruption, weak laws, ethnic and religious conflicts and insecurity. Given these restrictions, the Mexican democracy and its democratic quality are questionable. As a result, this investigation attempts to answer the question of whether the current context of democratic transition and commercial opening has affected citizen values and political attitudes, and subsequently influenced forms of political participation and the decision about which political party to vote for.

In response to all these issues, we ask the question: Is it conceivable to think about a new citizen, a Mexican citizen in transition? As such, the objective is to better understand the impact that the new reality has had on Mexican citizens' internalization of political affairs.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

The first question to consider is whether the economic context and perception affect the political sphere, especially with regard to citizens' voting decisions. The empirical models presented in Chapter 2 extend the analysis, by considering the relationships between objective and subjective economics and the impact on voter choice. This chapter introduces a latent variable for the subjective perception of the economy, satisfying both the statistical and theoretical requirements. Subsequently, an analysis of the decision to vote variable is conducted. The results reveal that voters with positive subjective perceptions are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. In the same manner, it is also concluded that the subjective and objective economy variables have the same effect on the voting decision. In other words, people with positive subjective perceptions (e.g., employed workers and voters with optimistic expectations about their employment prospects) are more likely to vote for the incumbent party. Consequently, Mexican voters are similar to those in more established democracies.

With regard to the analysis of the relationship between the objective and subjective economy, it is concluded that subjective perceptions are positively related to the GDP growth rate. Subjective perceptions are also negatively related to the unemployment rate. Positive evaluations reflect scenarios in which there is a reduction in the inflation rate. However, the likelihood of voting for a political party varies, depending on the variable analysed. For example, the inflation rate is more likely to hurt the PRI, while the unemployment rate is more likely to affect the PRD.

This chapter concludes that voting decisions are influenced by both subjective perceptions and an objective economy. It was determined that voters not only adjust their subjective perceptions based on the information they have, but that their awareness is also consistent with what will happen in the economy. In other words, subjective perceptions can precede the objective economy, but those subjective perceptions are also based on a

past objective reality, pointing to a reciprocal causation. These findings suggest that Mexican voters resemble voters in other democratic systems.

Once we had determined the effect of economic evaluations on electoral political decisions, we then focused our attention on an analysis of the political values and the effect these values have on non-electoral political actions, specifically in relation to participation in peaceful demonstrations (instrumental) and the signing of petitions (symbolic).

The objectives of Chapter 3 were to reproduce the two dimensions of basic human values developed by Schwartz (1992) and then establish the effect of these values, alongside the values defined by Inglehart (1977), on instrumental and symbolic participation. Similarly, we presented the implications of these values in different generations and subsequently analysed their impact on political participation. Hence, Chapter 3 demonstrates that it is possible to replicate the analysis of the values developed by Schwartz and confirms that political values are associated with lower levels of instrumental and symbolic participation.

In contrast, for the values developed by Inglehart (1977), from the analysis presented in this chapter, we conclude that post-materialist values are associated with a greater probability of signing petitions. On the other hand, materialistic values are related to an increase in the probability of participating in demonstrations. Mexican citizens belonging to the generations of pluralism and political alternation are less likely to participate in instrumental and symbolic actions. Chapter 3 also presents empirical evidence, concluding that political values and generational differences influence the non-electoral political participation of the Mexican people. As such, Mexicans with strong political values who belong to the generation of political alternation have a lower probability of participating politically in a symbolic or instrumental manner.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

Empirical analysis confirms that Mexican citizens use economic assessments to predict the future situation of the economy; these evaluations influence voting decisions. In addition, political values and generational affiliations are determinants for Mexicans in deciding which way they will participate politically (e.g. in peaceful demonstrations or in signing petitions).

Consequently, an analysis of the development of one of the most important political heuristics in political and democratic development was conducted: party identification. It is important to consider that PID is one of the most significant factors in building a democratic system, because it allows for the construction of a stable party system and avoids the volatility of the electoral system.

The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 4 illustrates that rational updating (short-term factors) plays a crucial role in determining Mexicans' PID, translating into a second-term social identity (long-term factors). In other words, positive evaluations and attitudes towards political parties and candidates, (for example, those relating to presidential approval; economic development; evaluation of corruption and perception of safety), have a measurable effect on Mexican partisan identity.

The panel data analysis revealed that partisan attachment is dynamic. The percentage of Mexicans considered 'movers' is very similar to those observed in democratic countries. In the same sense, partisan instability also depends on the intensity with which Mexicans say that they identify with political options. The percentage of 'movers' will increase when the intensity of attachment is less intense. Finally, the factors that increase the likelihood of a voter being considered a 'mover' are both social (e.g., social class and religiosity) and short-term (e.g., attitudes relating to political parties and candidates; perceptions of the economy; presidential approval). This section of the

doctoral thesis presents empirical evidence that supports the existence of the two theories linked to PID: Michigan Theory and the Rochester School.

In summary, Mexican citizens are in a process of adapting to a democratic system and economic openness. Mexicans use economic assessments to forecast the economic situation; this is an important determinant of voting intentions. Therefore, short-term factors (parties' and candidates' evaluations and campaigns) play a key role in the instability of the PID. Non-electoral political participation, including the signing of petitions or participating in peaceful demonstrations, can be explained by generational differences and political values. The empirical analysis presented in this study suggests the presence of citizens who are experiencing growth and development: Mexican citizens in transition. The actions and political attitudes of Mexican citizens are determined as much by their identity as by their process of constant rational update, which in turn contributes to the strengthening of the democratic regime.

5.3. The contribution

In general terms, this research project aims to prove that, in this new context of political competitiveness and economic openness, Mexican citizens internalise issues of a political nature in different ways. This doctoral thesis makes three central contributions to the study of political science and the analysis of political behaviour in Mexico. First, it contributes to the empirical debate developed in recent years around economic voting and considers its impact and importance in Mexicans' voting decisions (Buendía, 2000; Beltrán, 2000, 2003; Domínguez, 1999; Moreno, 2003, 2009; Singer, 2007). Second, based on the analysis developed by Moreno (2005) concerning values in Mexico, this project makes a contribution by evaluating the links between human values (Schwartz, 1992); material and post-material values (Inglehart, 1977) and non-electoral political participation (Whiteley, 2012). In the process, it reveals that these values are determinants

of the participation of Mexicans in demonstrations and the signing of petitions. Finally, in response to the analysis of partisan identification in Mexico conducted by Estrada (2005), Guardado (2009) and Moreno (2003, 2009), this project shows that partisan identification in Mexico is unstable, and that it appears at levels observed in consolidated democracies (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009; Neundorf, 2010; Neundorf, Stegmüller and Scotto, 2011; Sanders, 2004).

The first contribution has been made in response to the studies carried out on economic voting in Mexico (Buendía, 2000; Beltrán, 2000, 2003; Domínguez, 1999; Moreno, 2003, 2009; Singer, 2007). This thesis proposes the use of a latent variable as an indicator of the subjective perception of the economy. This variable contributes to the debate on empirical discrepancies found in the country in the analyses of the different presidential elections. In this sense, I show that the subjective perception of the economy influences the vote decision, and that this relationship is directly in parallel with the one observed in the objective economy, in terms of both the individual (for example, if he has employment) and the nation (with measurements based on variables such as inflation, unemployment and gross domestic product). In addition, voters use this economic assessment to forecast what will happen in the national economy.

The second contribution, following Moreno's (2005) analysis of the change in the composition of Mexicans' values in recent decades, shows that both human values, as defined by Schwartz (1992), and material and postmaterial values, as developed by Inglehart (1977), are determinants of non-electoral participation – i.e. signing of petitions and participation in peaceful demonstrations. Additionally, this study underlines the fact that generational differences do not increase non-electoral participation. Nevertheless, the factors that determine this participation are different for each generation. The argument

behind this study focuses on the fact that changes in the political culture (values and attitudes) reveal changes in the mechanisms of political participation.

Finally, the third contribution made by this project is related to the puzzle surrounding party identification instability. It provides input to the debate on the determinants of partisan identification, as theorised by Moreno (2003, 2009) and empirically developed by Estrada (2005) and Guardado (2009). It contributes to the empirical analysis of partisan instability by identifying the levels of instability and the factors that influence the probability of identification being unstable. Levels of instability among Mexicans are very similar to those encountered in consolidated democracies; for example, in Canada, the United States of America (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009), the United Kingdom (Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009; Sanders, 2004) and Germany (Neundorf, 2010; Neundorf, Stegmueller and Scotto, 2011). Short-term factors (opinions about candidates and political parties, as well as presidential approval), rather than long-term factors, are decisive in determining Mexicans' partisan instability.

Most of these conclusions are only one side of the coin, and there is a whole other side that remains unexplored: all of these issues relate to a process of constant, rational updating of the Mexican. There is still plenty of research that remains to be done in the analysis of political behaviour in Mexico. It is important, therefore, to consider the limitations and areas of opportunity that this project exhibits.

5.4. Methodological Choice: Secondary Data

This doctoral research project uses secondary data generated by Latinobarómetro, World Values Survey, and MIT. Secondary data is the analysis of data collected by someone else (Boslaugh, 2007), and can include any data that is examined to answer a research question other than the question(s) for which the data was initially collected (Vartanian, 2011). The biggest advantage in using secondary data is an economic one. These data

were collected beforehand, so the PhD project costs are significantly reduced, and there is also the benefit of huge time savings (Boslaugh, 2007).

Another advantage in using secondary data is that organisations have gathered different information about the Mexican population over several years, so it becomes feasible to make an analysis over time. A third advantage in using secondary data relates to the process of collection. The collection process – as in the case of the databases used in this work – is conducted by an experienced group of specialists and professionals over several years: a favourable feature that is not available for small projects. In some instances, for example in individual research projects (using primary data), the data are collected by the students or researchers themselves.

However, secondary data has important restrictions. Sometimes the information is not relevant to the research, making it impossible to answer the research questions (Boslaugh, 2007). In other words, the information does not match or conform to the subject of the study; data can be vague, ambiguous or inaccurate, thereby generating little accuracy in the analysis. In addition, it is possible that there are not sufficient data to meet the requirements of the research project, meaning the research questions cannot be answered. In this respect also, since the investigator was not the one who collected the data, it is possible he has no control over the information, which limits the analysis, and sometimes it is therefore necessary to modify the research question. Another limiting factor in the use of secondary data is that the researcher may not understand how the process of data generation and collection was performed (Boslaugh, 2007). So it may not be known how (or whether) the data has been affected by the rate of non-response, or by the lack of understanding of the questionnaire. Sometimes this information is available (for example, in the bases used in this thesis). However, in many other cases, this type of information is not freely available.

5.5. Possible limitations in the research: Problems of endogeneity

The use of secondary data creates significant limitations. This doctoral research project may present this type of problem either by omitted variables, simultaneity or unobserved heterogeneity.

These problems may occur in the chapter concerning the analysis of the economic vote. Evans and Andersen (2006) point out that the empirical results of the economic vote are over-represented by distortions generated by partisanship. In this case, it is necessary to assume that these independent variables are exogenous. The authors argue that economic perceptions are a function of partisan identification (Bartels, 1996; Duch and Palmer, 2002; Franklin Wlezien and Twiggs, 1997; Van der Eijk et al., 2004; Zaller, 2005), making these variables endogenous. Conversely, Lewis-Beck (2006) concluded that it is possible there are problems of endogeneity in studies of the economic vote. However, in the opposite sense, partisanship is influenced by economic perceptions.

Despite these arguments, this hypothesis is difficult to sustain, since various aggregated studies show the high correlation between macroeconomic development and support for the governing party (Campbell, 2005; Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Bélenger, 2004; Wilkin and Norpoth, 1997); such a correlation functions as a good prediction of electoral contests. In terms of individual analysis, Sanders showed that in the case of the United Kingdom "unemployment perceptions track 'real' unemployment, and inflation perceptions track 'real' inflation very well" (2000: 209). In turn, Nadeau and Lewis-Beck demonstrated that in the case of the United States, the "business index generally tracks the income index" (2001: 161). Therefore, it can be inferred that economic perceptions strongly impact the vote decision and that this is not affected by endogeneity bias from party identification. Cees van der Eijka and Mark Franklin (2002) say that another way

to resolve likely endogeneity in the analysis of the economic vote is by using structural equation modelling.

Researchers in the social sciences have spent many years studying the stability of partisan identification, as it is one of the more constant political attitudes (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Converse and Markus, 1979). The traditional view points out that party identification is a psychological attachment, and that it serves as an ‘unmoved mover’ within a field of causal forces, culminating in the vote choice (Achen, 1992; Beck and Jennings, 1975; Campbell et al., 1960; Franklin, 1984; Jennings and Niemi, 1968). On the other hand, the revisionist view suggests that partisan identification is flexible and that its instability is determined by short-term factors: for example, retrospective evaluations (Brody and Rothenberg, 1988; Fiorina, 1981) and evaluations of presidential candidates (Markus and Converse, 1979). Simply, partisan attachment can be viewed as "an information shortcut that is continually updated and adjusted based on rational evaluation" (Settle et al., 2009: 601).

These analyses tend to suggest that party identification and ideology have a mutual causality (Evans, 2004; Fleury and Lewis Beck, 1993; Shachar, 2003). In this sense, Fiorina (1981) argued that partisanship is an accumulation of personal experience and political assessments. This implies that party identification is also potentially endogenous; that is, both a cause and consequence of political evaluations. However, this problem of endogeneity can be resolved using data panels.

Evans and Andersen (2006) concluded that party identification can be made more exogenous by measuring it at a prior point in time. In order to overcome the endogeneity problem of the party identification variable, scholars occasionally use the lagged variable as an instrument. In the same vein, Fiorina (1981) noted that it is

important to use instrumental variables of partisan identity to make it even more exogenous.

This opens an opportunity for future analysis: researchers should strive to make partisan measures, such as party identification, as exogenous as possible. Additionally, it will also be important in the future to analyse the structuring and formulation of questions relating to partisan identification. Miller (1991), and Miller and Shanks (1996), suggested that question wording leads to problems of differential endogeneity between the short-term and the long-term forces influencing party identification. In other words, different forms of questions lead to different types of political attitudes, which in turn influence the construction of partisanship (Timpone and Neely 1997).

5.6. The other side of the coin: Emotions and Psychology

Another important limitation this doctoral research project presents is that we have studied only one side of the coin: the side that analyses the Mexican citizen as a being with human and political values which influence the forms of democratic participation. This citizen uses subjective assessments of the economy to decide which political party to vote for and to define his partisan identification – which is unstable, as in those countries with consolidated democracies – and this identification is determined by short-term factors. However, these studies are established to analyse the citizen based only on social factors and rational updates, leaving aside the psychological and emotional determinants.

This predicament arises from the inability to find questions and variables that are related to this topic. However, it is important to consider that this other side of the coin, relating to emotions and psychology, plays a central role in the understanding of political behaviour.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

In the period of the Enlightenment, philosophers believed emotions were undesirable - and even an obstacle - to citizens' democratic governance. This likely incompatibility gave rise to the abandonment of emotions in early studies of political behaviour (Clarke, Hoggett and Thompson, 2006; Marcus, 2002; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen, 2000). Emotions are generally defined as mental and physical responses to identifiable stimuli, deemed consequential for individual or group objectives (Brader, 2006; Damasio, 1994; Ekman, 1992; Ellsworth, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore and Collins, 1988; Scherer, et. Al., 1994).

At present, political consultants see emotions as a key factor in political advertising (Arterton, 1992; Kamber, 1997; Kern, 1989; Perloff and Kinsey, 1992;). In this sense, political psychologists have demonstrated that feelings toward issues and candidates are a determining factor in citizens' political preferences (Abelson et al., 1982; Conover and Feldman, 1986; Kinder, 1994). Marcus et al. (2000) proposed the theory of Affective Intelligence, arguing that a citizen with anxiety (as a reaction to threat) is more likely to pay attention to issues of a political nature and take reasoned decisions; on the other hand, enthusiastic citizens (as a reaction to signals that have positive repercussions for a person's objectives) tend to rely on party predispositions. So, the theory of Affective Intelligence can reveal the underlying functioning of political campaigns. This theory argues that if someone makes you feel anxious, you like him or her less; if someone makes you feel enthusiastic, you like him or her more (LeDoux, 1995; Zajonc, 1998).

Another theory suggests that people process information depending on mood. When the mood is positive, the citizen will depend mostly on pre-existing beliefs, while a negative mood will trigger a more systematic analysis (Schwarz, 2000).

In recent years, we have seen the resurgence of emotions as a key element for analysis by citizens. Academicians dedicated to the analysis of emotions conclude that

they play a central role in the formation of political attitudes and political behaviour. Emotions are determinants in the appraisals of candidates (Abelson et al., 1982; Ottati, Steenbergen and Riddle, 1992); in the evaluations of officials (Conover and Feldman, 1986); in the analysis of public policies (Huddy et al., 2005; Pagano and Huo, 2007); and they have a major effect on the impact of political campaigns (Brader, 2006). In addition, analyses of emotions have shown that they are essential for citizens' rational updates, and that these updates facilitate the process of individual political learning (Dolan and Holbrook, 2001; Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 2000).

In summary, the thoughts and feelings of citizens about political parties may be factors that explain political behaviour and political attitudes (Greene, 2002; Roscoe and Christiansen, 2001). Feelings of enthusiasm merely reflect and reinforce people's political choices; feelings of anxiety cause a fundamental change in people's political thinking (Marcus, 2002; Marcus and MacKuen, 1993, 2001; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000); anxious voters interrupt their habitual behaviour and engage in more effortful information processing (Marcus et al., 2000).

In general, the study of emotions in political psychology has re-emerged. Emotions can condition the way in which people acquire and analyse political information (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000), influencing rational updates and evaluations (Kunda, 1990; Lodge, Taber, and Weber, 2006; Redlawsk, 2002; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Lau, 2007).

5.7. The next steps: future research

This research paper is viewed as a starting point in the analysis of the Mexican citizen in a democratic environment of economic openness. This project examines three major themes within the study of political behaviour; there is much more to be learned. The

concepts developed throughout the thesis provide a guide for future research on the Mexican citizen and his political participation.

In my opinion there are several avenues for future research. First, if you count the resources for the development of primary data (either by students or organisations), it is important to consider the necessity to generate extensive data panels (with a greater number of rounds of questions) and to complete a more detailed analysis of the factors that influence the citizens (which this research project has presented as limited). These factors include, for example, partisan stability analysis and the correction of the problems generated by endogeneity in partisan identification, the vote decision and the economic vote.

Panel surveys enable the investigation to determine whether changes in one variable lead to changes in another. However, this type of information is expensive and difficult to implement. As well as the limitations presented by the cross-section information, it also presents other problematic limitations unique to this type of data: for example, the actual process of interviewing the same individuals on various occasions causes changes in their attitudes and behaviours.

At the same time, by generating the primary data from new questionnaires it would be possible to analyse the concept of partisan identification from another perspective. For example, Burden and Klobstad (2005) show that a small change in the structuring of the question can generate substantial changes in the degree of partisanship measured in the United States. These authors found that using the original question, Democrats have an advantage of 9 percent. However, when an experimental question using emotions (anxiety) was employed, the Republicans led by 10%. This type of analysis encourages further research on the subject, which is particularly important in the case of Mexico.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

In generating new questionnaires, it is important to include questions related to citizens' psychological and emotional factors, since it is an aspect of the development of political science in Mexico that has not been widely explored.

The path of future research is not limited to the reproduction of new data. Secondary data can be further employed to analyse key factors for the democratic development and political behaviour of Mexicans. It would be interesting to analyse cognitive mobility (Dalton, 1984), social capital and invalid votes in the country's new political and economic context. It would also be beneficial for future research to focus on the effect of insecurity perception and low social mobility on Mexicans' political behaviour, and the consequences these may have on the consolidation of the democratic regime.

Another important point is that this analysis was limited to a single cohort study. Therefore, future research could focus on extending the study to include different generations throughout the country, and to see the implications that the socialisation process (as developed by Neundorf in 2010 to analyse Western political systems) has had on political participation and political behaviour. The investigation could be extended to the study of institutions (for example, political parties) and democratic performance, since the development of the system also depends on the development of these concepts.

Future analyses of the political behaviour of Mexican citizens must also be developed using new methodological tools: for example, the contextual analysis of the citizen could be measured by employing experiments, quasi-experiments and the use of technologies (such as social networks) for the implementation of surveys.

Much of the research in political science focuses on individuals in total isolation from their environment. In other words, individuals are treated as if they were not living in society, where history, geography and especially social relations are

fundamental factors for their development and behaviour. Context affects people in different ways. Therefore, in order to make a more detailed analysis of political behaviour and elections it is necessary to study the interaction between the context and the individual. This dissertation accordingly recommends the analysis of the Mexican citizen through the application of multilevel methodologies, in order to know how context influences the individual's behaviour (Achen and Shively, 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1993; Prysby and Books, 1991). For example, this type of methodology facilitates the study of how context may determine the scale of the impact of subjective assessments of the economy on the vote decision (Duch and Stvenson, 2008), and how certain conditions and strategies determine the ideological vote (Duch, May and Armstrong, 2008). Given this scenario, it is necessary to relate survey studies (primary or secondary) to information at municipal, state or national level managed by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).

Researchers acknowledge the importance of experiments in the study of political behaviour (Kinder and Palfrey, 1993). This methodology permits the random assignment of subjects to treatment and control groups; scholars can be certain that the contents of the disturbance term are not driving the results. Whatever covariance there is between the independent and dependent variables can thus be attributed to the manipulation of the former. Therefore, the experiments generate stronger causal inferences based on controls in the initial conditions, and random exposure to different stimuli. This methodology can be applicable to the study of emotions in political communication (Glaser and Salovey, 1998; Isbell and Ottati, 2002), and the analysis of the impact of subjective perceptions of the economy on vote decision. The experimental analysis can also be applied to the analysis of the effects of the media on political behaviour (Gerber, Karlan and Bergan, 2009), since the presence of two media

(newspapers) in the same region creates a good possibility for analysing their effect in a naturally developed context for the same population. In addition, experiments can be applied to the analysis of the formation of the vote decision based on partisanship, where partisan attachment is manipulated in order to know precisely what the relationship between the two variables is. On the other hand, experiments can be developed to study the impact of the assessments of both candidates and the economy on voter intention, treating these variables in different conditions (for a similar analysis, see Cowden and McDermott, 2000).

In the same vein, quasi-experiments have also taken on great relevance in the study of contemporary political science. Quasi-experiments are studies in which the treatment takes place in the real world in a natural way. Therefore, it is not distributed randomly among the population. In quasi-experimental work, investigators must assume the veracity of a counterfactual claim, and accept that varying the contents of the disturbance term would not alter the results (Fearon, 1991). Survey experiments are frequently labelled as quasi-experiments, because researchers do not have control over all of the conditions of the experimental tests (Sanders et al., 2007). This type of methodology arises when a strategy (event) is introduced in a population in a non-random way: for example, the implementation of a public policy or strategy in the media (campaign). This methodology can be applied to the study of partisan instability and economic vote models, since the effects that the short-term has on these concepts can be analysed more accurately.

The application of experimental and quasi-experimental models can be developed at state level. The geographic, economic, social and political diversity of each of the 32 federal entities can generate natural circumstances of treatment and control for the study of political behaviour.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

Last, but not least, is the need for the development of surveys via the Internet in Mexico. Sanders et al. (2007) demonstrated in the case of Great Britain that the models considered that were based on in-person data have virtually the same results as those based on the Internet, suggesting that surveys developed on the Internet provide data comparable in quality to those acquired by traditional methods.

The results presented in this document provide the necessary basis for the analysis in a different time and space; in other words, it would be possible to extend the study to other countries and other moments in time. In the case of Mexico, the study could be developed for previous years, including the periods of authoritarianism, or for future years, reminding us that the country is in a process of democratic consolidation. A vast research agenda on political behaviours in Mexico exists for the years ahead, and this is inevitably linked to the continuous improvement of the quality of surveys and macro data available. This research project is only one building block: many puzzles are awaiting answers.

Appendix

Chapter 2. Economic Voting Models

Question Wording and Coding

Table 6.1. Economic Evaluations

Question Wording		
	Sociotropic	Egocentric
	Sociotropic Current Evaluation	Egocentric Current Evaluation
Current/Present	In general, how would you describe the present economic situation of the country? Would you say that it is ...?.	In general, how would you describe your present economic situation and that of your family?. Would you say that it is very good, good, about average, bad or very bad?.
	Past economic situation of the country	Past personal economic situation
	Retrospective Sociotropic	Retrospective Egocentric
Retrospective	Do you consider the current economic situation of the country to be better, the same, or worse than 12 months ago?	Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family to be better, the same, or worse than 12 months ago?
	Future economic situation of the country	Future personal economic situation
	Prospective Sociotropic	Prospective Egocentric
Prospective	And in the next 12 months do you think that, in general, the economic situation of your country will improve, stay the same or get worse compared to the way it is now?	And in the next 12 months do you think that your economic situation and that of your family will improve, stay the same or get worse compared to the way it is now?

All these variables were harmonised using the coding: 1 as ‘got worse’; 2 as ‘stayed the same’; and 3 as ‘got better’. Variables with five answer categories were coded 1 and 2 as ‘got worse’; 3 as ‘stayed the same’; and 4 and 5 as ‘got better’.

Employment status

What is your current employment situation? (1) was coded as ‘freelance, public wage earner and private wage earner’; (0) ‘temporary doesn’t work, retired, in charge of house, or student’.

Concerned of future employment status

How concerned would you say you are that you will be left without work or unemployed during the next 12 months? (4) 'Very concerned'; (3) 'concerned'; (2) 'a little concerned' & 'not at all concerned'; (1) without work.

Satisfaction with democracy

In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [the nation]? (4) 'very satisfied'; (3) 'rather satisfied'; (2) 'not very satisfied'; (1) 'not at all satisfied'.

Confidence in president

Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following groups, institutions or persons mentioned on the list: a lot, some, a little or no confidence? (4) 'a lot of confidence'; (3) 'some confidence'; (2) 'little confidence'; (1) 'no confidence at all'.

Confidence in political parties

Please look at this card and tell me how much confidence you have in each of the following groups, institutions or persons mentioned on the list: a lot, some, a little or no confidence? (4) 'a lot of confidence'; (3) 'some confidence'; (2) 'little confidence'; (1) 'no confidence at all'.

Approval of the President

Do you approve or disapprove of how the current administration, headed by (name of president), is running the country? (1) approve; (2) disapprove.

Most important problem in the country

In your opinion, what do you consider to be the most important problem in the country? (1) 'low salaries; inflation; price rises; economic crisis; unemployment; poverty; social inequality; distribution of income; social injustice; economy; financial problems'.

(0) 'transport; terrorism; political violence; guerrilla; health problems; corruption; drug trafficking; crime; public security; drugs consumption; addiction; racial discrimination; problems with neighbour countries; political crisis; deficient basic services; others, no problem; don't know'.

Subjective Income

Do your salary and the total of your family's salaries allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? Which of the following situations do you find yourself in? (4) 'it is sufficient, you can save'; (3) 'it is just sufficient, without major problems'; (2) 'it is not sufficient, you have problems'; (1) 'it is not sufficient, you have big problems'.

Socioeconomic level


Perception of the respondent's socioeconomic status. Point of reference: Quality of housing, quality of furniture and respondent's looks. (4) 'Very good'; (3) 'good'; (2) 'bad'; (1) 'very bad'.

Exploratory Factor Analysis

The EFA model evaluates the dimensionality of observed variables (for example, information generated by a survey) based on the generation of a smaller number of factors, which facilitate the interpretation of the existing correlations. This method, grounded on eigenvalues (factor variance), establishes the number of latent variables necessary to explain the variance between the observed values. In this sense, an eigenvalue less than 1.0 suggests that the corresponding factor represents less than the variance of the indicator. For Brown (2006), three methodologies exist for determining the number of necessary factors: 1) the Kaiser-Guttman rule; 2) the screen test; and 3) parallel analysis. In this study, the first two will be used to constitute the number of latent variables.

In the case of “the Kaiser criterion”, this model has an eigenvalue greater than 1 (eigenvalue = 2.855). For a graphic representation, see Figure 6.1. We can determine that the minimum optimum number of latent variables that explain the correlation between the observed variables is equal to 1.

Figure 6.1. Eigenvalues for exploratory factor analysis



Source: The author

Given this, it is possible to continue with the analysis of the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), whose purpose will be to establish the relationship between the indicators and the factors or latent variables.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Three models were analysed in this study. The first model generated two latent variables: egocentric and sociotropic perceptions of the economy (Model 1). The second model generated three latent variables, which are the present, retrospective and prospective perceptions of the economy (Model 2). Finally, model 3 generated a single latent variable, the subjective perception of the economy (Model 3).

To evaluate the adjustment of the model, Yu (2002) considered that the best way to evaluate it is based on the WRMR, which should be less than 1, and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), which should be less than 0.06. On the

other hand, Bentler (1990) pointed out that for a model to adjust correctly the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) should approach the range of 0.90–0.95. Yu (2002) concluded that the models with Comparative Fit Indices (CFI) at a cut-off value close to 0.96 are acceptable when there is an $N \geq 250$.

Table 6.2 shows the level of adjustment of each model, indicating that all three models fit the data well.

Table 6.2. Model Fit

Models	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	Egocentric/Sociotropic	Current/Retrospective/ Prospective	Subjective Perception of the Economy
n	6,474	6,474	6,474
Chi-square	32.03	48.44	10.48
df	3	1	1
RMSEA	0.04	0.09	0.04
CFI	1.00	1.00	1.00
TLI	0.98	0.92	0.98
WRMR	0.85	0.97	0.53

Source: The author

All of the loading factors are statistically significant and substantial for generation of the latent variable and, moreover, are equal to or greater than 0.50, which suggests sufficient validity of the variables within the model.

Table 6.3. Standardised Coefficients for CFA

Latent Construct / Observed Variable	β	S.E.	Est. / S.E.	P-Value	R-square	Residual Variance
Model 1						
Egocentric						
Present Egocentric	0.61	0.01	42.96	0.00	0.39	0.61
Retrospective Egocentric	0.67	0.01	46.66	0.00	0.50	0.50
Prospective Egocentric	0.53	0.02	35.28	0.00	0.33	0.67
Sociotropic						
Present Sociotropic	0.62	0.02	31.05	0.00	0.37	0.63
Retrospective Sociotropic	0.71	0.02	38.23	0.00	0.45	0.55
Prospective Sociotropic	0.57	0.02	36.77	0.00	0.28	0.72
Model 2						
Retrospective						
Retrospective Sociotropic	0.66	0.02	42.76	0.00	0.44	0.57
Retrospective Egocentric	0.63	0.02	41.64	0.00	0.39	0.61
Prospective						
Prospective Sociotropic	0.72	0.02	47.86	0.00	0.51	0.49
Prospective Egocentric	0.65	0.02	43.72	0.00	0.42	0.58
Current						
Current Sociotropic	0.74	0.02	34.94	0.00	0.55	0.46
Current Egocentric	0.55	0.02	30.13	0.00	0.30	0.70
Model 3						
Subjective Perception of the Economy						
Present Sociotropic	0.67	0.02	29.83	0.00	0.45	0.55
Retrospective Sociotropic	0.52	0.03	19.82	0.00	0.27	0.73
Prospective Sociotropic	0.53	0.02	27.12	0.00	0.28	0.72
Presente Egocentric	0.63	0.02	37.01	0.00	0.39	0.61
Retrospective Egocentric	0.62	0.02	34.69	0.00	0.38	0.62
Prospective Egocentric	0.55	0.02	32.82	0.00	0.31	0.69

Source: The author

Table 6.4. Multi logistic Analysis by year

Variables	2000		2001		2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2008		2009	
	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD
<u>Economic Evaluations</u>																		
Subjective Perception of the Economy	-0.46+	-0.25	-0.74***	-0.84***	-0.09	-0.98**	-0.62*	-1.52***	-0.56+	-0.89**	-0.40+	-0.83***	-0.38+	-0.42*	-0.23	-1.02**	-0.27	-0.52
	[0.25]	[0.32]	[0.21]	[0.22]	[0.28]	[0.30]	[0.27]	[0.30]	[0.30]	[0.33]	[0.21]	[0.23]	[0.20]	[0.21]	[0.21]	[0.31]	[0.28]	[0.42]
Concerned of future employment status	0.08	-0.01	0.17	0.02	0.12	0	0.02	-0.23	0.11	-0.28	0.09	-0.23	0.26	0.26	0.09	0.70*	0.42*	0.33
	[0.11]	[0.14]	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.17]	[0.17]	[0.19]	[0.20]	[0.20]	[0.21]	[0.18]	[0.18]	[0.20]	[0.22]	[0.16]	[0.30]	[0.21]	[0.33]
Employment Status	0.23	0.23	-0.04	-0.05	-0.07	0.09	-0.66	0.08	.	.	-0.19	0.83+	-0.87+	-0.54	-0.63	-2.06*	-0.57	-1.08
	[0.28]	[0.35]	[0.24]	[0.26]	[0.48]	[0.49]	[0.51]	[0.54]	.	.	[0.46]	[0.48]	[0.48]	[0.53]	[0.46]	[0.89]	[0.54]	[0.83]
<u>Control Variables</u>																		
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.02	-0.1	-0.09	-0.12	-0.25	-0.18	-0.07	-0.14	-0.28	-0.31	0.28*	-0.12	0.01	-0.67***	0.02	-0.54*	-0.01	0.15
	[0.11]	[0.15]	[0.13]	[0.15]	[0.18]	[0.19]	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.18]	[0.20]	[0.14]	[0.15]	[0.15]	[0.16]	[0.14]	[0.24]	[0.17]	[0.25]
L/R Self-positioning	0.17***	-0.20**	-0.27***	-0.48***	-0.06	-0.17***	0.04	-0.03	0.04	-0.05	-0.06	-0.14**	-0.13**	-0.35***	0.02	-0.33***	-0.03	-0.29***
	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.04]	[0.07]	[0.05]	[0.08]
First Problem in the Country: Economy	-0.16	0.38	-0.19	-0.01	0.66**	0.38	0.70**	-0.27	0.35	0.09	0.02	-0.09	-0.53*	-0.18	0.26	-0.03	0.26	-0.04
	[0.22]	[0.28]	[0.21]	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.24]	[0.25]	[0.27]	[0.29]	[0.32]	[0.21]	[0.22]	[0.26]	[0.27]	[0.22]	[0.33]	[0.27]	[0.40]
Subjective Income	-0.08	-0.33+	-0.11	0.16	-0.36*	-0.23	-0.04	-0.02	0.23	-0.02	0.1	0.16	0.21	0.35+	0.11	-0.18	0.12	0.31
	[0.15]	[0.19]	[0.18]	[0.20]	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.16]	[0.17]	[0.19]	[0.20]	[0.19]	[0.20]	[0.17]	[0.19]	[0.15]	[0.22]	[0.19]	[0.27]
Female	0.22	0.08	0.05	0.02	-0.01	-0.23	-0.48+	-0.66*	-0.45	-0.61+	0.29	0.51*	-0.50+	-0.19	-0.06	-0.63+	0.13	-0.18
	[0.27]	[0.33]	[0.22]	[0.24]	[0.25]	[0.26]	[0.25]	[0.27]	[0.29]	[0.32]	[0.21]	[0.22]	[0.27]	[0.30]	[0.24]	[0.37]	[0.29]	[0.42]
Age	0	-0.01	0.01	0	-0.01	-0.02+	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0	0.01	0	0	0	-0.02+	0	0.01
	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]	[0.01]
Married	0.03	-0.26	-0.21	-0.12	-0.21	-0.51+	0.3	0.15	0.14	0.59+	0	-0.18	-0.4	0.25	-0.23	0.01	0.50+	-0.13
	[0.25]	[0.30]	[0.24]	[0.26]	[0.27]	[0.27]	[0.25]	[0.27]	[0.29]	[0.32]	[0.22]	[0.23]	[0.25]	[0.28]	[0.22]	[0.35]	[0.29]	[0.41]
Catholic	0.01	0.38	-0.59*	-0.38	0.02	0.35	-0.41	-0.26	-0.19	-0.04	-0.11	-0.49*	0.06	-0.77*	-0.06	-0.25	0.25	-0.03
	[0.37]	[0.56]	[0.23]	[0.25]	[0.32]	[0.34]	[0.30]	[0.33]	[0.35]	[0.40]	[0.23]	[0.24]	[0.38]	[0.36]	[0.28]	[0.39]	[0.37]	[0.53]
Education	-0.06+	-0.03	-0.08**	-0.07*	-0.02	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.11**	-0.02	0.01	-0.07+	-0.05	-0.08**	-0.01	0.01	0.06
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.06]
Socioeconomic Level	-0.30*	-0.22	0	0.12	0.17+	0.16	0.16	0	0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.28+	-0.24	-0.16	0.08	-0.12	-0.24
	[0.15]	[0.19]	[0.10]	[0.11]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.12]	[0.13]	[0.14]	[0.16]	[0.13]	[0.13]	[0.17]	[0.18]	[0.14]	[0.23]	[0.20]	[0.28]
Constant	0.23	2.12+	2.61**	3.00**	1.36	2.32*	-0.18	1.82+	-0.82	3.09*	-0.52	0.28	1.87+	3.71***	1.06	2.37*	-0.58	-0.45
	[0.92]	[1.23]	[0.93]	[0.99]	[1.00]	[1.04]	[1.02]	[1.09]	[1.32]	[1.39]	[0.81]	[0.85]	[0.98]	[1.01]	[0.78]	[1.15]	[1.08]	[1.64]
Obs	448		626		457		463		334		602		464		471		306	
ll(null)	-467		-678		-502		-505		-365		-660		-497		-472		-295	
ll(model)	-426		-604		-474		-466		-338		-626		-426		-414		-277	
df	28		28		28		28		26		28		28		28		28	
AIC	908		1,264		1,003		989		728		1,309		907		884		609	
BIC	1,023		1,388		1,119		1,105		827		1,432		1,023		1,000		714	
McFadden's Adj R2:	0.09		0.11		0.12		0.08		0.07		0.05		0.14		0.12		0.06	
PRE	0.40		0.41		0.40		0.39		0.38		0.40		0.40		0.42		0.40	

Significance Levels + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. Notes: Standard errors in brackets.

Table 6.5. Multi logistic Regression on Vote Choice


Variables	Egocentric & Sociotropic Model		Retrospective & Prospective		Subjective Perception of the Economy	
	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD	PRI	PRD
<u>Economic Evaluations</u>						
Egocentric	0.43	0.24				
	[0.23]	[0.26]				
Sociotropic	-0.85***	-1.09***				
	[0.22]	[0.26]				
Retrospective			-0.35	-0.75		
			[0.53]	[0.63]		
Prospective			-0.19	-0.43*		
			[0.16]	[0.19]		
Current Evaluation			0.10	0.31		
			[0.43]	[0.51]		
Subjective Perception of the Economy					-0.38***	-0.76***
					[0.08]	[0.09]
<u>Control Variables</u>						
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.00	-0.21***	-0.01	-0.21***	-0.02	-0.22***
	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]	[0.05]
L/R Self-positioning	-0.03*	-0.20***	-0.03*	-0.20***	-0.03*	-0.20***
	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.02]	[0.01]	[0.02]
First Problem in the Country: Economy	0.20*	0.01	0.16*	0.02	0.16*	0.02
	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]
Concerned of future employment status	0.08*	-0.02	0.08*	-0.02	0.08*	-0.02
	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.05]
Subjective Income	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.06]
Female	-0.09	-0.13	-0.08	-0.13	-0.08	-0.13
	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]
Age	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.00]
Married	-0.05	-0.08	-0.04	-0.08	-0.04	-0.08
	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.09]
Employment Status	-0.26*	0.00	-0.26*	1.00	-0.26*	2.00
	[0.11]	[0.13]	[0.114]	[0.132]	[0.114]	[0.132]
Catholic	-0.24*	-0.29**	-0.24*	-0.29**	-0.24*	-0.29**
	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]	[0.10]
Education	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.04***	-0.05***	-0.04***
	[0.00]	[0.01]	[0.00]	[0.01]	[0.00]	[0.01]
Socioeconomic Level	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.01
	[0.0405]	[0.0450]	[0.0404]	[0.0449]	[0.0403]	[0.0449]
Years Dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Constant	1.04***	1.94***	0.96**	1.85***	0.96**	1.85***
	[0.31]	[0.36]	[0.31]	[0.36]	[0.31]	[0.36]
Obs	4,171		4,171		4,171	
ll(null)	-4,526		-4,526		-4,526	
ll(model)	-4,224		-4,226		-4,232	
df	46		48		44	
AIC	8,541		8,549		8,552	
BIC	8,832		8,853		8,831	
McFadden's Adj R2:	0.07		0.07		0.07	
PRE	0.46		0.46		0.46	

Significance Levels + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Notes: Standard errors in brackets.


Source: Latinbarometer.

Figure 6.2. GDP growth, 2000-2009




Source: INEGI

Figure 6.3. Inflation Rate (cumulative), 2000-2009



Source: INEGI


Figure 6.4. Unemployment Rate annual variations, 2000-2009



Source: INEGI


Figures 6.5 and 6.6 illustrate that the year 2009 showed greater negative variations in inflation, and that 2008 showed the greatest variation in the unemployment rate. It is important to consider that other years also showed important changes (for example, 2007 for the unemployment rate) but we do not have specific information. On the other hand, in the year of the presidential election of 2006, the economic condition was favourable: the annual inflation rate was nearly 4 per cent and unemployment fell 8 percentage points when compared to 2005.

Figure 6.5. SEM with Unemployment Rate



Notes: n: 4,171; AIC: 23,967; BIC: 24,024;
 Standardised coefficients and only significant coefficients.
 Source: Latinbarometer

Figure 6.6. SEM with Inflation Rate



Notes: n: 4,171; AIC: 25,774; BIC: 25,831.

Standardised coefficients and only significant coefficients.

Source: Latinbarometer

Chapter 3. Values; Attitudes and Participation

Question Wording and Coding

Control Variables

Social class (subjective) with 6 categories

People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: (6) Upper class; (5) Upper middle class; (4) Middle class; (3) Lower middle class; (2) Working class; (1) Lower class

Education: highest educational level attained

What is the highest educational level that you have attained? (Use functional equivalent of the following, in given society; if student, code highest level he/she expects to complete): (1) Inadequately completed elementary education; (2) Completed (compulsory) elementary education; (3) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type/ (compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualification; (4) Completed secondary school: technical/ vocational type/ Secondary, intermediate vocational qualification; (5) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory

type/ Secondary, intermediate general qualification; (6) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/ Full secondary, maturity level certificate; (7) Some university without degree/ Higher education - lower-level tertiary certificate; (8) University with degree/ Higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate.

Marital status

Are you currently: (1) is coded as married and living together as married; (0) divorced; separated; widowed; single/never married?

Employment status

Are you employed now or not? IF YES: About how many hours a week do you work? If more than one job: only for the main job: (1) coded as full time; part time and self-employed; (0) retired; housewife; student; unemployed; other.

Religious denomination: Catholic

Religious denomination. Do you belong to a religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one. (1) Roman Catholic; (0) Evangelical; Jehovah Witness; Jew; Mormon; Muslims; Other; Protestant; Seven Day Adventist.

Core Variables

Values

Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? (Code one answer for each description):

1. Self-direction: It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative, to do things one's own way.
2. Power: It is important to this person to be rich, to have a lot of money and expensive things.

3. Security: Living in secure surroundings is important to this person, and also to avoid anything that might be dangerous.
4. Hedonism: It is important to this person to have a good time, to “spoil” oneself.
5. Benevolence: It is important to this person to help the people nearby and to care for their well-being.
6. Achievement: Being very successful is important to this person, and to have people recognise one’s achievements.
7. Stimulation: Adventure and taking risks are important to this person, to have an exciting life
8. Conformity: It is important to this person to always behave properly, and to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
9. Universalism: Looking after the environment is important to this person and to care for nature.
10. Tradition: Tradition is important to this person, to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family.

All these variables are coded: (6) very much like me; (5) like me; (4) somewhat like me; (3) a little like me; (2) not like me; (1) not at all like me.

Attitudes

Satisfaction with financial situation of household

How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (1) is coded as completely dissatisfied; (10) completely satisfied;

Importance of Democracy

How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?

Ideology

Self-positioning on political scale

In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (1) coded as Left and (10) as Right.

Dependent Variables

Political Participation

Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or if you would never, under any circumstances, do it.

1. Signing a petition
2. Attending lawful demonstrations

All these variables were harmonised using the coding: (1) as 'have done or might do and (0) as 'would never do.

Chapter 4. Party Identification Dynamism: A Latent Class Analysis

Question wording and Coding: 2000

Female:

Gender (1) Female; (0) Male

Age:

What is your date of birth?

Political Interest:

How much interest would you say you have in politics? (4) a lot; (3) some; (2) a little; (1) none.

Ideological self-placement

In politics, people talk about “Left” and “Right”. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is “left” and 10 is “right”, where would you place yourself? 1; very left; 2, somewhat on the left; 3, center-left; 4 center-center; 5, center-right; 6; somewhat on the right; 7; very on the right.

Candidate Opinion

I am going to ask your opinion about some political parties and candidates for President. On this scale, a 0 means that your opinion is very bad and a 10 means that your opinion is very good. If you don’t have an opinion, just let me know and we will go on to the next one.

Negative Feelings towards Parties

I am going to ask your opinion about some political parties and candidates for President. On this scale, 0 means that your opinion is very bad and 10 means that your opinion is very good. If you don’t have an opinion, just let me know and we will go on to the next one.

Presidential Approval: Zedillo

In general, do you approve or disapprove of the job Ernesto Zedillo is doing as president? (INSIST) Do you approve/disapprove a lot or approve/disapprove somewhat? (5) Approve a lot; (4) somewhat approve; (3) neither approve nor disapprove; (2) disapprove somewhat; (1) disapprove a lot.

Economic Perception

In the last 12 months, would you say that the national economy has got better, got worse, or stayed the same? (INSIST) Would you say that it has got much better / worse or somewhat better / worse? (5) Much better; (4) somewhat better; (3) the same; (2) somewhat worse; (1) much worse.

Corruption Evaluation

In the last 12 months, would you say that corruption in the government has increased, decreased, or stayed the same? (INSIST). Would you say that it has increased / decreased a lot or increased / decreased somewhat? (5) increased a lot; (4) increased somewhat; (3) stayed the same; (2) decreased somewhat; (1) decreased a lot.

Security Concern

In the last 12 months, would you say that public safety in your [City/Town/Community] has got better, got worse, or stayed the same? (INSIST) Would you say that it has got much better / worse or somewhat better /worse? (5) Much better; (4) somewhat better; (3) the same; (2) somewhat worse; (1) much worse.

Religiosity

How often do you attend religious services? (5) More than once per week; (4) once per week; (3) once per month; (2) only on special occasions; (1) never.

Subjective Social Class:

Socioeconomic Level of Dwelling: (5) A&B; (4) C; (3) D; (2) E; (1) F.

Education Level

Until what grade in school did you study? (5) College or more; (4) High School; (3) Secondary/ vocational/ equivalent; (2) Primary; (1) No formal education.

Married

What is your civil status? (1) Married; (0), Single, Cohabiting, Widow, Separated/Divorced.

Employment Status

What is your principal occupation? (0) Retired, student, housewife, other; (1) employer 10 or more employees, employer fewer than 10 employees, professional, office worker/supervisor, office worker under supervision, teacher, employee in established business,

chauffer/security guard, manual laborer, salesman, nanny/domestic, farmer on collective farm, farmer, fisherman.

Subjective Income

Between all the people that live here with you, approximately how much do they make per month?

Question wording and Coding: 2006

Female

Gender (write without asking): 0) Male 1) Female

Age

How old are you?

Political Interest

How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, a little or none? (4) a lot; (3) some; (2) a little; (1) none.

Candidate Opinion

I am going to ask you your opinion about some people and institutions. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you have a very negative opinion and 10 means you have a very positive opinion, what is your opinion of...

Negative Feelings towards Parties

I am going to ask you your opinion about some people and institutions. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you have a very negative opinion and 10 means you have a very positive opinion, what is your opinion of...

Presidential Approval: Fox

In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way in which Vicente Fox is doing his job as president, [INSIST] a lot or a little? (5) Approve a lot; (4) somewhat approve; (3) neither approve nor disapprove; (2) disapprove somewhat; (1) disapprove a lot.

Ideological self-placement

In politics, would you consider yourself on the left, on the right, or in the center? (IF LEFT OR RIGHT) Very or somewhat on the left / right? (CENTER) center-left, center-right, o center-center? 1; very left; 2, somewhat on the left; 3, center-left; 4 center-center; 5, center-right; 6; somewhat on the right; 7; very on the right.

Economic Perception

Since Fox became president, would you say the national economy has got better, has got worse, or has stayed the same? (INSIST) Would you say it has got a lot [better / worse] or a little [better / worse]? (5) Much better; (4) somewhat better; (3) the same; (2) somewhat worse; (1) much worse.

Education Level

How many years of schooling have you had? (1) No schooling; (2) Incomplete elementary school and Complete elementary School; (3) Incomplete Middle School/ Technical school and Complete Middle school/Technical school; (4) Incomplete High School and Complete High School; (5) Incomplete college and Complete college or more.

Married

Marital status? (1) Married; (0) single, living with partner, widowed, divorced or separated.

Employment status

What is your occupation? (1) Manager of more than 10 employees, manager of less than 10 employees; professional, office employee/supervisor; office employee/under supervision, teacher, retail employee, chauffeur/bodyguard, manual worker/blue collar,

shopkeeper/street vendor; domestic worker, peasant on collective farm, peasant/farmer / fisherman (2) retired/pensioner, student, unemployed, housewife.

Subjective Social Class:

Socioeconomic level of household: 5) A 4) B 3) C 2) D 1) E

Religiosity

How often do you attend religious services? (5) More than once per week; (4) once per week; (3) once per month; (2) only on special occasions; (1) never.

Subjective Income

I will show you a card with different income levels. Which one would your household monthly income fall into, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other sources of income?

Criteria for classifying socioeconomic level of dwellings and neighbourhoods

Level A

Neighbourhoods with large residences, built on plots of 1000 square metres. They may have a pool, tennis court, pediment or large garden. They have a garage and three or more luxury cars, as well as private security and a guardhouse. They are located in areas with trees, paved roads and sidewalks in good condition, with underground electric cables and without mass transit. (Less than 1% of first round sample).

Level B

Neighbourhoods or blocks with large residences on plots of 500-1000 square metres, well finished and solidly built of good materials. They have a garage with new cars and a garden. This category includes luxury condominiums. Level B dwellings are located in areas with good paving and sidewalks, outfitted with above or below ground electric cables and well-kept lawns. (Less than 5% of first round sample).

Level C

Areas with townhouses or medium-sized apartments on individual lots or in condominium buildings, between 150 and 300 square metres in size. The majority have garages with an older automobile, but no garden. This category includes medium-sized homes in subsidised housing developments. Level C dwellings are located in residential zones with paved streets and sidewalks in good condition serviced by public transportation. (Approximately 10% of first round sample).

Level D

Includes company towns, public housing developments (INFONAVIT), and small homes on developments acquired with government-subsidised loans (FOVI). Spotty maintenance of buildings and individual units. Level D homes are located in zones with paved road and sidewalks in fair condition with irregular maintenance. Few green spaces and badly kept or dirty lawns. (Approximately 20% of first round sample).

Level E

Neighbourhoods of small dwellings, including unfinished homes without completed exteriors (i.e., exposed cinderblock). Dwellings are located in dirty, working class zones with poorly maintained paving and sidewalks. (Approximately 40% of first round sample).

Level F

All areas with small dwellings of precarious construction built with deficient building materials, such as plastic, wood, cardboard, fibreglass, etc. Level F zones lack some or all public services. Dwellings are located on irregular lots without pavements. Common problems include a lack of proper sewage systems, running water or a trash collection. (20-25% of first round sample).

*Mover- Stayer: PID Instability 2000***Table 6.6. Ratio Movers & Stayers, 2000**

Political Parties		M-S	PID Intensity				
			Some		Very		
1 st . Wave	PAN	27.12	29.63		22.41		
	PRI	56.73	52.69		67.69		
	PRD	16.15	17.68		9.91		
2 ^{do} . Wave	PAN	24.66	27.65		20.95		
	PRI	58.86	53.91		69.02		
	PRD	16.49	18.44		10.03		
3 rd . Wave	PAN	27.84	32.40		24.40		
	PRI	56.78	50.65		65.57		
	PRD	15.38	16.96		10.03		
4 th .Wave	PAN	36.21	42.79		28.45		
	PRI	49.14	41.48		62.02		
	PRD	14.66	15.74		9.53		
		Mover Stayer		Mover Stayer		Mover Stayer	
	PAN	69.30	0.60	61.40	6.60	31.80	20.80
	PRI	24.00	77.30	33.10	66.90	64.80	68.20
	PRD	6.70	22.10	5.50	26.50	3.40	11.00
	Total	38.63	61.37	42.01	57.99	14.28	85.73
	Entropy	0.93		0.901		0.947	
	AIC	4,648		2,714		1,338	
	BIC	4,784		2,832		1,444	

Source: The author

*Mover- Stayer: PID Instability 2006***Table 6.7. Ratio Movers & Stayers, 2006**

Political Parties		M-S	PID Intensity				
			Some		Very		
1 st . Wave	PAN	31.85	32.60		29.81		
	PRI	29.81	33.28		42.74		
	PRD	38.33	34.12		27.45		
2 ^{do} . Wave	PAN	36.09	33.00		33.88		
	PRI	29.57	28.56		39.39		
	PRD	34.34	38.45		26.73		
3 rd . Wave	PAN	36.67	37.07		34.35		
	PRI	33.16	23.96		36.80		
	PRD	30.17	38.97		28.85		
		Mover Stayer		Mover Stayer		Mover Stayer	
	PAN	15.60	35.40	23.00	36.30	16.90	32.20
	PRI	26.40	30.50	63.50	21.40	63.70	38.90
	PRD	58.00	34.10	13.40	42.20	19.40	28.90
	Total	17.72	82.29	28.15	71.85	15.39	84.61
	Entropy	0.914		0.887		0.960	
	AIC	3,144		1,913		1,223	
	BIC	3,250		2,006		1,308	

Source: The author

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